Generic language use reveals domain differences in young children's expectations about animal and artifact categories

The goal of the present study was to explore domain differences in young children's expectations about the structure of animal and artifact categories. We examined 5-year-olds’ and adults’ use of category-referring generic noun phrases (e.g., “Birds fly”) about novel animals and artifacts. The same stimuli served as both animals and artifacts; thus, stimuli were perceptually identical across domains, and domain was indicated exclusively by language. Results revealed systematic domain differences: children and adults produced more generic utterances when items were described as animals than artifacts. Because the stimuli were novel and lacking perceptual cues to domain, these findings must be attributed to higher-order expectations about animal and artifact categories. Overall, results indicate that by age 5, children are able to make knowledge-based domain distinctions between animals and artifacts that may be rooted in beliefs about the coherence and homogeneity of categories within these domains.     

Interrogating p-values

This article is a discussion of a paper by Greg Francis for a special issue edited by E.J. Wagenmakers.     

Effects of generic language on category content and structure

We hypothesized that generic noun phrases (“Bears climb trees”) would provide important input to children’s developing concepts. In three experiments, four-year-olds and adults learned a series of facts about a novel animal category, in one of three wording conditions: generic (e.g., “Zarpies hate ice cream”), specific–label (e.g., “This zarpie hates ice cream”), or no-label (e.g., “This hates ice cream”). Participants completed a battery of tasks assessing the extent to which they linked the category to the properties expressed, and the extent to which they treated the category as constituting an essentialized kind. As predicted, for adults, generics training resulted in tighter category–property links and more category essentialism than both the specific-label and no-label training. Children also showed effects of generic wording, though the effects were weaker and required more extensive input. We discuss the implications for language-thought relations, and for the acquisition of essentialized categories.     

Children,Object Value,and Persuasion

We argue that, contrary to standard views of development, children understand the world in terms of hidden, nonobvious structure. We review research showing that early in childhood, items are not understood strictly in terms of the features that present themselves in the immediate “here‐and‐now,” but rather are thought to have a hidden reality. We illustrate with two related but distinct examples: category essentialism, and attention to object history. We discuss the implications of each of these capacities for how children determine object value. Across a broad range of object types (natural and artifactual, real and virtual, durable and consumable), an item is evaluated very differently, depending on inferred qualities and context. In this way, children's early‐emerging conceptual frameworks influence how objects attain both psychological and monetary value, and may have important implications for which messages children find most persuasive.     

The generative basis of natural number concepts

Number concepts must support arithmetic inference. Using this principle, it can be argued that the integer concept of exactly ONE is a necessary part of the psychological foundations of number, as is the notion of the exact equality - that is, perfect substitutability. The inability to support reasoning involving exact equality is a shortcoming in current theories about the development of numerical reasoning. A simple innate basis for the natural number concepts can be proposed that embodies the arithmetic principle, supports exact equality and also enables computational compatibility with real- or rational-valued mental magnitudes.     

A developmental examination of the conceptual structure of animal, artifact, and human social categories across two cultural contexts

Previous research indicates that the ontological status that adults attribute to categories varies systematically by domain. For example, adults view distinctions between different animal species as natural and objective, but view distinctions between different kinds of furniture as more conventionalized and subjective. The present work (N = 435; ages 5-18) examined the effects of domain, age, and cultural context on beliefs about the naturalness vs. conventionality of categories. Results demonstrate that young children, like adults, view animal categories as natural kinds, but artifact categories as more conventionalized. For human social categories (gender and race), beliefs about naturalness and conventionality were predicted by interactions between cultural context and age. Implications for the origins of social categories and theories of conceptual development will be discussed.     

Preschoolers' counting: principles before skill

Three- to 5-year-old children participated in one of 4 counting experiments. On the assumption that performance demands can mask the young child's implicit knowledge of the counting principles, 3 separate experiments assessed a child's ability to detect errors in a puppet's application of the one-one, stable-order and cardinal count principles. In a fourth experiment children counted in different conditions designed to vary performance demands. Since children in the errror-detection experiments did not have to do the counting, we predicted excellent performance even on set sizes beyond the range a young child counts accurately. That they did well on these experiments supports the view that errors in counting—at least for set sizes up to 20—reflect performance demands and not the absence of implicit knowledge of the counting principles. In the final experiment, where children did the counting themselves, set size did affect their success. So did some variations in conditions, the most difficult of which was the one where children had to count 3-dimensional objects which were under a plexiglass cover. We expected that this condition would interfere with the child's tendency to point and touch objects in order to keep separate items which have been counted from those which have not been counted.     

Carrot-Eaters and Creature-Believers: The Effects of Lexicalization on Children's Inferences About SocialCategories

This article examines how language affects children's inferences about novel social categories. We hypothesized that lexicalization (using a noun label to refer to someone who possesses a certain property) would influence children's inferences about other people. Specifically, we hypothesized that when a property is lexicalized, it is thought to be more stable over time and over contexts. One hundred fifteen children (5- and 7-year-olds) learned about a characteristic of a hypothetical person (e.g., "Rose eats a lot of carrots"). Half the children were told a noun label for each character (e.g., "She is a carrot-eater"), whereas half heard a verbal predicate (e.g., "She eats carrots whenever she can"). The children judged characteristics as significantly more stable over time and over contexts when the characteristics were referred to by a noun than when they were referred to by a verbal predicate. Lexicalization (in the form of a noun) provides important information to children regarding the stability of personal characteristics.