Can we imagine how objects look from other viewpoints?

Many psychologists who study cognition believe that perception achieves object-centered representations that make it possible to extract representations of how the object would appear from differing viewpoints. Others believe we can achieve representations of how an object would appear by a process of visualization or mental rotation. We report experiments in which the subject tries to imagine how three-dimensional novel wire objects would appear from positions other than the one they are in. Subjects are unable to perform this task unless they make use of strategies that circumvent the process of visualization. It is suggested that the linear increase in time required to succeed in mental rotation tasks as a function of the angular discrepancy between the figures compared is the result of increasing difficulty rather than of the time required for rotation.     

Eye movement as a cue to figure motion in anorthoscopic perception

When a figure moves behind a narrow aperture in an opaque surface, if it is perceived as a figure, its shape will often appear distorted. Under such anorthoscopic conditions, the speed or direction of the object's motion is ambiguous. However, when the observer simultaneously tracks a moving target, a figure is always perceived, and its precise shape is a function of the speed or direction of tracking. The figure is seen as moving with the speed or in the direction of the target. Thus, it is argued that eye movement serves as a cue to the figure's motion, which, in turn, determines its perceived length or orientation.     

Alternative solutions to kinetic stimulus transformations

It has been assumed that certain stimulus transformations lead directly to depth effects, that is, that such transformations are the necessary and sufficient conditions for kinetically generated depth perception. An alternative is to view such perception as the preferred solution to the problem posed by the transforming stimulus as to what even in the world is producing that transformation. In several experiments it is shown that when other solutions are supportable by the stimulus, those same transformations will no longer lead to depth perception. These other solutions become preferred on the basis of rejection of certain coincidental features of the stimulus that otherwise would have to be accepted were the kinetic depth solution to be maintained. The findings are interpreted as challenging any theory that perception is simply the direct result of stimulation or of extraction of stimulus information and as supporting the Helmkoltzian rule of perception as a construction of the most reasonable representation.     

The effect of knowledge of reversibility on the reversibility of ambiguous figures

The role of knowledge of the reversibility of reversible figures was tested in four experiments. Two ambiguous figures, the vase-face figure and a depth-reversing pyramid-hallway figure were shown to high school students. In the Uninformed condition, subjects were not told that the figures were reversible. A sampling procedure was used in which subjects reported what they perceived at 5-sec intervals. Viewing durations of up to 3 min were used, and approximately half of all subjects did not reverse at all during the uninformed condition, whereas virtually all subjects reversed quickly and frequently once they knew that the figures were reversible. These results are not consistent with neural fatigue models of perceptual reversal.     

Size constancy in children: a new interpretation

Existing evidence indicates that there are differences between children and adults in size constancy when observation distances are large. Findings are reported which suggest that this phenomenon is based on a difference in the accessing of proximal stimulus information, which, in the case of size, refers to visual angle subtended. Age differences were found when a traditional size constancy task was used, but these differences disappeared when all the comparison objects subtended the same visual angle. Since this finding demonstrates that young children can make accurate size matches, it is suggested that the underconstancy previously reported is not necessarily the result of children's inability to use fully certain cues to distance. Rather, the findings suggest that children access proximal stimulus information more spontaneously than do adults.     

A test of the tau-dot hypothesis of braking control in the real world

A controlled experiment used instrumented vehicles in a real-world driving task to compare D. N. Lee's (1976) tau-dot hypothesis of braking control with an alternative based on the direct estimation and control of ideal deceleration (T. Yates, M. Harris, & P. Rock, 2004). Drivers braked to stop as closely as possible to a visual target from different starting speeds and times-to-contact. The data provided little support for the tau-dot hypothesis, and analysis suggested that braking in the real world is better explained by a direct deceleration strategy.