Positive Emotions Speed Recovery from the Cardiovascular Sequelae of Negative Emotions

Two studies tested the hypothesis that certain positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. In Study 1, 60 subjects (Ss) viewed an initial fear-eliciting film, and were randomly assigned to view a secondary film that elicited: (a) contentment; (b) amusement; (c) neutrality; or (d) sadness. Compared to Ss who viewed the neutral and sad secondary films, those who viewed the positive films exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. In Study 2, 72 Ss viewed a film known to elicit sadness. Fifty Ss spontaneously smiled at least once while viewing this film. Compared to Ss who did not smile, those who smiled exhibited more rapid returns to pre-film levels of cardiovascular activation. We discuss these findings in terms of emotion theory and possible health-promoting functions of positive emotions.     

Vicario's illusion of sloping steps reexamined

If a few parallel horizontal rows of dots are set diagonally, like steps, across the visual field, the inner rows appear not to be horizontal but sloping up to one side; the effect holds as long as the vertical distances between the rows do not exceed a given visual angle. This illusion, described by Vicario in 1978, was never explained. An experiment is reported in which the illusion was still visible at row separations well in excess of the spatial limits originally considered, provided the stimulus elements were enlarged. The maximum illusion was obtained for length ratios (interrow distance to size of dots) identical to those which have been shown to produce the largest effects in a number of illusions of area and length. This suggests that Vicario's illusion is similar to other illusions of extent, and that it can be explained by a neural extent-coding model.     

The influence of only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences

We report an eye movement experiment investigating the influence of the focus operator only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences. Paterson, Liversedge, and Underwood (1999) found that readers were garden pathed by "short" reduced relative clause sentences containing the focus operator only . They argued that due to thematic differences between "short" and "long" relative clause sentences, garden path effect might not occur when "long" reduced relative clause sentences are read. Eye-tracking data show that garden path effects found during initial processing of the disambiguating verb of "long" reduced sentences without only were absent or delayed in the case of counterparts with only . We discuss our results in terms of current theories of sentence processing.     

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk.

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.     

On Making and Keeping Promises

Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.