Depressive symptoms are associated with unrealistic negative predictions of future life events

This study examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and bias in the prediction of future life events. Responding to internet announcements, 153 participants varying widely in self-reported depression symptom severity estimated the probability of 40 events occurring over the succeeding 30 days. After the 30-day period, participants reported which events occurred. Optimistic/pessimistic biases were related to level of depressive symptoms. A non-significant optimistic bias characterized participants with low depressive symptoms whereas a significant pessimistic bias characterized participants with high depressive symptoms. Those reporting mild symptoms did not exhibit a systematic pessimistic or optimistic bias. General imprecision in predictions for undesirable events was associated with depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that depression is associated with pessimistic bias rather than accuracy in judgment.     

Editorial: Animal Metaphors

Social dominance theory (SDT) suggests that prejudice legitimizes and maintains the existing social hierarchy. Consistent with an SDT explanation, it was predicted that (a) perceptions of threat to the existing social hierarchy and (b) social dominance orientation (SDO) would be related to stronger beliefs in stereotypes and "legitimizing myths." In addition, this analysis tests SDT's predicted interaction between perceptions of threat and SDO. It was predicted that for high SDO individuals the relation between perceptions of intergroup threat and the endorsement of legitimizing myths would be stronger than for low SDO individuals. These predictions were examined using a national probability General Social Survey archival data set. The results were consistent with our predictions and suggest that social dominance theory compliments and augments other threat theories of prejudice.     

One Desire Too Many1

I defend the widely-held view that acting with moral worth does not require a desire for rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their argument employs. Consequently, the argument provides no reason to doubt the popular view that a desire for rightness as such is no part of virtue. I conclude by suggesting that a family of worries about merely accidentally right action presuppose one side of the recent debate about objectivism and perspectivism concerning moral rightness.