The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

Self-focused attention and depression: Self-evaluation,affect, and life stress

Recent theory and research (Smith & Greenberg, 1981; Ingram & Smith, 1984) suggest an association between self-focused attention and depression. In an attempt to clarify the nature of this relationship, two studies were undertaken. Study I demonstrated that self-focused attention (i.e., private self-consciousness) was correlated with depression but was unrelated to test anxiety. Thus, self-focused attention was a correlate of depression but not emotional difficulty in general. Further, both depression and private self-consciousness were independently associated with a negative evaluation of the self. Self-focused attention was also found to be correlated with negative mood in individuals experiencing at least some symptoms of depression but not in nondepressed persons. Study II demonstrated that self-focused attention and stressful life events were independently associated with depression. Self-focused attention did not, however, moderate the relationship between stress and depression.     

Flexible visual processing of spatial relationships

Visual processing breaks the world into parts and objects, allowing us not only to examine the pieces individually, but also to perceive the relationships among them. There is work exploring how we perceive spatial relationships within structures with existing representations, such as faces, common objects, or prototypical scenes. But strikingly, there is little work on the perceptual mechanisms that allow us to flexibly represent arbitrary spatial relationships, e.g., between objects in a novel room, or the elements within a map, graph or diagram. We describe two classes of mechanism that might allow such judgments. In the simultaneous class, both objects are selected concurrently. In contrast, we propose a sequential class, where objects are selected individually over time. We argue that this latter mechanism is more plausible even though it violates our intuitions. We demonstrate that shifts of selection do occur during spatial relationship judgments that feel simultaneous, by tracking selection with an electrophysiological correlate. We speculate that static structure across space may be encoded as a dynamic sequence across time. Flexible visual spatial relationship processing may serve as a case study of more general visual relation processing beyond space, to other dimensions such as size or numerosity.     

Evidence for long-term spatial memory in a parid

Many animals use spatial memory. Although much work has examined the accuracy of spatial memory, few studies have explicitly focused on its longevity. The importance of long-term spatial memory for foraging has been demonstrated in several cases. However, the importance of such long-term memory for all animals is unclear. In this study, we present the first evidence that a parid species (the black-capped chickadee, Poecile atricapillus) can remember the location of a single food item for at least 6 months under an associative-learning spatial memory paradigm with multiple reinforcements. We did not detect a significant difference in memory longevity between two populations of chickadees shown previously to differ in short-term spatial memory and hippocampal morphology, an area of the brain involved in spatial memory. Our study showed that small birds such as parids can maintain spatial memories for long periods, a feat shown previously only in corvids. Moreover, we were able to demonstrate this longevity within the context of only 16 repeated trials. We speculate that this ability may potentially be useful in relocating caches if reinforced by repeated visits. Future studies are necessary to test whether our results were specifically due to multiple reinforcements of the food-containing location and whether parids may have similar memory longevity during food-caching experiences in the wild.     

Identifying component-processes of executive functioning that serve as risk factors for the alcohol-aggression relation

The present investigation determined how different component-processes of executive functioning (EF) served as risk factors for intoxicated aggression. Participants were 512 (246 males and 266 females) healthy social drinkers between 21 and 35 years of age. EF was measured using the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Adult Version (BRIEF-A) that assesses nine EF components. After the consumption of either an alcohol or a placebo beverage, participants were tested on a modified version of the Taylor Aggression Paradigm in which mild electric shocks were received from, and administered to, a fictitious opponent. Aggressive behavior was operationalized as the shock intensities and durations administered to the opponent. Although a general BRIEF-A EF construct consisting of all nine components predicted intoxicated aggression, the best predictor involved one termed the Behavioral Regulation Index that comprises component processes such as inhibition, emotional control, flexible thinking, and self-monitoring.     

Two tales of functional explanation

This paper considers two ways functions figure into scientific explanations: (i) via laws—events are causally explained by subsuming those events under functional laws; and (ii) via designs—capacities are explained by specifying the functional design of a system. We argue that a proper understanding of how functions figure into design explanations of capacities makes it clear why such functions are ill-suited to figure into functional-cum-causal law explanations of events, as those explanations are typically understood. We further argue that a proper understanding of how functions enter into design explanations of capacities enables us to show why two prominent objections to functionalism in the philosophy mind—the argument from metaphysically necessary effects (Bennett, 2007; Rupert, 2006) and causal exclusion (Kim, 1993, 1998; Malcolm, 1968)—are misguided when interpreted as posing a threat to functional explanation in science across the board. If those arguments pose a threat at all, they pose it to instances of (i); however, a great number of the functional explanations we find in psychology—and the sciences generally—are instances of (ii).