Precision and power grip priming by observed grasping

The coupling of hand grasping stimuli and the subsequent grasp execution was explored in normal participants. Participants were asked to respond with their right- or left-hand to the accuracy of an observed (dynamic) grasp while they were holding precision or power grasp response devices in their hands (e.g., precision device/right-hand; power device/left-hand). The observed hand was making either accurate or inaccurate precision or power grasps and participants signalled the accuracy of the observed grip by making one or other response depending on instructions. Responses were made faster when they matched the observed grip type. The two grasp types differed in their sensitivity to the end-state (i.e., accuracy) of the observed grip. The end-state influenced the power grasp congruency effect more than the precision grasp effect when the observed hand was performing the grasp without any goal object (Experiments 1 and 2). However, the end-state also influenced the precision grip congruency effect (Experiment 3) when the action was object-directed. The data are interpreted as behavioural evidence of the automatic imitation coding of the observed actions. The study suggests that, in goal-oriented imitation coding, the context of an action (e.g., being object-directed) is more important factor in coding precision grips than power grips.     

A bottleneck in face identification: repetition priming from flanker images

There is evidence that face processing is capacity-limited in distractor interference tasks and in tasks requiring overt recognition memory. We examined whether capacity limits for faces can be observed with a more sensitive measure of visual processing, by measuring repetition priming of flanker faces that were presented alongside a face or a nonface target. In Experiment 1, we found identity priming for face flankers, by measuring repetition priming across a change in image, during task-relevant nonface processing, but not during the processing of a concurrently-presented face target. Experiment 2 showed perceptual priming of the flanker faces, across identical images at prime and test, when they were presented alongside a face target. In a third Experiment, all of these effects were replicated by measuring identity priming and perceptual priming within the same task. Overall, these results imply that face processing is capacity limited, such that only a single face can be identified at one time. Merely attending to a target face appears sufficient to trigger these capacity limits, thereby extinguishing identification of a second face in the display, although our results demonstrate that the additional face remains at least subject to superficial image processing.     

Beliefs and data on the relationship between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony

Two studies concerned with consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony were conducted. In Study 1 potential jurors indicated the degree to which they considered that various witness on‐stand behaviours indicated testimonial accuracy. Witness statements that were inconsistent with previous statements were considered to be the strongest indicators of inaccuracy. Study 2 examined the relationship between consistency and accuracy of testimony. Witnesses viewed a film of a robbery and were interviewed twice (2 weeks apart) about the crime in a 4 (interview format)×2 (interview occasion) design. Regardless of whether consistency was operationalised in terms of direct contradictions between interviews, or degree of agreement on detail across interviews, no more than 10% of the variance in overall accuracy rate was explained by any individual measure. Number of contradictions and overall agreement between interviews did, however, make additive contributions to prediction of overall accuracy. Also, higher correlations between contradiction‐based consistency measures and interview two accuracy rate were detected. Neither consistency nor accuracy for specific testimonial dimensions were predictive of accuracy on the other dimensions, or overall accuracy. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Should A “Gibsonian Neuroscience” Look Like? Introduction to the Special Issue

Abstract

Ecological psychology has been criticized for ignoring the brain in its theory formation. In recent years, however, a number of researchers have started asking ecologically-inspired questions about the ways in which not only the embodied activity of the organism in its environment, but also the particulars of the organism's nervous system matter. This work has typically appeared in neuroscience journals, thereby potentially escaping the attention of ecological psychologists. The current article introduces a Special Issue of Ecological Psychology that aims to correct this problem. This issue brings together one empirical and six theoretical articles that develop ideas about the contributions of the nervous system to perception-action. We briefly review each of the articles, identify common themes, and point out the surprising variety in theoretical positions. It is hoped that this Special Issue will help guide discussions amongst ecological psychologists and (ecological) neuroscientists as they confront the question “What should a ‘Gibsonian neuroscience’ look like?”     

Mindful social inferences: Decentering decreases hostile attributions

While research indicates that mindfulness can benefit individual well-being, less is known about its potential impact in the interpersonal domain. In the current research, we examined whether a central element of mindfulness—decentering—decreases hostile attributions in ambiguous social situations. We hypothesized that decentering from experiences—observing and considering them as mental events that arise and disappear—hampers the development of hostile attributions. A series of three laboratory studies, two of which were high-powered and pre-registered, demonstrated that decentering decreases hostile attribution in response to ambiguous social scenarios as compared to immersion instructions, and as compared to baseline. Additionally, the results suggest that decentering may be particularly beneficial in reducing hostile attribution bias among participants high in trait rumination. The current findings provide initial insights into the effect of decentering on the development of hostile attribution bias, and the association between mindfulness and interpersonal responses more generally.     

Tool-use and the left hemisphere: What is lost in ideomotor apraxia?

Impaired tool related action in ideomotor apraxia is normally ascribed to loss of sensorimotor memories for habitual actions (engrams), but this account has not been tested against a hypothesis of a general deficit in representation of hand-object spatial relationships. Rapid reaching for familiar tools was compared with reaching for abstract objects in apraxic patients (N = 9) and in a control group with right hemisphere posterior stroke. The apraxic patients alone showed an impairment in rotating the wrist to correctly grasp an inverted tool but not when inverting the hand to avoid a barrier and grasp an abstract object, and the severity of the impairment in tool reaching correlated with pantomime of tool-use. A second experiment with two apraxic patients tested whether barrier avoidance was simply less spatially demanding than reaching for a tool. However, the patient with damage limited to the inferior parietal lobe still showed a selective problem for tools. These results demonstrate that some apraxic patients are selectively impaired in their interaction with familiar tools, and this cannot be explained by the demands of the task on postural or spatial representation. However, traditional engram theory cannot account for associated problems with imitation of novel actions nor the absence of any correlated deficit in recognition of the methods of grasp of common tools. A revised theory is presented which follows the dorsal and ventral streams model ( Milner & Goodale, 2008) and proposes preservation of motor control by the dorsal stream but impaired modulating input to it from the conceptual systems of the left temporal lobe.     

The illness perception questionnaire: A new method for assessing the cognitive representation of illness

Abstract

The Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ) is a new method for assessing cognitive representations of illness. The IPQ is a theoretically derived measure comprising five scales that provides information about the five components that have been found to underlie the cognitive representation of illness. The five scales assess identity - the symptoms the patient associates with the illness, cause - personal ideas about aetiology, time-line - the perceived duration of the illness, consequences - expected effects and outcome and cure control - how one controls or recovers from the illness. The IPQ has a specific number of core items but allows the user to add items for particular patient groups or health threats. Data is presented supporting the reliability and validity of the IPQ scales in different chronic illness populations.     

Cultural and learning differences in the Judd illusion

In the present study, we examined whether individual differences in the perception of illusory Judd drawings point to variability in the pickup of informational variables. Two sources for these individual differences were addressed: culture and learning. East Asian (n = 24) and Western (n = 24) participants made perceptual judgments of the midpoint of the shaft of various Judd figures in a pretest–practice–posttest design. During practice, half of the participants received feedback about the actual midpoint after each trial, while the other half did not receive feedback. The results showed differences among perceivers of different cultures in judging the midpoints of the shafts of Judd figures, particularly with respect to their propensity to improve perceptual accuracy after repeated practice and feedback. For most participants, changes in illusory bias as a consequence of learning were shown to reflect either a change in what informational variable they exploited or a rescaling or calibration of the perception to the informational variable. However, the individual differences in illusory bias related to culture could not be unequivocally attributed to either of these perceptual-learning processes.     

Bernstein's Theory of Movement Behavior: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance

The traditional concept of cerebral dominance relies for support on the facts of handedness and the association of propositional speech with the leading hemisphere. This is regarded as evidence for specialization but not that the hemispheres are involved in an unchanging dominance relationship. The fact that the corpus callosum forms a bridge between the hemispheres means that they are not isolated units and that one may work through the other to control the functions of the limbs. Control however may be switched as the tasks demand the respective specializations of each hemisphere.     

Humour in advertising: An associative processing model

This chapter reviews a research programme on the effects of humour in advertising on positive and negative brand associations and brand choice, and integrates the findings into a single overarching model. Based on the Associative and Propositional Processes Model of Evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2007, 2011), we propose that repeated pairings of a novel brand with brand-unrelated humour forms positive brand associations, which mediate spontaneous brand choice. This associative process was found to be independent from the level of distraction posed by humour and from awareness of the stimulus pairings. In fact the distraction posed by humour benefits persuasion by preventing negative brand associations. Previous marketing research, which mainly viewed humour as a cue in peripheral processing, was rather pessimistic about the persuasive impact of humour. In contrast, this research programme suggests that a repeated pairing of a brand with humour affects the brand’s underlying associative structure, which may lead to stable attitude changes that guide overt spontaneous brand choice. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.