Personality Factors and Inhibited Career Development: Testing the Unique Contribution of Shyness

This study evaluated the hypothesis that shyness is uniquely associated with delayed development of personal resources for dealing with career tasks during the college years. In addition to shyness, the set of relevant personality factors included academic self-esteem and dysphoria. Canonical correlation and semipartial analysis were used to assess the mutual and unique variance associated with these three personality factors and a set of career development variables pertinent to college students in late adolescence. Results revealed that shyness was uniquely related with vocational self-concept crystallization and aspects of vocational maturity (e.g., attitudes toward planning), but unrelated with indexes of self and environmental exploration. Academic self-esteem was only related to vocational self-concept, while dysphoria evidenced no unique association with any career variables. Implications of the expected and unexpected findings are discussed.     

Acquisition of blood, injury, and needle fears and phobias

The origins of fear and phobia of blood, injury, and injections were investigated in a sample of 128 fearful university students. Based on Mutilation Questionnaire scores, subjects were designated as common fear, high fear, or phobic. Ss reports of their onset experiences obtained from structured interviews were categorized into one or more acquisition pathways of conditioning, vicarious observation, and information. Of the 73% of Ss who recalled one or more onset experiences, 76% reported conditioning-like events as the primary pathway with the majority reporting fear-related UCSs. Vicarious experiences were reported as primary by 20% and 3% reported information as being primary in their fear onset. Severity of fear was unrelated to the pathway by which it was acquired, to whether the onset was recalled, and if recalled, whether it was due to a single or to multiple traumatic events. Results are discussed in terms of methodological problems of memory issues and means by which data are collected.     

Book Reviews

G rünbaum , A dolf . Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis
H ollis , J ames . The Middle Passage: From Misery to Meaning in Midlife
B ertoia , J udi . Drawings from a Dying Child: Insights into Death from a Jungian Perspective
H olt , D avid . The Psychology of Carl Jung: Essays in Application and Deconstruction     

Instance-based categorization: Automatic versus intentional forms of retrieval

Two experiments are reported which attempt to disentangle the relative contribution of intentional and automatic forms of retrieval to instance-based categorization. A financial decision-making task was used in which subjects had to decide whether a bank would approve loans for a series of applicants. Experiment 1 found that categorization was sensitive to instance-specific knowledge, even when subjects had practiced using a simple rule. L. L. Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure was adapted for use in Experiment 2 to infer the relative contribution of intentional and automatic retrieval processes to categorization decisions. The results provided (1) strong evidence that intentional retrieval processes influence categorization, and (2) some preliminary evidence suggesting that automatic retrieval processes may also contribute to categorization decisions.     

A DEVELOPMENTAL DEFICIT IN LOCALIZING OBJECTS FROM VISION

Abstract— We describe a college student, A. H., with a developmental deficit in determining the location of objects from vision. The deficit is selective in that (a) localization from auditory or tactile information is intact, (b) A H reports the identity of mislocalized objects accurately, (c) visual localization errors preserve certain parameters of the target location, and (d) visual localization is severely impaired under certain stimulus conditions, but nearly intact under other conditions. These results bear on the representation and processing of location information in the visual system, and also have implications for understanding developmental dyslexia.     

On the naming of color words and color patches

Subjects can name color words faster than they can name color patches. To account for that effect, a generic model of naming is described which assumes that words access the mental lexicon directly, whereas color patches do so only indirectly via an initial imaginal or semantic representation. However, Lund (1927) reported that the naming advantage for words disappeared when all the items to be named on a page were the same (i.e., they were blocked). In the present study, three experiments are reported that were designed to provide a clearer empirical definition of Lund’s blocking effect and to ascertain the extent to which it requires a modification of the generic model. The blocked lists had 50 items arranged into 10 blocks, with each block homogeneous with respect to color. The block lengths were either all a predictable length of 5 items or they varied randomly from 1 to 9 items. The data indicated the following: (1) The blocking effect occurred even when the task required a full identification of each item, and (2) the blocking effect was confined to within-block transitions. Blocking seemed to eliminate the word advantage by allowing the subject to re-use the lexical entry used for the immediately prior item, which is consistent with the generic model.     

Demonstrative induction,old and new evidence and the accuracy of the electrostatic inverse square law

Maxwell claimed that the electrostatic inverse square law could be deduced from Cavendish's spherical condenser experiment. This is true only if the accuracy claims made by Cavendish and Maxwell are ignored, for both used the inverse square law as a premise in their analyses of experimental accuracy. By so doing, they assumed the very law the accuracy of which the Cavendish experiment was supposed to test. This paper attempts to make rational sense of this apparently circular procedure and to relate it to some variants of traditional problems concerning old and new evidence.My interest in demonstrative induction developed as the result of being given the opportunity by Joseph Pitt to comment on an earlier version of John Norton's Science and Certainty (1994) at a conference held at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I want to thank Joe and John for much stimulating discussion and John specifically for sharing his work on demonstrative induction with me. My gratitude also goes to the National Science Foundation (DIR-8920699) and Ohio State University for providing funding for a larger project of which this paper forms a part.