Means-means-end tool choice in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): finding the limits on primates’ knowledge of tools

Most studies of animal tool use require subjects to use one object to gain access to a food reward. In many real world situations, however, animals perform more than one action in sequence to achieve their goals. Of theoretical interest is whether animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize the relationship between consecutive action sequences in which there may be one overall goal and several subgoals. Here we ask if cotton-top tamarins, a species that in captivity uses tools to solve means-end problems, can go one step further and use a sequence of tools (means) to obtain food (end). We first trained subjects to use a pulling tool to obtain a food reward. After this initial training, subjects were presented with problems in which one tool had to be used in combination with a second in order to obtain food. Subjects showed great difficulty when two tools were required to obtain the food reward. Although subjects attended to the connection between the tool and food reward, they ignored the physical connection between the two tools. After training on a two-tool problem, we presented subjects with a series of transfer tests to explore if they would generalize to new types of connections between the tools. Subjects readily transferred to new connections. Our results therefore provide the first evidence to date that tamarins can learn to solve problems involving two tools, but that they do so only with sufficient training.     

Conceptual development and conversational understanding

Children's understanding of the implications of conversation can influence their responses on tasks designed to measure conceptual development. These responses are in keeping with developmental changes in the ability to recognize and resolve ambiguity in communicative contexts, as shown, for example, in children's ability to compute "scalar implicatures". Examining steps children take to overcome difficulties in processing the relevant features of tasks and in correctly interpreting task instructions promise to illuminate mechanisms of conceptual development. We review recent research in this area, focussing on early knowledge of the appearance-reality distinction and knowledge of cosmological concepts.     

On Modal μ-Calculus and Non-Well-Founded Set Theory

A finitary characterization for non-well-founded sets with finite transitive closure is established in terms of a greatest fixpoint formula of the modal -calculus. This generalizes the standard result in the literature where a finitary modal characterization is provided only for wellfounded sets with finite transitive closure. The proof relies on the concept of automaton, leading then to new interlinks between automata theory and non-well-founded sets.     

Representation of two geometric features of the environment in the domestic chick (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Gallus gallus</Emphasis>)

We report experiments based on a novel test in domestic chicks (Gallus gallus), designed to examine the encoding of two different geometric features of an enclosed environment: relative lengths of the walls and amplitude of the corners. Chicks were trained to search for a food reward located in one corner of a parallelogram-shaped enclosure. Between trials, chicks were passively disoriented and the enclosure was rotated, making reorientation possible only on the basis of the internal spatial structure of the enclosure. In order to reorient, chicks could rely on two sources of information: the relative lengths of the walls of the enclosure (associated to their left-right sense order) and the angles subtended by walls at corners. Chicks learned the task choosing equally often the reinforced corner and its rotational equivalent. Results of tests carried out in novel enclosures, the shapes of which were chosen ad hoc (1) to induce reorientation based only on the ratio of walls lengths plus sense (rectangular enclosure), or (2) to induce reorientation based only on corner angles (rhombus-shaped enclosure), suggested that chicks encoded both features of the environment. In a third test, in which chicks faced a conflict between these geometric features (mirror parallelogram-shaped enclosure), reorientation seemed to depend on the salience of corner angles. These results shed light on the elements of the environmental geometry which control spatial reorientation, and broaden the knowledge on the geometric representation of space in animals.     

Substance P antagonists: meet the new drugs,same as the old drugs? Insights from transgenic animal models

Antidepressants that primarily target the reuptake of monoamines have been highly successful treatments. However, therapies with these drugs still have several drawbacks, namely severe side effects, delays in the onset of action, and a significant percentage of non-responders. Recently, non-peptidic antagonists of the neurokinin 1 receptor, or substance P antagonists, have emerged as a novel class of drugs with antidepressant efficacy that is comparable to current drugs, but a potentially reduced side effect profile. This review summarizes the pre-clinical evidence derived from pharmacological and transgenic animal studies that suggests an important role for the substance P/neurokinin 1 system in anxiety and depression. Also, potential mechanisms by which substance P antagonists may produce their therapeutic effects are discussed.     

Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants

Based on anticipatory looking and reactions to violations of expected events, infants have been credited with 'theory of mind' (ToM) knowledge that a person's search behaviour for an object will be guided by true or false beliefs about the object's location. However, little is known about the preconditions for looking patterns consistent with belief attribution in infants. In this study, we compared the performance of 17- to 26-month-olds on anticipatory looking in ToM tasks. The infants were either hearing or were deaf from hearing families and thus delayed in communicative experience gained from access to language and conversational input. Hearing infants significantly outperformed their deaf counterparts in anticipating the search actions of a cartoon character that held a false belief about a target-object location. By contrast, the performance of the two groups in a true belief condition did not differ significantly. These findings suggest for the first time that access to language and conversational input contributes to early ToM reasoning.     

Chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit divergent spatial memory development

Spatial cognition and memory are critical cognitive skills underlying foraging behaviors for all primates. While the emergence of these skills has been the focus of much research on human children, little is known about ontogenetic patterns shaping spatial cognition in other species. Comparative developmental studies of nonhuman apes can illuminate which aspects of human spatial development are shared with other primates, versus which aspects are unique to our lineage. Here we present three studies examining spatial memory development in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (P. paniscus). We first compared memory in a naturalistic foraging task where apes had to recall the location of resources hidden in a large outdoor enclosure with a variety of landmarks (Studies 1 and 2). We then compared older apes using a matched memory choice paradigm (Study 3). We found that chimpanzees exhibited more accurate spatial memory than bonobos across contexts, supporting predictions from these species’ different feeding ecologies. Furthermore, chimpanzees – but not bonobos – showed developmental improvements in spatial memory, indicating that bonobos exhibit cognitive paedomorphism (delays in developmental timing) in their spatial abilities relative to chimpanzees. Together, these results indicate that the development of spatial memory may differ even between closely related species. Moreover, changes in the spatial domain can emerge during nonhuman ape ontogeny, much like some changes seen in human children.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE QUESTION “WHAT IS THIS?” ON TACT-TRAINING OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN WITH AUTISM

Tact training is a common element of many habilitative programs for individuals with developmental disabilities. A commonly recommended practice is to include a supplemental question (e.g., “What is this?”) during training trials for tacts of objects. However, the supplemental question is not a defining feature of the tact relation, and prior research suggests that its inclusion might sometimes impede tact acquisition. The present study compared tact training with and without the supplemental question in terms of acquisition and maintenance. Two of 4 children with autism acquired tacts more efficiently in the object-only condition; the remaining 2 children acquired tacts more efficiently in the object + question condition. During maintenance tests in the absence of the supplemental question, all participants emitted tacts at end-of-training levels across conditions with no differential effect observed between training conditions.Key words: autism, language training, stimulus control, tacts, verbal behaviorSkinner (1957) defined the tact as a response “evoked by a particular object or event or property of an object or event” (p. 82) and considered it to be one of the most important verbal operants. Tacts are maintained by generalized social reinforcement and, thus, they are central to many social interactions. For example, the tact “That cloud looks like a horse” (under the control of a visual stimulus) could evoke a short verbal interaction about the sky or horses. The tact “My tummy hurts” (under the control of an interoceptive stimulus) could evoke soothing statements from a parent. A child who tacts “doggie” in the presence of a cat likely would evoke a correction statement from an adult, further refining two stimulus classes (i.e., dog and cat). These examples illustrate that, despite their topographical differences, the tact relations share antecedent control by a nonverbal discriminative stimulus (S^D) and are maintained by generalized social reinforcement.In habilitative programs for individuals with language impairments, autism, and intellectual disabilities, tacts often are taught for objects (e.g., ball), object features (e.g., color, size, shape), activities (e.g., jumping), prepositions (e.g., between), and emotions (e.g., sad) among others. Although conceptualized differently among therapeutic approaches, the tact relation occupies a central position in many early-intervention curricula. For example, Lovaas (2003) and Leaf and McEachin (1999) describe these relations as expressive labels and recommend that they be taught early in language training using three-dimensional objects accompanied by the supplemental questions “What is it?” or “What''s this?” Alternatively, Sundberg and Partington (1998) explicitly refer to the relation as a tact and recommend beginning instruction by including the question “What is it?” before eventually fading the question. In addition to these clinical manuals, the use of supplemental questions during tact training has appeared in some empirical studies on tact or expressive-label training (e.g., Braam & Sundberg, 1991; Coleman & Stedman, 1974), but not others (e.g., Williams & Greer, 1993). Regardless of whether tact training initially includes supplemental questions prior to response opportunities, tacts ultimately should be emitted readily under the sole control of the nonverbal S^D as well as when it happens to be accompanied by a question.Conceptually, at least four potential problems could arise from introducing supplemental questions early and consistently in tact training. First, the acquired responses might not be emitted unless the question is posed (i.e., prompt dependence). This problem would lead to few spontaneous tacts occurring outside the explicit stimulus control of the training environment. Williams and Greer (1993) compared comprehensive language training conducted under the stimulus control specified in Skinner''s (1957) taxonomy of verbal behavior to a more traditional psycholinguistic perspective with supplemental questions and instructions embedded within trials. For all three adolescents with developmental disabilities, the targets taught from the verbal behavior perspective were maintained better in natural contexts than those taught from the psycholinguistic perspective. However, because data were not reported for each individual verbal operant, it is unclear what specific impact their tact-training procedures had on the outcomes.The second potential problem is that the supplemental question might acquire intraverbal control over early responses and interfere with the acquisition of subsequent tact targets. For example, Partington, Sundberg, Newhouse, and Spengler (1994) showed that the tact repertoire of a child with autism had been hindered by prior instruction during which she was asked “What is this?” while being shown an object. The supplemental question subsequently evoked previously acquired responses and blocked the ability of new nonverbal S^Ds (i.e., objects) to evoke new responses. Partington et al. then showed that new tacts were acquired by eliminating the supplemental question from instructional trials.The third potential problem is that learners might imitate part of or the entire supplemental question prior to emitting the target response (e.g., “What is it” → “What is it … ball.”). For example, Coleman and Stedman (1974) demonstrated that a 10-year-old girl with autism imitated the question “What is this?” while being taught to label stimuli depicted in color photographs. Such an outcome results in a socially awkward tact repertoire and requires additional intervention to remedy the problem.Finally, including supplemental questions during tact training might impede skill acquisition, perhaps via a combination of the problems described earlier. Sundberg, Endicott, and Eigenheer (2000) taught sign tacts to two young children with autism who had prior difficulty acquiring tacts. In one condition, the experimenter held up an object and asked, “What is that?” In the comparison condition, the experimenter intraverbally prompted the participant to “sign [object name]” in the presence of the object. Sundberg et al. demonstrated substantially more efficient tact acquisition under the sign-prompt condition than when the question “What is that?” was included in trials; the latter condition sometimes failed to produce mastery-level responding.Teaching an entire tact repertoire while including supplemental questions (e.g., “What is it?”) during training trials could produce a learner who is able to talk about his or her environment only when asked to do so with similar questions. To the extent that this is not a therapist''s clinical goal, teaching the tact under its proper controlling variables may eliminate such problems. Of course, inclusion of supplemental questions during the early phases of language training could be faded over time such that the target tact relation is left intact prior to the end of training (Sundberg & Partington, 1998). However, the aforementioned studies have documented problems with using supplemental questions during tact training. Given the ubiquity of tact training in habilitation programs, the numerous problems that may arise when supplemental questions are included in training trials, and the limited research on the topic, further investigation is warranted. Thus, the purpose of the present study was to compare directly the rate of acquisition and subsequent maintenance of tacts taught using only a nonverbal S^D (i.e., object only) with tacts taught using a question (“What is this?”) in conjunction with the nonverbal S^D (i.e., object + question). The present study extends earlier research by examining both acquisition and maintenance and by including individuals with no prior history of formal tact training.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Upward and downward comparison in the intermediate-status group: the role of social stratification stability

This work analyses intergroup comparison choices made by intermediate-status group members. Seventy-six psychology students were categorized in an intermediate position with respect to other faculties. Stability was manipulated at three levels: stable, upwardly unstable, and downwardly unstable. Data on strength of comparison, comparison for enhancing, comparison for evaluation, and ingroup identification were collected. Results revealed that in the stable condition, participants were equally engaged in both upward and downward comparison. In the upwardly unstable condition, participants were more likely to compare themselves with the high-status group, whereas in the downwardly unstable condition, they were more likely to choose a downward comparison. In this latter condition, both downward comparison for enhancement and in-group identification were lower than in other conditions.