Picture memory: How the action schema affects retention

When an action scene is viewed, an action schema guides the formation of an episodic representation. Within episodic memory, items of high relevance to the theme of the action schema are represented in a prototypical form closely connected to the action theme. In contrast, items of low relevance are represented in detail but their representation is unconnected to that of the action. The action schema is used as a retrieval framework for both recalling and recognizing whether or not an item was depicted in a scene (i.e., item presence), but is not used for recognition of figurative detail (i.e., item appearance). Four experiments confirmed these hypotheses. Children, aged 7- and 9-years, and adults organized pictured scenes around themes from action schemata. The appearance of high relevant items was recognized poorly, while their presence was recalled well. Memory for the presence of high relevant items surpassed that for low relevant items even when recognition of item names was assessed. Conversely, the appearance of low relevant items was recognized accurately, but memory for their presence was difficult to retrieve.     

CREATION AND EVOLUTION: ANOTHER ROUND IN AN ANCIENT STRUGGLE

Abstract. Creation and evolution were historic allies against eternalism. However, Darwinism seemed to undercut cosmological theism and human dignity, and modern reconcilers of evolution and theology have not convinced opponents that they can preserve these concerns. Creationists find divine handiwork in natural order and freedom in human uniqueness. For them, even entropy and continuity of kinds are emblematic of the unity of nature and the needfulness of salvation. Anti-evolutionists' impatience and frustration are not well answered by dogmatic or mythicized science. Neither is creation well served by reduction to merely empiric facts. Because creationism and evolutionism rest on the unabstractable categories of contingency and necessity, neither will disappear.     

Homelessness as psychological trauma. Broadening perspectives.

Most mental health literature on homelessness has focused on characteristics that may be risk factors for homelessness. The authors of this article argue that homelessness itself is a risk factor for emotional disorder and use the construct of psychological trauma--focusing on social disaffiliation and learned helplessness--to understand the potential effects of homelessness. Psychological trauma is likely among homeless individuals and families for three reasons. (a) The sudden or gradual loss of one's home can be a stressor of sufficient severity to produce symptoms of psychological trauma. (b) The conditions of shelter life may produce trauma symptoms. (c) Many homeless people--particularly women--become homeless after experiencing physical and sexual abuse and consequent psychological trauma. Research suggests that negative psychological responses to traumatic events can be prevented or mitigated by a supportive and empowering posttrauma environment. The implications of trauma theory for improving the psychosocial conditions of homeless people are discussed.     

Social perspective-taking and teacher ratings of peer interaction in hyperactive boys

Hyperactive and matched control boys at two age levels were compared on teacher ratings of peer interaction and three measures of social perspective-taking. The teachers' ratings of peer interaction discriminated between the hyperactive children and their controls. In addition, a significant interaction effect indicated that teachers rated the older hyperactive group as more deviant with peers than both their younger hyperactive counterparts and their age-matched controls. In a structured laboratory setting, the hyperactive children did not differ from control children on the three measures of social perspective-taking. The perspective-taking measures did, however, show differences across age groups. Implications for treatment are examined.The research reported in this paper is based on master's thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences of the University of Pittsburgh by the first author. The authors are indebted to Dr. C. Keith Conners for his assistance in recruiting hyperactive subjects and to Drs. Alex Siegel and Carl Barenboim for their critical evaluations regarding this investigation. Appreciation is expressed to the staff, teachers, parents, and students of the Forest Grove Elementary School for their cooperation.     

Across-reinforcement blocking effects in a mediational test of the CS's general signaling property

Rats received Pavlovian aversive (shock) conditioning in which white noise was established for independent groups as a CS+, CSo, or CS−. Then, in an easy (light-dark) T-maze discrimination, the CS was presented either immediately following choice (Locus 1) or at the food cup in the goal (Locus 3), contingent upon either a food-reinforced (right) or nonreinforced (wrong) response. When presented at Locus 3, the CS+ facilitated and the CS− retarded learning for CS/right subjects, with these effects being exactly reversed but somewhat less pronounced for CS/wrong subjects. However, when the CS was presented at Locus 1, the CS+ and CS− effects for both response contingencies were attenuated. These findings oppose an interpretation of the CS's function as a general cue or transformed signal for the presence or absence of the new appetitive reinforcer and argue instead for across-reinforcement blocking effects: By signaling in the presence of food reinforcement an outcome (safety or shock) which is consonant with or discrepant from the “good” outcome obtained, the CS− blocks (retards) and the CS+ counterblocks (enhances) the association of food reinforcement and the S^D; conversely, in the presence of nonreinforcement (a “bad” outcome), the CS− counterblocks and the CS+ blocks inhibitory conditioning to the S^Δ. As in Kamin's (1968) original research, such effects are attenuated when the CS is presented early in the compound, distal to the reinforcer.     

Children's attention to stimulus components with variation in relative salience of components and degree of stimulus integration

A total of 400 children at ages 5, 9, and 12 years were given a component selection task with stimuli differing in color and shape. Relative salience of these two stimulus components was manipulated across subjects in two ways: the standard shapes and colors from previous studies were compared with standard shapes in fluorescent colors, and the latter materials were compared with nonsense shapes in fluorescent colors. While fluorescence of color had little effect, the replacement of standard shapes with nonsense figures caused attention to be redirected from shape to color as the primary cue for learning. This effect was more pronounced at age 9 than at age 5. Apparently there is a greater tendency for older than for younger children to withdraw attention from a normally dominant component such as shape, when it is advantageous to adopt another feature such as color as the primary functional cue. An additional variable was integration of components (color within shape vs color as background for shape). Integration produced generally greater attention to color but did not affect the general pattern of salience effects.     

The cheating and intention of a partner as determinants of evaluative decisions among juvenile offenders

Male juvenile offenders were asked to evaluate the work of an experimental partner (confederate) who completed a work task four times. The work partner cheated on two trials and did not cheat on two trials while working for a charity (one cheat and one noncheat trial) or for selfish gain (one cheat and one noncheat trial). It was found that subjects rated the work done on cheating trials lower than work done on noncheating trials. In addition, subjects shared less reward money on cheating trials relative to noncheating trials. However, the intentions of the confederate, defined as the reward recipient, failed to affect subjects' judgments. These results were described as supporting previous studies which have indicated that delinquents fail to take account of others' intentions when making moral judgments.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.