Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Objective self-awareness,standards of evaluation,and moral behavior

In a performance setting, subjects were given an opportunity to cheat without fear of detection on puzzle problems. Subjects were led to believe that successful performance was due to ability in some conditions, but to luck in other conditions. In fact, most of the problems were insolvable, so that success was impossible without cheating. Self-awareness was induced in half the subjects by having them sit in front of a mirror and listen to a tape recording of their own voice as they worked on the puzzle problems; the remaining subjects were not exposed to a mirror and listened to a tape of someone else's voice as they worked on the problems. It was predicted that cheating frequency would be higher under ability attribution conditions than under luck attribution conditions, and that this effect of performance attribution would be greater among self-aware subjects than among non-self-aware subjects. Results confirmed these hypotheses. Discussion centered on the differential use of morality and competence standards for behavior when in a state of self-awareness.     

Self-control of smoking—II effects of cue salience and source of delay imposition on the effectiveness of training under increasing delay

Imposed increasing delay of cigarette puffs has been shown to facilitate smoking inhibition. Hypothetical mechanisms involved (frustration extinction or rehearsal of coping responses) imply that increased temptation cue salience and decreased degree of external control in increasing delay training, should facilitate smoking inhibition. After three pre-test delay tolerance trials, all subjects were cued to pace their smoking in an increasing sequence of delay. During treatment the cigarette temptation cues were either visible or hidden. Delays were either self-imposed but cued by the experimenter or the delays were physically imposed by the experimenter. Post-test consisted of three delay tolerance trials. Pre-test to post-test improvement was significantly facilitated by cue salience and reduced external control. No significant interaction effects were obtained. Cue salience significantly reduced the self-reported aversiveness and GSRs during self-control trials. Implications for treatment were advanced.     

The effects of feature necessity and extrinsicity on gradedness of category membership and class inclusion relations*

Two theories of differences among natural language categories in graded membership and strength of class inclusion are contrasted. The two sets of hypotheses tested were: (1) that categories represented by features which many people believe to be necessary would have less graded memberships, and stronger class inclusion, than those represented by features which few people believe to be necessary, and (2) that categories which people believe are represented primarily by intrinsic features (i.e. features that are true of an entity in isolation; see Barr & Caplan, 1987) would have less graded structures, and stronger class inclusion, than those which people believe are represented primarily by extrinsic features (i.e. features representing relations between an entity and other entities). The findings suggest that feature necessity and feature extrinsicity have independent effects on gradedness of category membership and on class inclusion.     

Experience and backswing movement time variability : A short note concerning a serendipitous observation

Decreased variability of both response outcome and movement kinematics is generally thought to be a characteristic of skilled performance. This note reports an apparently paradoxical case in which expertise is associated with greater variability of an aspect of movement kinematics. The relative variability of backswing and downswing duration (standard deviation as a percent of movement time) was assessed for experienced and novice field hockey players performing a drive of an approaching ball. The experienced group exhibited higher relative variability of backswing duration than the novice group. It is argued that this variability is functional (in the sense that greater backswing duration variability is associated with superior task performance) and may result from the joint effects of players visually controlling movement during its execution (Bootsma 1988) and the experienced subjects' earlier pick-up of relevant information for visual control (cf. Abernethy and Russell 1987).     

Children's explanations for self‐presentational behaviour

Previous research has underestimated children's capacity to understand the self‐presentational behaviour of other people. We argue from recent research in mental‐state understanding that 8‐year‐olds should be able to attribute self‐presentational motives in order to explain others' behaviour. In the present study, children aged 6 to 11 years heard stories involving emotion‐masking displays and were then asked to explain the motivations for those displays. Results supported our prediction. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.