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51.
Harold D. Carter 《The Journal of psychology》2013,147(1):49-59
Bendig's (1) Pittsburgh Scales of Social Extraversion-Introversion (SEI) and Emotionality (Em) were translated so that they were of appropriate reading difficulty for children as well as for adults. The revised scales correlated highly (both .90) with the Pittsburgh scales, and they had high test-retest reliabilities (.92 and .89). Data from samples representing third grade to college ages were presented for the revised scales. SEI-Em correlations were nonsignificant for most subsamples, indicating that the revised SEI-Em scales are independent. Scale means were stable across ages. The revised scales should be considered as research instruments, since more representative normative data and validity data are still required. The scales should, though, facilitate developmental research in extraversion and emotionality. 相似文献
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We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology. 相似文献
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J. Adam Carter Benjamin Jarvis Katherine Rubin 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):249-263
We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth. 相似文献
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Roger I. Stanbridge Frank R. Burbach y S. Lucas Karen Carter 《Journal of Family Therapy》2003,25(2):181-204
Although research has shown the efficacy of family interventions in psychosis, there has been little research into families' own experience of services in routine clinical settings. Fifteen of the first twenty-two referrals to a Somerset Family Interventions Service agreed to take part in semi-structured interviews regarding family satisfaction and clinical outcome. High levels of engagement and satisfaction with the service were reported in spite of initial apprehension regarding family sessions. Family members thought that the sessions had helped them deal more effectively with problems and relatives' symptoms. They valued the opportunity for open discussion, developing new perspectives and problem-solving, as well as liaison/closer working with mental health services. Positive therapeutic qualities/skills (e.g. empathic, non-judgemental approach; mutually agreed goals) were highlighted. This study also indicated that successful engagement in family work requires referral at an early stage. The findings of this study, particularly those relating to the therapeutic relationship, are discussed, including their relevance for future research. 相似文献
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Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed. 相似文献
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