La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions (Rhetoric 1, 2, 8). On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples (viz., historical example, comparison, and fable). Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be made by the orator, whereas historical examples are not (Rhetoric 2, 20, 2s). The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by induction reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term induction preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, induction gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which induction applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term (M) meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples (like real inductions) produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof.

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La classification des exemples d'après Aristote (Rhétorique 2,20)

     

Evaluation of a comprehensive inpatient rational-emotive therapy program: Some preliminary data

Mental health practitioners are faced with a profound challenge surrounding the prevalence of adult mental disorders, the need for inpatient treatment programs, and the costs of such programs. This paper describes the development of an adult inpatient psychiatric program based on Rational-Emotive Therapy. Specific elements of this program are described briefly, and preliminary outcome data presented on 372 patients. Concerns and future directions are also discussed. Development of adult inpatient psychiatric programs based on Rational-Emotive Therapy would appear to be one method of providing effective and cost-efficient treatment within the current cost-containment atmosphere of psychiatric treatment.Dr. Nottingham is an Associate Fellow and Approved Supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy. He is in independent practice with Germantown Psychological Associates, P.C. and is Director of Psychology at Parkwood Hospital, Olive Branch, MS. Dr. Neimeyer is an Associate Professor and Director of Clinical Training in the Department of Psychology of Memphis State University. He has written extensively in the areas of cognitive and constructivist psychotherapy, and is co-editor of the International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology.The authors would like to thank Kat Bagley, Joe Grillo, Ivey Bright, Brooke Bensen, Cathy Michas, Brad Barris, Lori Passmore, David Wilkins, and Dee Conrad for their help with data collection. Additionally, without the assistance and support of the Parkwood Hospital administration and staff, neither this treatment program nor this paper could have been developed.Portions of this paper based on earlier data analyses were presented at the Mississippi Psychological Association Convention, September, 1990. This research was conducted at Parkwood Hospital.     

Diathesis-stress models of psychopathology: A quantitative genetic perspective

When genetics is considered in diathesis-stress models of psychopathology, it is often assumed that heredity provides the diathesis and environmental factors are responsible for the stressor. We discuss two quantitative genetic models relevant to the diathesis-stress construct. One model focuses on genotype-environment interaction, which is the usual way in which genetic influence is represented in diathesis-stress models. A second model—genotype-environment correlation—provides an alternative that represents both genetic and environmental influences relevant to the development of psychopathology. Implications of these models for clinical research are discussed.     

Relevance reviewed: The case of argumentum ad hominem

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions.     

WHEN PREDICTIONS CREATE REALITY:

Abstract —Nelson and Dunlosky (Psychological Science, July 1991) reported that subjects making judgments of learning (JOLs) can be extremely ac curate at predicting subsequent recall performance on a paired-associate task when the JOL task is delayed for a short while after study They argued that this result Is surprising given the results of earlier research, as well as their own current experiment, indicating that JOLs are quite inaccurate when made immediately after study We note that the delayed-JOL procedure used by Nelson and Dunlosky invited covert recall practice (which was reported by their subjects) Retrieval practice is a welt-known determinant of subsequent recall Accordingly, Nelson and Dunlosky s findings can be explained by the simple assumption that people base delayed JOLs on an assessment of retrieval success which in turn influences their retrieval success on the subsequent recall test     

Parallel distributed processing and neuropsychology: A neural network model of Wisconsin card sorting and verbal fluency

Neural networks can be used as a tool in the explanation of neuropsychological data. Using the Hebbian Learning Rule and other such principles as competition and modifiable interlevel feedback, researchers have successfully modeled a widely used neuropsychological test, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. One of these models is reviewed here and extended to a qualitative analysis of how verbal fluency might be modeled, which demonstrates the importance of accounting for the attentional components of both tests. Difficulties remain in programming sequential cognitive processes within a parallel distributed processing (PDP) framework and integrating exceedingly complex neuropsychological tests such as Proverbs. PDP neural network methodology offers neuropsychologists co-validation procedures within narrowly defined areas of reliability and validity.     

Computerized assessment in neuropsychology: A review of tests and test batteries

This article contains detailed reviews of 13 computerized neuropsychological and performance test batteries and six stand-alone computer tests. Tasks found on these instruments are described and tables illustrate which batteries employ which measures. In addition to issues of reliability and validity, special considerations apply to computerized assessment. These issues are discussed and readers are provided information to help them assess computerized tests in relation to their particular clinical and research needs. Since many computerized tests were developed as performance assessment tools, the relationship between performance and neuropsychological assessment is examined.