Working memory capacity and a notorious brain teaser: the case of the Monty Hall Dilemma

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is an intriguing example of the discrepancy between people's intuitions and normative reasoning. This study examines whether the notorious difficulty of the MHD is associated with limitations in working memory resources. Experiment 1 and 2 examined the link between MHD reasoning and working memory capacity. Experiment 3 tested the role of working memory experimentally by burdening the executive resources with a secondary task. Results showed that participants who solved the MHD correctly had a significantly higher working memory capacity than erroneous responders. Correct responding also decreased under secondary task load. Findings indicate that working memory capacity plays a key role in overcoming salient intuitions and selecting the correct switching response during MHD reasoning.     

Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement

The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed.     

Dual processing in reasoning: two systems but one reasoner

Human reasoning has been characterized as an interplay between an automatic belief-based system and a demanding logic-based reasoning system. The present study tested a fundamental claim about the nature of individual differences in reasoning and the processing demands of both systems. Participants varying in working memory capacity performed a reasoning task while their executive resources were burdened with a secondary task. Results were consistent with the dual-process claim: The executive burden hampered correct reasoning when the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, but not when beliefs cued the correct response. However, although participants with high working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans in cases of a conflict, all reasoners showed similar effects of load. The findings support the idea that there are two reasoning systems with differential processing demands, but constitute evidence against qualitative individual differences in the human reasoning machinery.     

Oral kinesthetic deficit in adults who stutter: a target-accuracy study

The current study was based on the hypothesis that chronic developmental stuttering in adults involves a deficiency in oral kinesthesia. The authors used a target-accuracy task to compare oral kinesthesia in adults who stutter (n = 17) and in normal speakers (n = 17). During the task, participants were instructed to make accurate jaw-opening movements in visual and nonvisual feedback conditions. The authors further contrasted oral movement control in a normal response time condition with that in a reaction time condition. Overall, the adults who stutter consistently made significantly less accurate and more variable movements than the control participants in the nonvisual condition, but particularly in the reaction time condition. In general, the present findings suggest that chronic developmental stuttering involves an oral kinesthetic deficiency, although without direct measures of somatosensory function, one cannot exclude a motor deficit interpretation.     

Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates vary according to individual differences in generalized control perception

This study tested the hypothesis that individual differences in generalized control perception for 43 undergraduate adults may be reflected in Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates during conversation in an interview. Control perception was assessed by means of Rotter's internal-external Locus of Control questionnaires, while Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates were computed from filmed videos of interviews consisting of a series of questions which could presumably have triggered different mental states. Pearson correlations and linear regression analyses indicated that the individual differences in Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates did not differ significantly across different questions, but that Spontaneous Eye Blink Rates measured over the entire interview correlated positively and significantly with an internal Locus of Control (r = .26). This could be interpreted as modest but corroborative evidence that a personality trait reflecting control perception may have a biological component. The possible roles of dopamine neurotransmission and frontal cortex involvement in higher cognition and Locus of Control are discussed.     

rTMS for PTSD: induced merciful oblivion or elimination of abnormal hypermnesia?

Neuroimaging studies and experimental data suggest that symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are associated with dysfunctions of neural circuits linking prefrontal cortex and the limbic system that have a role in autobiographic episodic memory. High-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been suggested to be beneficial to patients with PTSD, transiently alleviating re-experiencing as well as avoidance reactions and associated anxiety symptoms. In healthy humans, converging evidence suggests that rTMS of the right DLPFC interferes with episodic memory retrieval. Hence, we hypothesize that daily applications of rTMS in PTSD patients may reduce access to the set of autobiographical stored events, that, if re-experienced, may cause the overt PTSD symptoms.     

Does Duration of Deregulated Religious Markets Affect Church Attendance? Evidence from 26 Religious Markets in Europe and North America Between 1981 and 2006

This study tests the deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory in 26 European and Northern American countries by examining differences in religious involvement between and within countries. The deregulation hypothesis, which is assumed to be universally valid, predicts that religious involvement is higher in deregulated religious markets. Moreover, countries having deregulated religious markets for a longer period of time are supposed to have higher levels of involvement. Therefore, we test the duration hypothesis. This test is important, as it also has been argued that it may take time for deregulation to have an effect on religious involvement. Multilevel analysis on the stacked European and World Value Surveys of 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006 show that deregulation fosters church attendance, but duration of deregulation does not increase church attendance. Although the deregulation hypothesis cannot be rejected, we find that modernization corrodes church attendance to a larger extent than deregulation can stimulate church attendance.     

Race and sex in a lifetime

Abstract: The Jungian analysts who participated in the writing of this paper 1 explicitly or implicitly address issues of social and political stasis, retrogression and change via their particular usages of the concept of the transcendent function. Singer proposes that the transcendent function is a term that is usually applied to individuals in whom symbolic material appears that suggests the reconciling of opposites, leading to psycho‐spiritual growth. He also looks at the notion of the transcendent function as it can appear in a similar way in the collective psyche. In addition, he gives attention to the opposite phenomenon—what might be called the descendent function—as it appears in the collective psyche and its leadership, wherein symbolic material can create the division of groups of people into opposites, mobilizing destructive rather than transformative experience. Meador states that Jung designated the mediating process of assimilating unconscious images and ideas into consciousness as the transcendent function. Just as this synthesizing process can produce insight in the individual, it can also be applied to changes in collective society. Embedded collective assumptions tend to shift when opposites collide, as they did, for example, in the turmoils of the 1960s. Her contribution focuses on the recent revolution in racial and sexual attitudes as the product of a collective struggle between certain ingrained social mores from the past and conflicting new points of view. Samuels’ conclusion is that the concept of the transcendent function has little value with respect to political problems. His contribution focuses on: (i) The limitations of using ideas (such as the transcendent function) derived from analysis with individuals in furtherance of an understanding of social and political phenomena. (ii) The specific problem of a lack of credible psycho‐political models for social progress and regress—he argues that the transcendent function is not useful in this regard. (iii) The question of political aggression, violence and conflict in society is explored from the standpoint of the transcendent function so as to investigate its possible role in the management of political conflict. Samuels severely criticizes what he terms ‘triangulation’ and ‘hyper‐reflection’ on the part of analysts who engage with political debates and issues. (iv) Leadership is examined from the standpoint of the transcendent function which, again, does not seem pertinent. Rather, new discoveries in family psychology about the role of the father have greater possibilities as a basis for new thinking about leadership.