Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others

Important asymmetries between self-perception and social perception arise from the simple fact that other people's actions, judgments, and priorities sometimes differ from one's own. This leads people not only to make more dispositional inferences about others than about themselves (E. E. Jones & R. E. Nisbett, 1972) but also to see others as more susceptible to a host of cognitive and motivational biases. Although this blind spot regarding one's own biases may serve familiar self-enhancement motives, it is also a product of the phenomenological stance of naive realism. It is exacerbated, furthermore, by people's tendency to attach greater credence to their own introspections about potential influences on judgment and behavior than they attach to similar introspections by others. The authors review evidence, new and old, of this asymmetry and its underlying causes and discuss its relation to other psychological phenomena and to interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

Contraction bias in memorial quantifying judgment: does it come from a stable compressed memory representation or a dynamic adaptation process?

A common response bias in psychophysical judgments is regression toward the mean (overestimation of small and underestimation of large values, or the response contraction bias). The same bias is observed in magnitude estimation from memorized quantities. Participants estimated alphabetic interval distances between 2 letters for different levels of interletter distances. The underestimated and overestimated values and the point of least error changed, depending on the level of alphabetic distances judged; furthermore, their estimation showed a progressively increasing tendency toward the mean, rendering the estimation progressively less accurate as the estimation task was repeated. We conclude that the regression toward the mean in memorial quantifying judgment derives from a cognitive adaptation process rather than from a permanent, compressed memory representation of the stimuli. Two opposing views on the adaptive meaning of this judgment bias are discussed.     

The influence of object-image velocity change on perceived heading in minimal environments

When human observers move forward and rotate their eyes, a complex pattern of light flows across the retina. This pattern is referred to as retinal flow. A model has been proposed to explain how humans perceive their direction of self-movement (or heading) from (1) static depth, (2) direction of image motion, and (3) whether image velocity undergoes acceleration or deceleration (Wang & Cutting, 1999). However, findings from past research in which sparse or minimalist stimuli were used have suggested that not all of the information to which participants are sensitive is captured within the scope of this model. In particular it has been suggested that the magnitude or size of image velocity change may be of significance beyond simply whether image velocity could be categorized as speeding up (i.e., accelerating) or slowing down (i.e., decelerating). In two experiments, the influence of this factor on heading judgments under minimal conditions was investigated. Evidence was found in support of the idea that the rate of image velocity change can influence judgments of the direction of self-movement in minimalist conditions.     

Psychopathological correlates of contextualized images in dreams

A contextualized image is a powerful central image in a dream which provides a picture context for the dominant emotion of the dreamer. This study examined the psychopathological correlates of both dream and nightmare contextualized images in a community-based sample of 378. As predicted, mean nightmare contextualized image scores were significantly higher than mean dream scores. In addition, while dream contextualized images were unrelated to psychopathology, nightmare contextualized images were significantly associated with elevated scores on three SCL-90-R subscales and the General Symptom Distress Index.     

Visual discrimination of number without counting

Observers in this study judged which of two fields contained the greater number of spots. Spots had difference-of-Gaussian luminance profiles and could differ in contrast polarity or were of uniform luminance and could differ in size. Weber fractions for all observers except one varied little except when spots varied in size. It is suggested that the results of this and previous studies might be explained by the existence of neurons tuned for number.     

The anatomy of suicidology: a psychological science perspective on the status of suicide research. 2002 Shneidman Award Address

Suicidologists have made tremendous strides in advancing the knowledge of correlates of completed suicide and nonfatal suicidal behavior since the early 1960s. In order to move beyond the simple identification of risk factors, however, scientific suicidology needs to give greater attention to the critical role of theory in guiding inquiry and advancing the understanding of suicidal behaviors. In this article I argue the importance of theoretical grounding from the perspective of psychological science, provide examples of this perspective from my work, and discuss their implications for future research in the field.     

Attentional blink for color

Colored letters were presented by means of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP). Two letters (T1 and T2) were targets that required a speeded (T1) or delayed (T2) response. T1 was shown on half of the trials. Two tasks were performed in the experimental conditions. Task 1 required a discrimination between 2 letters (when T1 was shown) or an indication that T1 was absent. In Experiment 1, Task 2 was to detect the presence of a unique color in the RSVP stream (e.g., green in a stream of alternating red and gray). In Experiment 2, Task 2 was to report the color of the first colored letter to appear in the RSVP stream. The lag between T1 and T2 in the RSVP stream was manipulated. Accuracy of color reports in Task 2 was poor at shorter lags and improved as the lag was lengthened in both experiments, demonstrating an attentional blink for chromatic information. Theoretical implications of the results are discussed.     

Mental Health and Incarcerated Youth. I: Prevalence and Nature of Psychopathology

The incarceration of mentally ill youth is a serious problem not receiving the same attention as in adults. In this study, we examine the prevalence of psychopathology and level of behavioral symptomatology in incarcerated youth versus youth receiving community mental health services or hospitalization. We randomly recruited youth from middle South Carolina served by a local CMHC (n = 60), youth served by the state adolescent inpatient program (n = 50), and youth in the S.C. Dept. of Juvenile Justice facilities from the same region (n = 75). We used the DISC-PC 2.3 to evaluate DSM-III-R diagnoses and the CBCL and YSR to evaluate behavioral symptomatology. On the DISC, incarcerated youth had significantly higher mean number of diagnoses and symptoms than CMHC youth, but lower numbers than hospitalized youth. Level of caseness (at least one diagnosis) was 86% in hospital youth, 72% in incarcerated youth, and 60% in CMHC youth. The groups differed in CBCL mean total T, internalizing T, and externalizing T scores as well as mean YSR internalizing T scores. Our results indicate the comparability in level of psychopathology in incarcerated and community-treated populations of youth, and the need to develop diversionary programs to prevent the entry of such youth into the juvenile justice system.     

Induction with cross-classified categories

One of the main functions of categories is to allow inferences about new objects. However, most objects are cross-classified, and it is not known whether and how people combine information from these different categories in making inferences. In six experiments, food categories, which are strongly crossclassified (e.g., a bagel is both a bread and a breakfast food), were studied. For each food, the subjects were told fictitious facts (e.g., 75% of breads are subject to spoilage from Aspergillus molds) about two of the categories to which it belonged and then were asked to make an inference about the food (e.g., how likely is a bagel to be subject to spoilage from Aspergillus molds?). We found no more use of multiple categories in these cases of cross-classification than in ambiguous classification, in which it is uncertain to which category an item belongs. However, some procedural manipulations did markedly increase the use of both categories in inferences, primarily those that focused the subjects’ attention on the critical feature in both categories.