The Effect of Erroneous Knowledge of Results on Skill Acquisition when Augmented Information is Redundant

Even though it can be shown that verbal knowledge of results (KR) is redundant with sensory feedback for learning certain motor skills, such findings do not eliminate the possibility that when KR is available it influences underlying learning processes. In order to examine the function of KR more closely, two experiments were designed in which the subjects received conflicting information about their own sensory feedback and the KR presented by the experimenter. In Experiment 1, two erroneous-KR groups, a correct-KR group, and a no-KR group performed 150 practice trials on a simple anticipation timing task and then performed three no-KR retention tests of 30 trials each following intervals of 10 minutes, 1 week, and 1 month. The results supported previous findings that providing correct KR is redundant in anticipation tasks. However, learning was influenced by KR as subjects performed according to the erroneous KR information, thereby ignoring their sensory feedback even after a 1-month interval. In Experiment 2, subjects practised a more complex striking response for the anticipation task for 75 trials and then performed no-KR retention trials either immediately, or 1 day or 1 week later. One of the groups received erroneous KR after 50 practice trials with correct KR. The results confirmed and extended those from Experiment 1, as erroneous KR, even after initial practice with correct KR, influenced retention performance. These results indicate that although KR provides information that is not needed to learn anticipation timing skills, this augmented verbal information is a dominant source of information that influences underlying cognitive processes involved in learning motor skills.     

SELF-ABANDONMENT AND SELF-DENIAL Quietism, Calvinism, and the Prospect of Hell

Self‐abandonment and self‐denial are, respectively, Catholic and hyper‐Calvinist analogues of each other. Roughly, each requires the surrendering of a person to God's will and providence through faith, hope, and love. Should the self‐abandoning/self‐denying individual accept his or her own damnation if that be God's will? This article, which is virtually alone in discussing the Catholic and Reformed Protestant traditions together, answers “No.” The unqualified self‐abandonment present in quietism and the radical self‐denial of Samuel Hopkins are perverse and irrational responses to the prospect of hell because they run counter to the Christian's deepest need to spend eternity with God. However, a qualified self‐abandonment is intellectually defensible and offers a viable Christian piety.     

Rawlsian Civic Education: Political not Minimal

abstract In Political Liberalism and later work John Rawls has recast his theory of justice as fairness in political terms. In order to illustrate the advantages of a liberal political approach to justice over liberal non‐political ones, Rawls discusses what kind of education might be required for future citizens of pluralistic and democratic societies. He advocates a rather minimal conception of civic education that he claims to derive from political liberalism. One group of authors has sided with Rawls’ political perspective and educational proposal, holding that a political approach and educational requirements that are not too demanding would have the advantage of being acceptable to a wide range of citizens with different religious, moral and philosophical perspectives. A second group of authors have criticized Rawls’ educational recommendations, holding that the production of a just society composed of reasonable citizens requires a more demanding civic education and, hence, that the political approach is not viable. The present paper argues that both groups are only partially right, and that there is a third way to understand civic education in Rawlsian terms, a way that is political but not minimal.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.