Accuracy, confidence, and calibration: how young children and adults assess credibility

Do children and adults use the same cues to judge whether someone is a reliable source of information? In 4 experiments, we investigated whether children (ages 5 and 6) and adults used information regarding accuracy, confidence, and calibration (i.e., how well an informant's confidence predicts the likelihood of being correct) to judge informants' credibility. We found that both children and adults used information about confidence and accuracy to judge credibility; however, only adults used information about informants' calibration. Adults discredited informants who exhibited poor calibration, but children did not. Requiring adult participants to complete a secondary task while evaluating informants' credibility impaired their ability to make use of calibration information. Thus, children and adults may differ in how they infer credibility because of the cognitive demands of using calibration.     

The role of system-justification motivation, group status and system threat in directing support for hate crimes legislation

We examine factors that explain variability in attitudes toward hate crimes legislation. We find that one's posture toward the current social system directs the conditions under which characteristics of hate crimes exert the most influence. System-justification motivation is negatively related to support for hate crimes legislation (Studies 1-3). This relation is partially mediated by perceptions of harm from hate crimes. Specifically, when hate crimes target low-status groups, system-justification motivation is negatively related to perceived harm and support for hate crimes legislation. Attitudes are unaffected when high-status groups are targeted. The status of the group targeted, perceptions of hate crimes as representative of the status quo, and temporarily enhanced feelings of system threat moderate this relation (Studies 2-4).     

Pragmatic enrichment: beyond Gricean rational reconstruction – a response to Mandy Simons

It has been claimed that pragmatic effects that arise in embedded clauses pose a problem for the Gricean reasoning procedure. I maintain, however, that the real issue these phenomena raise for Grice, as he himself acknowledged, is their violation of his saying/implicating distinction. While these effects can be accounted for by Gricean reasoning, which Mandy Simons clearly demonstrates, there is no way round this latter problem other than a major revision of Grice’s notion of ‘saying’ and hence of the saying/implicating distinction.     

What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function.     

Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction

Most people working on linguistic meaning or communication assume that semantics and pragmatics are distinct domains, yet there is still little consensus on how the distinction is to be drawn. The position defended in this paper is that the semantics/pragmatics distinction holds between (context-invariant) encoded linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Two other ‘minimalist’ positions on semantics are explored and found wanting: Kent Bach’s view that there is a narrow semantic notion of context which is responsible for providing semantic values for a small number of indexicals, and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore’s view that semantics includes the provision of values for all indexicals, even though these depend on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Finally, some implications are considered for the favoured semantics/pragmatics distinction of the fact that there are linguistic elements (lexical and syntactic) which do not contribute to truth-conditional content but rather provide guidance on pragmatic inference.     

The development of collective remembering

This essay outlines a sociocultural, developmental approach to collective memory. This work is grounded in Halbwachs' (1950/1980) theory of collective memory and in recent prospective studies of collective remembering within families from early childhood through adolescence. The claim is that the basic process of collective remembering is present from the earliest conversations about the past between parents and children, but it is not until adolescence that collective memory is informed by family stories and by history. There are both positive and negative consequences of collective remembering as a function of the nature of the collective. In conclusion, researchers are urged to broaden their view of the collective in their studies of autobiographical and collective memory.     

Trust,social categories,and individuals: The case of gender

While the cooperate vs. defect choice in the prisoner's dilemma is not an appropriate paradigm for the study of trust and trusting behavior, the play vs. not play choiceis. We show that femalesas a category are more trusted to cooperate — by both male and female judges — than males. Yet neither male nor female judges use gender to predict cooperation from particular individuals (trust) or as a criterion for choosing to play (trusting behavior) when they have the option of not playing particular prisoner's dilemma games. Further, in our experimental context, female and male did not differ in their cooperation rates. We speculate (a) that subjects' generalized expectations are a response to gender-based role differences outside the laboratory, (b) that subjects' failure to make individual-by-individual discriminations by gender is a response to the fact that the experimental context made such natural-world roles irrelevant, and (c) that our findings about the irrelevance of genderper se in trusting relationships will be true for other social categoriesper se.The research reported in this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation grant SES-9008157 to Orbell and Dawes; any opinions, conclusions or recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Pamela Ferrara played an important role in administering all stages of the experiments; Jean Stockard gave us a helpful methodological and substantive critique; and Debbie Elvin, Tom Morikawa, Matthew Mulford, and Catherine Shatto each helped at several stages of the paper.