Below the Age of Consent: Influences on Moral and Legal Judgments of Adult–Adolescent Sexual Relationships1

Sexual age‐of‐consent violations involving adult–adolescent relationships (AARs) are sometimes viewed with ambivalence by the media and are infrequently prosecuted. Two studies conducted in Britain (where the age of consent is 16) examined influences on disapproval of minimally presented AARs between a 14‐year‐old and a 30‐year‐old. In Study 1, AARs involving an older man were seen as more harmful and objectionable than those involving an older woman. A second study on a jury‐eligible adult population replicated Study 1's gender effects, and also found a difference between legal knowledge and personal belief that the older person had committed a crime. Gender effects in both studies were mediated by perceived harm and emotions.     

A year of unprecedented progress in Down syndrome basic research

The years 2006 and 2007 saw the publication of three new and different approaches to prevention or amelioration of Down syndrome effects on the brain and cognition. We describe the animal model systems that were critical to this progress, review these independent breakthrough studies, and discuss the implications for therapeutic approaches suggested by each.     

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts.     

The big picture: Writing psychology into the history of the human sciences

The grand narratives which once gave order and readability to histories, of science and of the human sciences are widely rejected in current historiography, and historians focus on detailed studies of scientific knowledge and activity in particular contexts. How, then, are synthetic general histories, accessible to the non-specialist, to be written? This paper, designed as an open-ended discussion, reflects on the business of writing about psychology in a general history of the human sciences. It considers three large topics: reflexivity, and the situation in the human sciences where “man” is both subject and object; the boundary-less identity of the human sciences and hence the need to express values in delimiting the content of the field; and the long-standing debate about what sort of “science” is appropriate for knowledge of human beings. The conclusion turns to “the quest” as a narrative form. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A social identity model of riot diffusion: From injustice to empowerment in the 2011 London riots

Previous research has shown that riots spread across multiple locations, but has not explained underlying psychological processes. We examined rioting in three locations during the August 2011 disorders in England to test a social identity model of riot diffusion. We triangulated multiple sources to construct a narrative of events; and we analysed interviews with 68 participants to examine experiences. In line with the model, we found evidence for two pathways of influence: “cognitive” and “strategic”. For some participants, previous rioting was highly self-relevant, and shared identity was the basis of their subsequent involvement. For others, previous rioting was empowering because it demonstrated the vulnerability of a common enemy (the police). In each location, interaction dynamics mediated the link between initial perceptions and collective action. The utility of this social identity approach is that it is able to account for both the boundaries and the sequence of urban riot diffusion.