Goal complexes: Integrating achievement goals as standards and self-attributed motives as reasons underlying goal pursuit

Goal complexes, which are formed by pairing standards of competence strivings with their underlying reasons, are essential to an understanding of achievement goal regulation. This paper examines goal complexes that cross other-approach and other-avoidance goals with the approach-avoidance dimensions of Big Three motives as underlying reasons. 220 undergraduates participated in Study 1 which developed and validated the Self-Attributed Motive Scale to measure hope of success, fear of failure, hope of affiliation, fear of rejection, hope of power, and fear of loss of power. Additionally, 235 undergraduates participated in Study 2 where goal complexes were created by crossing the motive items developed in Study 1 with other-approach and other-avoidance goals. The predictive utility of the resultant goal complexes was examined in relation to positive well-being (positive learning-related emotions and engagement), negative well-being (negative learning-related emotions and burnout), and academic buoyancy. The contributions of the studies to the self-attributed motive and goal complex literatures are discussed.

     

Presupposition processing declines with age

Cognitive Processing - The present study investigates the processing of presuppositions across the life span and extends the findings of the only available study on presupposition processing and...     

Evaluating clinical significance: Incorporating robust statistics with normative comparison tests

The purpose of this study was to evaluate a modified test of equivalence for conducting normative comparisons when distribution shapes are non‐normal and variances are unequal. A Monte Carlo study was used to compare the empirical Type I error rates and power of the proposed Schuirmann–Yuen test of equivalence, which utilizes trimmed means, with that of the previously recommended Schuirmann and Schuirmann–Welch tests of equivalence when the assumptions of normality and variance homogeneity are satisfied, as well as when they are not satisfied. The empirical Type I error rates of the Schuirmann–Yuen were much closer to the nominal α level than those of the Schuirmann or Schuirmann–Welch tests, and the power of the Schuirmann–Yuen was substantially greater than that of the Schuirmann or Schuirmann–Welch tests when distributions were skewed or outliers were present. The Schuirmann–Yuen test is recommended for assessing clinical significance with normative comparisons.     

A Basic Bivariate Structure of Personality Attributes Evident Across Nine Languages

Here, two studies seek to characterize a parsimonious common‐denominator personality structure with optimal cross‐cultural replicability. Personality differences are observed in all human populations and cultures, but lexicons for personality attributes contain so many distinctions that parsimony is lacking. Models stipulating the most important attributes have been formulated by experts or by empirical studies drawing on experience in a very limited range of cultures. Factor analyses of personality lexicons of nine languages of diverse provenance (Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Turkish, Greek, Polish, Hungarian, Maasai, and Senoufo) were examined, and their common structure was compared to that of several prominent models in psychology. A parsimonious bivariate model showed evidence of substantial convergence and ubiquity across cultures. Analyses involving key markers of these dimensions in English indicate that they are broad dimensions involving the overlapping content of the interpersonal circumplex, models of communion and agency, and morality/warmth and competence. These “Big Two” dimensions—Social Self‐Regulation and Dynamism—provide a common‐denominator model involving the two most crucial axes of personality variation, ubiquitous across cultures. The Big Two might serve as an umbrella model serving to link diverse theoretical models and associated research literatures.     

The effect of psychological stress and expectation on auditory perception: A signal detection analysis

Both psychological stress and predictive signals relating to expected sensory input are believed to influence perception, an influence which, when disrupted, may contribute to the generation of auditory hallucinations. The effect of stress and semantic expectation on auditory perception was therefore examined in healthy participants using an auditory signal detection task requiring the detection of speech from within white noise. Trait anxiety was found to predict the extent to which stress influenced response bias, resulting in more anxious participants adopting a more liberal criterion, and therefore experiencing more false positives, when under stress. While semantic expectation was found to increase sensitivity, its presence also generated a shift in response bias towards reporting a signal, suggesting that the erroneous perception of speech became more likely. These findings provide a potential cognitive mechanism that may explain the impact of stress on hallucination‐proneness, by suggesting that stress has the tendency to alter response bias in highly anxious individuals. These results also provide support for the idea that top‐down processes such as those relating to semantic expectation may contribute to the generation of auditory hallucinations.     

“Jung Has Always Seemed Like an Old Friend”: An Encounter with Claire Dunne

This article provides an account of a visit with the author of a very popular Jungian book, Carl Jung: Wounded Healer of the Soul, in which the interviewer relates his conversation with Claire Dunne about her relationship with Jung and how she got involved in Jungian psychology. She also discusses the workshops she has done around the world and the fascinating dreams she has had of Jung.     

On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism

According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled account of how her criteria of doxastic freedom are criteria of freedom. In two recent papers, Steup (Synthese 188:145–163, 2012; Dialectica 65(4):559–576, 2011) takes up the first disjunct of the challenge by proposing that even though beliefs cannot be practically intentional, they can be epistemically intentional. McHugh (McHugh forthcoming) instead takes up the second disjunct by proposing that the freedom of belief be modelled not on the freedom of action but on the freedom of intention. I argue that both Steup’s and McHugh’s strategies are problematic.