The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

On the anatomy of social engineering attacks—A literature‐based dissection of successful attacks

The aim of this study was to explore the extent to which persuasion principles are used in successful social engineering attacks. Seventy‐four scenarios were extracted from 4 books on social engineering (written by social engineers) and analysed. Each scenario was split into attack steps, containing single interactions between offender and target. For each attack step, persuasion principles were identified. The main findings are that (a) persuasion principles are often used in social engineering attacks, (b) authority (1 of the 6 persuasion principles) is used considerably more often than others, and (c) single‐principle attack steps occur more often than multiple‐principle ones. The social engineers identified in the scenarios more often used persuasion principles compared to other social influences. The scenario analysis illustrates how to exploit the human element in security. The findings support the view that security mechanisms should include not only technical but also social countermeasures.     

Security-by-Experiment: Lessons from Responsible Deployment in Cyberspace

Conceiving new technologies as social experiments is a means to discuss responsible deployment of technologies that may have unknown and potentially harmful side-effects. Thus far, the uncertain outcomes addressed in the paradigm of new technologies as social experiments have been mostly safety-related, meaning that potential harm is caused by the design plus accidental events in the environment. In some domains, such as cyberspace, adversarial agents (attackers) may be at least as important when it comes to undesirable effects of deployed technologies. In such cases, conditions for responsible experimentation may need to be implemented differently, as attackers behave strategically rather than probabilistically. In this contribution, we outline how adversarial aspects are already taken into account in technology deployment in the field of cyber security, and what the paradigm of new technologies as social experiments can learn from this. In particular, we show the importance of adversarial roles in social experiments with new technologies.     

Practice schedule and cognitive style interaction in learning a maze task

In the present study the effects of contextual interference on the retention and transfer performance of reflectives and impulsives on a maze task were studied. Forty-seven subjects were randomly assigned to either a high contextual interference group or to a low contextual interference group. Within the two groups subjects were further classified according to their preferred modes of responding. Retention and transfer were measured immediately following practice and after a 4-week delay. The dependent variables were tracing time and errors. Reflectives made fewer errors and moved more quickly after practising under conditions of high contextual interference. Impulsives tended to have fewer errors after practising under conditions of high contextual interference but moved more slowly. Based on these results it was suggested that trainers consider individual differences in reflectivity-impulsivity before designing particular practice schedules.     

Using Indirect Measurement Tasks to Assess the Self‐concept of Personality: A Systematic Review and Meta‐analyses

This systematic review presents the current state of research investigating the implicit self‐concept of personality. First, we present results on meta‐analyses estimating internal consistency, reliability coefficients, the implicit–explicit consistency and the single association predictive effect of implicit self‐concept of personality measures. To do this, studies were aggregated over personality domains. Second, for each of the Five Factor personality domains, different aspects of construct validity and predictive validity are reviewed in a narrative way. Results show that implicit self‐concept of personality measures are reliable, and there is evidence for the construct and predictive validity of these implicit measures, especially in the extraversion and agreeableness domains of personality. However, it must be kept in mind that clear evidence for publication bias was found for studies examining the single association predictive pattern. Finally, this systematic review identifies some achievable improvements that are needed in future research. Large cross‐lab efforts are important in this respect. Moreover, the implicit self‐concept of personality field must move from an ‘ad hoc’ to a ‘validation’ approach in developing new indirect measurement tasks. By adopting these research objectives, the information processing account of personality will increase its potential to become integrated into mainstream personality theory and research. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

When demand accelerates demand: Trailing the bandwagon

Consumers generally prefer scarce products, which has been related to their exclusiveness. Currently scarce products, however, are not necessarily exclusive, but could be scarce because many other consumers previously bought them. We propose that consumers also prefer scarce products in this situation, which an appeal to uniqueness cannot explain. Three experiments support our predictions and reveal that scarcity effects even occur when consumers only see traces of others' behavior through emptied shelf space. Furthermore, this bandwagon effect disappears when uniqueness is threatened due to others in close spatial distance.     

Attention switching during scene perception: how goals influence the time course of eye movements across advertisements

Eye movements across advertisements express a temporal pattern of bursts of respectively relatively short and long saccades, and this pattern is systematically influenced by activated scene perception goals. This was revealed by a continuous-time hidden Markov model applied to eye movements of 220 participants exposed to 17 ads under a free-viewing condition, and a scene-learning goal (ad memorization), a scene-evaluation goal (ad appreciation), a target-learning goal (product learning), or a target-evaluation goal (product evaluation). The model reflects how attention switches between two states--local and global--expressed in saccades of shorter and longer amplitude on a spatial grid with 48 cells overlaid on the ads. During the 5- to 6-s duration of self-controlled exposure to ads in the magazine context, attention predominantly started in the local state and ended in the global state, and rapidly switched about 5 times between states. The duration of the local attention state was much longer than the duration of the global state. Goals affected the frequency of switching between attention states and the duration of the local, but not of the global, state.     

Effectiveness of online word of mouth on exposure to an Internet-delivered intervention

The use of online word of mouth (WOM) seems a promising strategy to motivate young people to visit Internet-delivered interventions. An Internet-delivered intervention aimed at changing implicit attitudes related to alcohol was used in two experiments to test effectiveness of e-mail invitations on a first visit to the intervention. The results of the first experiment (N = 196) showed that an invitation by e-mail from a friend was more effective to attract young adults (aged 18–24 years) to the intervention website than an invitation from an institution. A 2 × 2 design was used in the second experiment (N = 236) to test manipulations of argument strength and the use of peripheral cues in invitations. Results showed that weak arguments were more effective to attract young adults to the intervention website when an incentive was withheld. These results need to be taken into account when using online WOM as a strategy to improve exposure to Internet-delivered interventions.     

Against Doxastic Compatibilism

William Alston has argued that the so‐called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible for our beliefs if we lack control over them? Several philosophers have argued that the idea that we bear responsibility for our beliefs can be saved, because absence of voluntary control over our beliefs is perfectly compatible with having obligations to hold particular beliefs. With others, I call this view ‘doxastic compatibilism’. It comes in two varieties. On the first variety, doxastic obligations do not require any kind of doxastic control whatsoever. I argue that this variety of doxastic compatibilism fails because it confuses doxastic responsibility with other closely related phenomena. On the second variety, doxastic obligations do not require voluntary doxastic control, but only compatibilist doxastic control (roughly, reason‐responsiveness) and we do in fact have such control. I grant that we have such control, but also argue that having such control is insufficient for bearing doxastic responsibility. The plausibility of the examples put forward by doxastic compatibilists in support of the claim that it is sufficient for doxastic responsibility derives from the fact that in these examples, the subjects have control over factors that influence what they believe rather than control over those beliefs themselves.