Haste makes waste,but not for all: The speed-accuracy trade-off does not apply to neurotics

ObjectivesTo examine if neurotics are the exception to the speed-accuracy rule and in fact are more accurate when making faster decisions.DesignThe study employed a laboratory-based, cross-sectional design.MethodOne hundred and ninety-six elite young cricketers completed measures of neuroticism before performing a cricket-specific computer-based decision-making task.ResultsNeuroticism significantly moderated the relationship between decision-making time and decision-making accuracy such that decreases in response time were associated with improvements in decision-making accuracy for individuals with high levels of neuroticism. Conversely, decreases in response time were associated with decrements in accuracy for individuals with low levels of neuroticism.ConclusionsThe study presents the first data that confirm that speed accuracy trade-offs do not occur across all individuals; individuals with high levels of neuroticism benefit from making faster decisions.     

SEX DIFFERENCES IN VISUAL ENCODING SKILLS: READING SYMBOLS

Written language in all cultures is composed of symbols to which sounds have been attached somewhat arbitrarily. Meanings are also attached somewhat arbitrarily to letters and groups of letters. The transformation of symbols into sounds is generally seen to be part of the reading process, though it is not clear whether it is of equal importance at all stages of competence. It is possible that, at some stages, the skilled reader may have direct access to the meaning of a word or phrase from its visual representation. There is evidence from work of Coltheart, Hull and Slater (1975) that females tend to use phonological encoding to a greater extent than males when reading. Naish (1980) found that females encoded phonologically at a faster rate than males, and suggested that this might explain why the preferred mode of access to meaning appeared to be phonological for females but visual for males.     

Erotic Education: Elaborating a Feminist and Faith‐Based Pedagogy for Experiential Learning in Religious Studies

This essay explores intersections among Jesuit, Quaker, and feminist theologies and pedagogies of social justice education in order to propose and elaborate an innovative theoretical and theological framework for experiential learning in religious studies that prioritizes relationality, called erotic education. This essay then applies the relational rationale of erotic education to interpret the author's design of a service or community‐based learning component in a course about contemporary U.S. Christian social justice movements, offered in both religiously‐affiliated and religiously‐inspired liberal arts colleges. The course case study not only chronicles the author's evolving pedagogical praxis as a feminist theologian teaching in Jesuit and Quaker institutions, but also is grounded in how the author's course embodies erotic education, that is, how specific objectives, learning practices, and assignments build and bolster relationships among students (in peer‐to‐peer small groups inside and outside the classroom) as well as among students and their community sites. In developing this framework and implementing it within this particular course, the author argues that erotic education emphasizes the naming and training of our existential desires for interpersonal relations in order to upbuild not only the individual but also the common good.     

MOTHERS' DEVELOPMENTAL TIMETABLES IN TWO CULTURAL GROUPS*

To explore differences in concepts about development, mothers in two cultural groups were interviewed to determine: (a) their developmental timetables (the ages at which they expected various skills to appear); (b) the extent to which they taught various skills before school; and (c) the extent to which they perceived several qualities, once established, as stable over time. Variables were the child's gender, the child's birth order (first or not first to begin school), and the mother's ethnic background (Australian-born or Lebanese-born). Gender and birth order showed minimal effects; ethnicity had a strong effect in areas (a) and (b) but not (c). The results bring out the content of mothers' ideas, raise questions about factors affecting this content, and point to some aspects of mothers' ideas as inter-related.     

Deduction from Uncertain Premises

We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne (1989). These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given a third statement that qualifies the likelihood of the additional premise, then the uncertainty of the conclusions they choose is systematically related to the suggested uncertainty. Experiment 2 confirms these observations in problems that omit the additional premise and qualify the first premise directly. Experiment 3 shows that the qualifying statement also affects the perceived probability of the consequent given the antecedent of the conditional. Experiment 4 investigates the effect of suggested uncertainty on the fallacies and shows that increases in uncertainty reduce the number of certain conclusions that are chosen while affirming the consequent but have no effect on denying the antecedent. We discuss our results in terms of rule theories and mental models and conclude that the latter give the most natural account of our results.     

The gist of the abnormal: Above-chance medical decision making in the blink of an eye

Very fast extraction of global structural and statistical regularities allows us to access the “gist”—the basic meaning—of real-world images in as little as 20 ms. Gist processing is central to efficient assessment and orienting in complex environments. This ability is probably based on our extensive experience with the regularities of the natural world. If that is so, would experts develop an ability to extract the gist from the artificial stimuli (e.g., medical images) with which they have extensive visual experience? Anecdotally, experts report some ability to categorize images as normal or abnormal before actually finding an abnormality. We tested the reality of this perception in two expert populations: radiologists and cytologists. Observers viewed brief (250- to 2,000-ms) presentations of medical images. The presence of abnormality was randomized across trials. The task was to rate the abnormality of an image on a 0–100 analog scale and then to attempt to localize that abnormality on a subsequent screen showing only the outline of the image. Both groups of experts had above-chance performance for detecting subtle abnormalities at all stimulus durations (cytologists d' ≈ 1.2 and radiologists d' ≈ 1), whereas the nonexpert control groups did not differ from chance (d' ≈ 0.23, d' ≈ 0.25). Furthermore, the experts’ ability to localize these abnormalities was at chance levels, suggesting that categorization was based on a global signal, and not on fortuitous attention to a localized target. It is possible that this global signal could be exploited to improve clinical performance.     

The Interaction of Three Facets of Concrete Thinking in a Game of Chance

The ratio-bias (RB) phenomenon refers to the perceived likelihood of a low-probability event as greater when it is presented in the form of larger (e.g. 10-in-100) rather than smaller (e.g. 1-in-10) numbers. According to cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), the RB effect in a game of chance in a win condition, in which drawing a red jellybean is rewarded, can be accounted for by two facets of concrete thinking, the greater comprehension (at the intuitive-experiential level) of single numbers than of ratios, and of smaller than of larger numbers. In a lose condition, in which drawing a red jellybean is punished, the assumption of a third facet of concrete thinking, the “affirmative-representation principle”, is necessary, as many participants reverse their focus of attention from the undesirable red to the desirable white jellybeans. Results supported the CEST explanation of the RB effect by demonstrating a predicted negative linear relation between the magnitude of the RB effect and the magnitude of the probability-ratios in the win condition and a positive linear relation in the lose condition. Support was also found for the associative principle of experiential processing.