Evidence for covert attention switching from eye-movements. Reply to commentaries on Liechty et al., 2003

We argue that our research objectives in Liechty, Pieters, and Wedel (2003) are to provide generalizable insights into covert visual attention to complex, multimodal stimuli in their natural context, through inverse inference from eye-movement data. We discuss the most important issues raised by Feng (2003) and Reichle and Nelson (2003), in particular the task definition, inclusion of ad features, object-based versus space-based attention and the evidence for the where and what streams.Author names are in reverse alphabetical order.     

Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan

In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge.     

Why envy outperforms admiration

Four studies tested the hypothesis that the emotion of benign envy, but not the emotions of admiration or malicious envy, motivates people to improve themselves. Studies 1 to 3 found that only benign envy was related to the motivation to study more (Study 1) and to actual performance on the Remote Associates Task (which measures intelligence and creativity; Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 found that an upward social comparison triggered benign envy and subsequent better performance only when people thought self-improvement was attainable. When participants thought self-improvement was hard, an upward social comparison led to more admiration and no motivation to do better. Implications of these findings for theories of social emotions such as envy, social comparisons, and for understanding the influence of role models are discussed.     

Heinz L. Ansbacher (1904-2006)

Heinz Ludwig Ansbacher was born in Frankfurt, Germany, on October 21, 1904. He died at his home in Burlington, Vermont, on June 22, 2006, at the age of 101 years. Alfred Adler's influence led Ansbacher to the field of psychology, where he began a lifelong scholarship on the psychology of Alfred Adler. Among Heinz's distinctions and honors were being named a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Kiel, Germany, and serving as president of the North American Society of Adlerian Psychology. Many of us will remember Professor Ansbacher as a person who lived by Adlerian principles: encouraging others while helping them to find a goal in life.     

Appraisal patterns of envy and related emotions

Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improving one's own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that appraisals of deservingness and control potential differentiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals in Study 2 and found that while both did not influence the intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that resulted. The more a situation was appraised as undeserved, the more participants experienced malicious envy. Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was not undeserved, and the most when the situation was appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current research also clarifies how the types of envy differ from the related emotions admiration and resentment.     

Self-esteem and depression revisited: implicit positive self-esteem in depressed patients?

The cognitive behavioural model of depression holds that negative cognitions related to the self have etiological importance for the maintenance and relapse of depression. This has been confirmed by research using questionnaires. Recent research using the Implicit Association Test, however, showed positive implicit self-esteem in formerly depressed participants, even after negative mood induction [Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy (2001). Mood-induced changes on the implicit association test in recovered depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 282-289]. These results are not in line with cognitive theory of depression. Since this could be an artifact of the specific procedure that was used, we investigated implicit self-esteem of currently depressed participants and healthy controls using three different paradigms: The Implicit Association Test, the Name Letter Preference Task, and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. The results of the three experiments are unequivocally indicative of positive implicit self-esteem in currently depressed patients. However, it remains an intriguing question what exactly these indirect measures assess.     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.