Trauma and autobiographical memory specificity in depressed inpatients

Research on autobiographical memory has shown that clinical depression is associated with a difficulty in retrieving specific autobiographical memories in response to cue words. This study examined the relation between lack of autobiographical memory specificity and self-reported trauma in a group of depressed adults (N = 23). In addition to the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) participants completed a number of questionnaires assessing the presence of traumatic experiences in the past, level of depression and neuroticism. The number of specific responses was not related to depression severity, but was significantly associated with the presence and severity of reported physical abuse. Participants who had been victim of physical abuse were less specific than participants who had not been confronted with such physical adversities. The results are discussed in the context of a functional hypothesis about the developmental relations between memory specificity, trauma and depression.     

Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder

The present study investigated general reality monitoring ability, and selective reality monitoring ability for anxiety relevant actions in a group of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a group of non-anxious controls. In addition, reality monitoring confidence was assessed, as well as specific meta-cognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence (by means of the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ)). No differences were found between both groups in actual reality monitoring ability. Unlike previous studies, the reality monitoring task included actions that were related to the individual concerns of the OCD patients and were ideographically selected. Nevertheless, no differential reality monitoring effect was observed for the anxiety relevant stimuli. Data from the MCQ, however, revealed that OCD patients had less overall confidence in their memory for actions and their reality monitoring ability. Analysis of the confidence ratings of the reality monitoring task showed that this reduced confidence was restricted to the neutral actions. No differences were observed for patients that reported low or high frequencies of checking behaviour. The whole of these data do not support memory deficit models of OCD, but are in line with recent emphasis on the importance of memory confidence and other meta-cognitive beliefs in OCD.     

Dynamics of multiple-goal pursuit

The authors propose and test a model of multiple-goal pursuit that specifies how individuals allocate effort among multiple goals over time. The model predicts that whether individuals decide to step up effort, coast, abandon the current goal, or switch to pursue another goal is determined jointly by the emotions that flow from prior goal progress and the proximity to future goal attainment, and proximally determined by changes in expectancies about goal attainment. Results from a longitudinal diary study and 2 experiments show that positive and negative goal-related emotions can have diametrically opposing effects on goal-directed behavior, depending on the individual's proximity to goal attainment. The findings resolve contrasting predictions about the influence of positive and negative emotions in volitional behavior, critically amend the goal gradient hypothesis, and provide new insights into the dynamics and determinants of multiple-goal pursuit.     

Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant

This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories and whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality might save foundherentism about scientific theories and the image of science as a crossword puzzle. I also draw lessons for social epistemology generally by applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.     

What Is Ignorance?

This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by paying attention to four philosophical problems in which ignorance plays a crucial role.     

Future‐oriented emotions: conceptualization and behavioral effects

We distinguish between two kinds of future‐oriented emotions (anticipatory and anticipated) and investigate their behavioral effects. Anticipatory emotions are currently experienced due to the prospect of a future event (e.g., hope or fear). Anticipated emotions, on the other hand, are expected to be experienced in the future if certain events do or do not occur (e.g., anticipated joy or regret). We discuss the theoretical differences between the two types of future‐oriented emotions and examine their role in motivating goal‐directed behavior. The results of a longitudinal study (n = 472) and a separate control group analysis (n = 340) provide consistent support for the convergent and discriminant validity of positive/negative anticipatory and anticipated emotions and their independent influence on goal‐directed behavior. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The case of the Dutch postcode lottery

Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may influence decision-making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates and extends these findings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, one’s postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating one may still find out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery influences the level of anticipated post-decisional regret, and moderates the influence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews, confirmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 replicated these findings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not differ with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret influence decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These findings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret research are discussed.     

Measurement error and ANCOVA: Functional and structural relationship approaches

This article discusses alternative procedures to the standardF-test for ANCOVA in case the covariate is measured with error. Both a functional and a structural relationship approach are described. Examples of both types of analysis are given for the simple two-group design. Several cases are discussed and special attention is given to issues of model identifiability. An approximate statistical test based on the functional relationship approach is described. On the basis of Monte Carlo simulation results it is concluded that this testing procedure is to be preferred to the conventionalF-test of the ANCOVA null hypothesis. It is shown how the standard null hypothesis may be tested in a structural relationship approach. It is concluded that some knowledge of the reliability of the covariate is necessary in order to obtain meaningful results.