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Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
295.
Christoph Kelp 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):287-292
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing
a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical
propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining
a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge. 相似文献
296.
Ram Neta 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):3-17
In his volume reflective knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers an account of knowledge, an argument against internalist foundationalism,
and a solution to the problem of easy knowledge. This paper offers challenges to Sosa on each of those three things. 相似文献
297.
Marya Schechtman 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):65-79
Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity.
Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose
personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my
comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated
than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal
identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that
the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features
of memory that must be part of a complete account. 相似文献
298.
Clare Batty 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):161-174
Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In this paper, I consider the question: does human olfactory experience represents objects as thus and so? If we take visual experience as the paradigm of how experience can achieve object representation, we might think that the answer to this question is no. I argue that olfactory experience does indeed represent objects—just not in a way that is easily read from the dominant visual case. 相似文献
299.
Karl Schafer 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(1):1-15
In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil
Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given
in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance
of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results
he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion
of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions. 相似文献
300.
David Blumenfeld 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(3):311-319
This essay critically examines Alfred R. Mele’s attempt to solve a problem for libertarianism that he calls the problem of
present luck. Many have thought that the traditional libertarian belief in basically free acts (where the latter are any free
A-ings that occur at times at which the past up to that time and the laws of nature are consistent with the agent’s not A-ing
at that time) entail that the acts are due to luck at the time of the act (present luck) rather than to the kind of agent control required for genuinely free, morally responsible
action. While libertarians frequently have tried to rebut the claim that basically free acts are due to present luck, Mele
argues for the daring thesis that they should embrace present luck rather than try to explain it away. His strategy is to
argue that the assumption of present luck in the decisions of very young children (or “little agents”) does not preclude us
from attributing to them a small amount of moral responsibility and that this makes it possible to conceive of moral development
as a gradual process in which as the frequency of the indeterministically caused free actions increases, the agents take on
greater and greater moral responsibility. In this paper I give several possible reconstructions of Mele’s argument and analyze
in detail why none of them succeeds. 相似文献