On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.     

Wittgenstein: “I can’t believe…or rather can’t believe it yet”

This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.     

Spirituality,spiritual sensibility and human growth

While notions of spirituality, spiritual experience and spiritual development seem much neglected in the literature of modern analytical philosophy, such terminology continues to be current in both common usage and religious contexts. This author has previously taken issue with some recent attempts to develop (educational and other professional) conceptions of spirituality and spiritual experience as substantially independent of religious attachment. Notwithstanding this, the present paper considers whether such a ‘religiously-untethered’ notion of spirituality, spiritual experience or sensibility might yet be sustainable in terms of two key criteria: (1) as a capacity for non-instrumental perspectives on, or interpretations of, the world of ordinary experience; and (2) as a corresponding capacity to identify goals and values that transcend or are not reducible to the meeting of immediate natural or material—either individual or social—needs.     

Omnipotence

If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘omnipotence,’ increasingly complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved.     

Surviving death: how to refute termination theses

When deciding how ‘death’ should be defined, it is helpful to consider cases in which vital functions are restored to an organism long after those vital functions have ceased. Here I consider whether such restoration cases can be used to refute termination theses. Focusing largely on the termination thesis applied to human animals (the view that when human animals die they cease to exist), I develop a line of argument from the possibility of human restoration to the conclusion that in many actual cases, human animals continue to exist after they die. The line of reasoning developed here can be extended to show that other organisms survive death in many actual cases. This line of reasoning improves on other arguments that have been offered against termination theses. And if my argument regarding human animals surviving death is successful, then assuming that human persons are animals, we can also conclude that human persons in many actual cases continue to exist after death.     

On the rationality of positive mysterianism

In Paradox in Christian Theology (2007) I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation of theological paradox and considering whether my proposal is indeed a form of “positive mysterianism” as Tuggy defines the term, I address the two main criticisms raised in Tuggy’s paper: first, that the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility cannot bear the weight required by my defense of paradox; and second, that my proposed model is afflicted with epistemic instability. I conclude that Tuggy has failed to show that a mysterian stance with respect to paradoxical Christian doctrines is in principle unreasonable, unnatural, or unsustainable.     

Against Hamri’s argument for the ultimate ground of being

In this paper, I reply to Hamri's (Int J Philos Relig.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9625-2, 2017) new kind of cosmological argument for the ultimate ground of being by blocking the argument in more than one place.     

Reaching Our 75th Anniversary: A History of AGPA 1992–2017—Part 3

This is the third in a series of three articles that chronicle and examine the 25-year history of the American Group Psychotherapy Association from 1992 to 2017. This time period has been divided into three naturally occurring eras: the pre–9/11 era, the 9/11 era, and the post–9/11 era. To permit meaningful comparisons across time, an effort has been made to contextualize events and to examine each era using the same set of seven facets/dimensions: (1) mission(s); (2) structure and administration; (3) jewels in the crown; (4) membership; (5) financial health; (6) organizational tensions and family dynamics; (7) relationships with the outside world.

This account while based on objective data, like all such histories, is inherently subjective. Choices about which specific events to chronicle, as well as their meaning and significance, are filtered through the authors’ perceptual and conceptual lenses.

This third section focuses on the post–9/11 era.     

Reaching Our 75th Anniversary: A History of AGPA 1992–2017—Part 2

This is the second in a series of three articles that chronicle and examine the 25-year history of the American Group Psychotherapy Association from 1992 to 2017. This time period has been divided into three naturally occurring eras: the pre–9/11 era, the 9/11 era, and the post–9/11 era. To permit meaningful comparisons across time, an effort has been made to contextualize events and to examine each era using the same set of seven facets/dimensions: (1) mission(s); (2) structure and administration; (3) jewels in the crown; (4) membership; (5) financial health; (6) organizational tensions and family dynamics; and (7) relationships with the outside world.

This account, while based on objective data, like all such histories, is inherently subjective. Choices about which specific events to chronicle, as well as their meaning and significance, are filtered through the authors’ perceptual and conceptual lenses.

This second section focuses on the 9/11 era.