Future‐oriented emotions: conceptualization and behavioral effects

We distinguish between two kinds of future‐oriented emotions (anticipatory and anticipated) and investigate their behavioral effects. Anticipatory emotions are currently experienced due to the prospect of a future event (e.g., hope or fear). Anticipated emotions, on the other hand, are expected to be experienced in the future if certain events do or do not occur (e.g., anticipated joy or regret). We discuss the theoretical differences between the two types of future‐oriented emotions and examine their role in motivating goal‐directed behavior. The results of a longitudinal study (n = 472) and a separate control group analysis (n = 340) provide consistent support for the convergent and discriminant validity of positive/negative anticipatory and anticipated emotions and their independent influence on goal‐directed behavior. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The case of the Dutch postcode lottery

Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may influence decision-making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates and extends these findings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, one’s postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating one may still find out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery influences the level of anticipated post-decisional regret, and moderates the influence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews, confirmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 replicated these findings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not differ with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret influence decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These findings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret research are discussed.     

Ecological Neuropsychology: An Alternative to the Deficit Model for Conceptualizing and Serving Students with Learning Disabilities

The present paper contends that children with learning disabilities are better served when assessment and intervention are conceptualized within an ecological neuropsychology perspective than within the traditional deficit model perspective, which is the predominant approach to intervention in medical and educational settings. The deficit method conceptualizes problems as within the child, and the major consequence of this approach is that little time is spent analyzing the learning environment or other systems that might impact the child's ability to be successful in an academic setting. Therefore, rehabilitation efforts have had limited success. In contrast, ecological neuropsychology is a strength-based approach that considers the child, as well as the systems within which he/she interacts, when assessing, diagnosing, and intervening with students who are experiencing learning difficulties.     

Inferring the Meaning of Work From the Effects of Unemployment

Questionnaire data from 148 unemployed individuals were analyzed to investigate the meaning for work. Both economic and experiential functions of work were examined. The data revealed that, as predicted, increasing length of unemployment was associated with increasing economic and experiential deprivation. Economic deprivation, in turn, was associated with both more experiential deprivation and lower subjective well-being. Unexpectedly, experiential deprivation was not related to subjective well-being. The results indicate the importance of the economic functions of work in people's lives.     

Experiences and psychosocial adjustment of Darfuri female students affected by war: An exploratory study

This paper presents the personal accounts of Darfuri students studying at Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman, Sudan. Their war‐related exposure, current ongoing life challenges, emotional distress, and coping strategies were explored using a semistructured interview protocol with a sample of 20 students. Through interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), the Darfuri students’ stories illustrated that they were exposed to an array of traumatic war events, including personal experiences of parental separation, injury and death of family members, and shortages of essential life‐sustaining supplies in internally displaced camps. Also, they were confronted with myriad current life hassles and urban‐cultural challenges, including being physically distant from their families, and losing the shelter of parents, the encouragement of extended family members, and their rich and familiar social support networks. Urban‐cultural challenges and lack of environmental mastery applied to most Darfuri participants as they relocated to Omdurman city, which included negotiating an unfamiliar transport system, learning the routes and directions to important city landmarks, and insufficient funds for basic hygienic essentials. Emotional distress reactions were coded by forming two distinct lists: directly mentioned by the participant; and observations of emotional manifestation during the interview. Patterns emerged that may be similar to symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders; for example, the DSM‐IV criteria for symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder and major depression. Strong religious practices and beliefs (such as praying and reading the Quran), ability to form interpersonal relationships, availability of social support networks, and a positive future outlook seemed to augment their ability to cope with their subsequent emotional distress owing to war‐related exposures, current ongoing life hassles and urban‐cultural challenges.     

Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?

Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is normally an excuse counts in favour of this thesis. On the other hand, three objections against this thesis are discussed and criticized. First, one might think that what suffices for doxastic responsibility is control over or influence on certain desirable or undesirable properties of beliefs. It is argued that this objection misrepresents the issue under consideration. Second, it may be objected that the thesis is contradicted by our intuitions in doxastic analogues of Frankfurt-style scenarios. It is argued that distinguishing between belief-universals and belief-particulars helps to see why this argument fails. Third and finally, one might draw an analogy with the asymmetry thesis in ethics by arguing that even if blameworthy belief requires the ability to believe otherwise, praiseworthy belief does not. It is argued that the main arguments in favour of this presumed asymmetry are wanting, partly because they fail to distinguish between two different kinds of praiseworthiness. Finally, the author sketches three implications of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise: counterfactual construals of responsible belief might be tenable, the deontological conception of epistemic justification needs revision on an important point, and there might be an important asymmetry between beliefs on the one hand and actions and many non-doxastic consequences on the other.     

Warding off the evil eye: when the fear of being envied increases prosocial behavior

The fear of being envied makes people act prosocially, in an attempt to ward off the potentially destructive effects of envy. In three experiments, people who were in a superior position and could be envied were more likely than control participants to give time-consuming advice to a potentially envious person or to help a potentially envious person pick up erasers she had accidentally scattered. However, helping behavior increased only if envy was likely to be malicious rather than benign. People who were better off did not increase their helping behavior toward people in general, but increased their helping only toward the potentially envious. This finding is consistent with the idea that the better off act more prosocially as an appeasement strategy. The fear of being envied serves useful group functions, because it triggers prosocial behavior that is likely to dampen the potentially destructive effects of envy and simultaneously helps to improve the situation of people who are worse off.     

Differential attrition in health behaviour change trials: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Objective: Attrition is a common problem in health behaviour change (HBC) trials. When the degree of attrition differs between treatment conditions, then this is called differential attrition and is regarded as a major threat to internal validity. The primary research question of this study was: how often and to what degree does differential attrition occur in HBC trials?

Design: A systematic review and meta-analysis of a random selection of HBC trials (k = 60). We meta-analysed the relative attrition rates using a random-effects model and examined the relationship between the relative attrition rates and the potential moderators: the amount of human contact in delivery and the intensity of the intervention/control condition, the type of control condition, and the follow-up intensity and duration.

Main outcome measures: Relative attrition rates.

Results: The average attrition rate was 18% (SD = .15; M = .15) in the intervention and 17% (SD = .13; M = .13) in the control conditions. The estimated average relative attrition rate was 1.10 (95% CI: 1.01–1.20, p = .02), suggesting an overall higher attrition rate of 10% in the intervention conditions. This relative attrition rate was not related to any of the potential moderators.

Conclusion: There is indication of a slightly higher amount of attrition on average in the intervention conditions of HBC trials.     

Believing at Will is Possible

There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at will is possible, namely that (1) mind-reading is impossible, (2) in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, (3) in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, (4) TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that (5) if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an important constraint on any version of the thesis that it is psychologically impossible to believe at will. Third, they show us that, contrary to what several philosophers claim or imply, believing at will should not be identified with believing irrespective of—what one considers to be—the truth, nor should believing irrespective of the truth be considered a necessary condition for believing at will.