The Development of Global and Local Processing: A Comparison of Children to Adults

In light of the adult model of a hemispheric asymmetry of global and local processing, we compared children (M _age = 8.4 years) to adults in a global-local reaction time (RT) paradigm. Hierarchical designs (large shapes made of small shapes) were presented randomly to each visual field, and participants were instructed to identify either the global or the local level in each of two blocks. We obtained evidence of a global-local processing asymmetry, with stronger effects for children than for adults. In both children and adults, responses were faster and more accurate for global identification in the right hemisphere and for local identification in the left hemisphere. Similarly, a significant asymmetry of global and local interference was obtained in children but not in adults. Interference reflects the RT cost of conflicting information at the nonattended level. For example, local interference indicates the degree to which inconsistency at the local level slows global identification. Stronger evidence for lateralized processing in children is discussed within the framework of increasing interhemispheric transfer. That is, as interhemispheric transfer increases, cost of presentation to the nonpreferred hemisphere (e.g., local identification in the right hemisphere) is reduced.     

Oculomotor atypicalities in Developmental Coordination Disorder

Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) fail to acquire adequate motor skill, yet surprisingly little is known about the oculomotor system in DCD. Successful completion of motor tasks is supported by accurate visual feedback. The purpose of this study was to determine whether any oculomotor differences can distinguish between children with and without a motor impairment. Using eye tracking technology, visual fixation, smooth pursuit, and pro‐ and anti‐saccade performance were assessed in 77 children that formed three groups: children with DCD (aged 7–10), chronologically age (CA) matched peers, and a motor‐match (MM) group (aged 4–7). Pursuit gain and response preparation in the pro‐ and anti‐saccade tasks were comparable across groups. Compared to age controls, children with DCD had deficits in maintaining engagement in the fixation and pursuit tasks, and made more anti‐saccade errors. The two typically developing groups performed similarly, except on the fast speed smooth pursuit and antisaccade tasks, where the CA group outperformed the younger MM group. The findings suggest that children with DCD have problems with saccadic inhibition and maintaining attention on a visual target. Developmental patterns were evident in the typically developing groups, suggesting that the pursuit system and cognitive control develop with age. This study adds to the literature by being the first to systematically identify specific oculomotor differences between children with and without a motor impairment. Further examination of oculomotor control may help to identify underlying processes contributing to DCD. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/NinXa2KlB4M . [Correction added on 27 January 2017, after first online publication: The video abstract link was added.]     

Do reasoning limitations undermine discourse?

Why does discourse so often seem shallow, with people arguing past one another more than with one another? Might contributing causes be individual and logical rather than only dialogical? We consider here whether there exist errors in reasoning that could be particularly damaging in their effects on argumentive discourse. In particular, we examine implications for discourse of two such errors – explanation as a replacement for evidence and neglecting the likelihood of multiple causes contributing to an outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, we show these errors to be prevalent in a cross section of adults, as well as samples of community college students and young adolescents, with minimal age-related improvement. They also occur, although less frequently, among a sample of highly educated adults, and in Study 3, we examine their role in the discourse of college-educated adults. We point finally to evidence that these individual reasoning errors are potentially addressable through education.