The world may not be just for you but you'd better not say it: On the social value of expressing personal belief in a just world

The expression of personal belief in a just world (PBJW) has been discussed as a criterion of excellence in social judgments. In four experimental studies we hypothesized and found that targets who express high versus low PBJW are judged as more: (i) deserving of success and (ii) suited to socio-organizational expectations. The four studies show that suitability to socio-organizational expectations mediates the relation between PBJW expressed and success deservingness, even after controlling for judgments of likability, status, rationality, optimism, and targets as victims. Studies 2 and 3 show this pattern occurs regardless of target performance appraisal. Study 4 indicates that expressing low PBJW decreases the social value of individuals, but expressing high PBJW does not increase it. We discuss the impact of PBJW expression on people's lives, namely on upward social mobility of members of low-status groups, and the influence of the negativity bias on judgments caused by PBJW expression.     

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Scholarly efforts to understand conspiracy theories have grown significantly in recent years, and there is now a broad and interdisciplinary literature. In reviewing this body of work, we ask three specific questions. First, what factors are associated with conspiracy beliefs? Our review of the literature shows that conspiracy beliefs result from a range of psychological, political, and social factors. Next, how are conspiracy theories communicated? Here, we explain how conspiracy theories are shared among individuals and spread through traditional and social media platforms. Next, what are the societal risks and rewards associated with conspiracy theories? By focusing on politics and science, we argue that conspiracy theories do more harm than good. We conclude by suggesting several promising avenues for future research.     

Justice for whom, exactly? Beliefs in justice for the self and various others

The present studies examine why people think the world is more just to themselves than to others generally. Beliefs in justice for the self were uniquely associated with psychological adjustment, consistent with the theoretical motive to believe in justice for the self (Studies 1 and 2). However, this "justice motive" did not appear to affect the relative strength of justice beliefs. Instead, self-other differences in justice beliefs appeared to reflect objective assessments of the justice received by various demographics. Undergraduates believed the world to be more just to themselves than to others but not their undergraduate peers specifically (Study 1). Participants of both genders believed the world to be more just to men, and to themselves, than to women (Study 2). Women did not exempt themselves individually from injustice but believed, similar to men, that undergraduate women receive as much justice as men (Study 3).     

Acutely induced anxiety increases negative interpretations of events in a closed-circuit television monitoring task

In two experiments we measured the effects of 7.5% CO₂ inhalation on the interpretation of video footage recorded on closed circuit television (CCTV). As predicted, inhalation of 7.5% CO₂ was associated with increases in physiological and subjective correlates of anxiety compared with inhalation of medical air (placebo). Importantly, when in the 7.5% CO₂ condition, participants reported the increased presence of suspicious activity compared with placebo (Experiment 1), a finding that was replicated and extended (Experiment 2) with no concomitant increase in the reporting of the presence of positive activity. These findings support previous work on interpretative bias in anxiety but are novel in terms of how the anxiety was elicited, the nature of the interpretative bias, and the ecological validity of the task.     

The establishment of auditory–visual equivalence classes with a go/no-go successive matching-to-sample procedure

The current study evaluated the effectiveness of a go/no-go successive matching-to-sample procedure (S-MTS) to establish auditory–visual equivalence classes with college students. A sample and a comparison were presented, one at a time, in the same location. During training, after an auditory stimulus was presented, a green box appeared in the center of the screen for participants to touch to produce the comparison. Touching the visual comparison that was related to the auditory sample (e.g., A1B1) produced points, while touching or refraining from touching an unrelated comparison (e.g., A1B2) produced no consequences. Following AB/AC training, participants were tested on untrained relations (i.e., BA/CA and BC/CB), as well as tacting and sorting. During BA/CA relations tests, after touching the visual sample, the auditory stimulus was presented along with a white box for participants to respond. During BC/CB relations tests, after touching the visual sample, a visual comparison appeared. Across 2 experiments, all participants met emergence criterion for untrained relations and for sorting. Additionally, 14 out of 24 participants tacted all visual stimuli correctly. Results suggest the auditory–visual S-MTS procedure is an effective alternative to simultaneous MTS for establishing conditional relations and auditory-visual equivalence classes.     

Aesthetic practices and normativity

What should we do, aesthetically speaking, and why? Any adequate theory of aesthetic normativity must distinguish reasons internal and external to aesthetic practices. This structural distinction is necessary in order to reconcile our interest in aesthetic correctness with our interest in aesthetic value. I consider three case studies—score compliance in musical performance, the look of a mowed lawn, and literary interpretation—to show that facts about the correct actions to perform and the correct attitudes to have are explained by norms internal to a practice. Practice-internal norms, however, cannot settle the distinct question of which practices we have reason to opt into. When it comes to the source of aesthetic normativity—in virtue of what aesthetic value is genuinely reason-giving—I argue that existing accounts, which appeal to pleasure or achievement, are inadequate. The only practice-external aesthetic requirement is a generic one to opt into at least some aesthetic practices.