Intention-behaviour consistency: Effects of consideration set size,involvement and need for cognition

This study focuses on the strength of the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in a multi-alternative choice context. Two separate moderating processes of intention-behaviour consistency were hypothesized, i.e. the amount of reasoning during intention formation, and the degree of confidence in the intention. Involvement (as an issue-specific factor), and need for cognition (as an individual difference factor) were investigated as antecedents of amount of reasoning. confidence in the intention was predicted from the size of the consideration set (i.e. the number of alternatives that one considers for choice), and involvement. The study comprised a longitudinal two-wave survey conducted before and after national elections in The Netherlands, in which pre-election voting intentions were compared with actual voting behaviour. A high degree of intention-behaviour consistency was found, which was significantly related to both amount of reasoning and confidence. The expected relations were found. The results extend current process models of attitude–behaviour relations. Furthermore, the results indicate that processes related to the consideration set size and content account for variance in intention-behaviour consistency in choice contexts that cannot be accounted for by traditional attitude-behaviour perspectives.     

A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0

We propose a theory of regret regulation that distinguishes regret from related emotions, specifies the conditions under which regret is felt, the aspects of the decision that are regretted, and the behavioral implications. The theory incorporates hitherto scattered findings and ideas from psychology, economics, marketing, and related disciplines. By identifying strategies that consumers may employ to regulate anticipated and experienced regret, the theory identifies gaps in our current knowledge and thereby outlines opportunities for future research.     

The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

Learning in mature mice (Peromyscus leucopus) subjected to deep hypothermia as neonates

In certain species of nonhibernating rodents, although young nestlings cease breathing and heart action when their body temperature is lowered to near freezing, the nestlings need only be rewarmed to recover. This remarkable capacity for immediate recovery has been known many years, but long-range consequences of deep neonatal hypothermia have never before been investigated. Mice (Peromyscus leucopus) that had been exposed to four 2.5-hr episodes of deep (2-4 degrees C) hypothermia when 4-10 days old were later compared with littermate controls in their performance on two learning tasks. The two groups did not differ in their acquisition or extinction of a lithium-induced learned taste aversion to sucrose. Nor did they differ in learning to find a hidden platform in a swimming pool. Thus in a nonhibernating rodent species, deep hypothermia experienced neonatally--unlike similar hypothermia administered in adulthood--seems not to induce deficits in subsequent learning capabilities. The resistance of neonates to damage probably represents an adaptation, for their modest thermoregulatory abilities render them vulnerable to deep hypothermia in frigid environments.     

When demand accelerates demand: Trailing the bandwagon

Consumers generally prefer scarce products, which has been related to their exclusiveness. Currently scarce products, however, are not necessarily exclusive, but could be scarce because many other consumers previously bought them. We propose that consumers also prefer scarce products in this situation, which an appeal to uniqueness cannot explain. Three experiments support our predictions and reveal that scarcity effects even occur when consumers only see traces of others' behavior through emptied shelf space. Furthermore, this bandwagon effect disappears when uniqueness is threatened due to others in close spatial distance.     

Attention switching during scene perception: how goals influence the time course of eye movements across advertisements

Eye movements across advertisements express a temporal pattern of bursts of respectively relatively short and long saccades, and this pattern is systematically influenced by activated scene perception goals. This was revealed by a continuous-time hidden Markov model applied to eye movements of 220 participants exposed to 17 ads under a free-viewing condition, and a scene-learning goal (ad memorization), a scene-evaluation goal (ad appreciation), a target-learning goal (product learning), or a target-evaluation goal (product evaluation). The model reflects how attention switches between two states--local and global--expressed in saccades of shorter and longer amplitude on a spatial grid with 48 cells overlaid on the ads. During the 5- to 6-s duration of self-controlled exposure to ads in the magazine context, attention predominantly started in the local state and ended in the global state, and rapidly switched about 5 times between states. The duration of the local attention state was much longer than the duration of the global state. Goals affected the frequency of switching between attention states and the duration of the local, but not of the global, state.     

Effectiveness of online word of mouth on exposure to an Internet-delivered intervention

The use of online word of mouth (WOM) seems a promising strategy to motivate young people to visit Internet-delivered interventions. An Internet-delivered intervention aimed at changing implicit attitudes related to alcohol was used in two experiments to test effectiveness of e-mail invitations on a first visit to the intervention. The results of the first experiment (N = 196) showed that an invitation by e-mail from a friend was more effective to attract young adults (aged 18–24 years) to the intervention website than an invitation from an institution. A 2 × 2 design was used in the second experiment (N = 236) to test manipulations of argument strength and the use of peripheral cues in invitations. Results showed that weak arguments were more effective to attract young adults to the intervention website when an incentive was withheld. These results need to be taken into account when using online WOM as a strategy to improve exposure to Internet-delivered interventions.     

Against Doxastic Compatibilism

William Alston has argued that the so‐called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible for our beliefs if we lack control over them? Several philosophers have argued that the idea that we bear responsibility for our beliefs can be saved, because absence of voluntary control over our beliefs is perfectly compatible with having obligations to hold particular beliefs. With others, I call this view ‘doxastic compatibilism’. It comes in two varieties. On the first variety, doxastic obligations do not require any kind of doxastic control whatsoever. I argue that this variety of doxastic compatibilism fails because it confuses doxastic responsibility with other closely related phenomena. On the second variety, doxastic obligations do not require voluntary doxastic control, but only compatibilist doxastic control (roughly, reason‐responsiveness) and we do in fact have such control. I grant that we have such control, but also argue that having such control is insufficient for bearing doxastic responsibility. The plausibility of the examples put forward by doxastic compatibilists in support of the claim that it is sufficient for doxastic responsibility derives from the fact that in these examples, the subjects have control over factors that influence what they believe rather than control over those beliefs themselves.