What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: a defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists

A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism. We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a na?ve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.     

Convening a 407 panel for research not otherwise approvable: "Precursors to diabetes in Japanese American youth" as a case study

Subpart D of 45 CFR 46 focuses on research involving children. Section 46.407 addresses research that is not otherwise approvable. The research is not otherwise approvable because either (1) it seeks to enroll healthy children, but offers no prospect of direct benefit and entails more than minimal risk; or (2) it seeks to enroll children with a disorder or condition, but offers no prospect of direct benefit and entails more than a minor increase over minimal risk. According to 46.407, such research can be permissible if it is approved by a panel of experts. Prior to 2000, only two 407 panels had been convened, but in 2001, the Office for Human Research Protections received more than 20 protocols for 407 review. The first, entitled "Precursors to Diabetes in Japanese American Youth," serves here as a case study in human subject protections.     

Conceiving the past and future

The authors compared people's views of their histories and futures by asking them to recall and anticipate personally significant episodes. It was hypothesized and found in Study 1 that individuals spontaneously recall an affectively mixed past, containing both "highs" and "lows," whereas they anticipate homogeneously ideal futures. It was further hypothesized that people devote little thought to negative futures, and this was tested directly in Studies 2 and 3 by assessing how quickly past and likely future events came to mind. Asked to report positive and negative episodes from the past and future, participants took longer to generate future negative than positive events. Speed of recall was unaffected by the valence of past episodes. In Study 4, the response latency difference was again replicated for future events and it was demonstrated that people are slower in both generating negative future events and judging those events as likely.     

The identity function of autobiographical memory: time is on our side

Autobiographical memory plays an important role in the construction of personal identity. We review evidence of the bi-directional link between memory and identity. Individuals' current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former selves. In turn, people's current self-views are influenced by what they remember about their personal past, as well as how they recall earlier selves and episodes. People's reconstructed evaluations of memories, their perceived distance from past experiences, and the point of view of their recollections have implications for how the past affects the present. We focus on how people's constructions of themselves through time serve the function of creating a coherent--and largely favourable--view of their present selves and circumstances.     

Charpentier (1891) on the size—weight illusion

This paper offers background for an English translation of an article originally published in 1891 by Augustin Charpentier (1852–1916), as well as a summary of it. The article is frequently described as providing the first experimental evidence for the size—weight illusion. A comparison of experiments on the judged heaviness of lifted weights carried out by Weber (1834) and by Charpentier (1891) supports the view that Charpentiers work deserves priority; review of other experimental studies on the size-weight illusion in the 1890s suggests that the idea that the illusion depended on “disappointed expectations,” especially with respect to speed of lift, became dominant almost immediately following the publication of Charpentiers paper. The fate of this and other ideas, including “motor energy,” in 20th-century research on the illusion is briefly described.     

Anxiety sensitivity and the five-factor model of personality.

Relations between anxiety sensitivity (AS) and the higher-order and lower-order dimensions of the 'Big Five' model of personality were examined in 317 university students. AS was significantly associated with a number of personality domains and facets of the NEO-PI-R. Regression analyses indicated that only the higher-order domains of neuroticism and extraversion (negatively) and the lower-order N facets of anxiety and self-consciousness, significantly predicted AS. Three lower-order factors within AS were identified and were also compared to NEO-PI-R domains and facets. In a hierarchical regression, the three AS factors significantly predicted variance in a measure of panic-related anxiety after the effects of the six N facets were statistically controlled. Results are discussed in the context of previous work with a Big Three taxonomy of personality and implications for understanding the nature and possible origins of AS are outlined.