Appraisal patterns of envy and related emotions

Envy is a frustrating emotion that arises from upward social comparison. Two studies investigated the appraisals that distinguish benign envy (aimed at improving one's own situation) from malicious envy (aimed at pulling down the superior other). Study 1 found that appraisals of deservingness and control potential differentiated both types of envy. We manipulated these appraisals in Study 2 and found that while both did not influence the intensity of envy, they did determine the type of envy that resulted. The more a situation was appraised as undeserved, the more participants experienced malicious envy. Benign envy was experienced more when the situation was not undeserved, and the most when the situation was appraised as both deserved and controllable. The current research also clarifies how the types of envy differ from the related emotions admiration and resentment.     

Mental health and identity: the evaluation of a drop‐in centre

This paper is based on interviews with users of a drop‐in centre run by a voluntary group. Using a grounded theory approach the paper argues that individuals' use of the drop‐in is linked to the discursive strategies that they have developed to cope with stigma. Tajfel's Social Identity Theory is employed as a framework to examine how users manage the threat to their identity posed by the diagnosis and experience of mental illness. The implications of this research are examined within the context of the empowerment paradigm of mental health. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-esteem and depression revisited: implicit positive self-esteem in depressed patients?

The cognitive behavioural model of depression holds that negative cognitions related to the self have etiological importance for the maintenance and relapse of depression. This has been confirmed by research using questionnaires. Recent research using the Implicit Association Test, however, showed positive implicit self-esteem in formerly depressed participants, even after negative mood induction [Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy (2001). Mood-induced changes on the implicit association test in recovered depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 282-289]. These results are not in line with cognitive theory of depression. Since this could be an artifact of the specific procedure that was used, we investigated implicit self-esteem of currently depressed participants and healthy controls using three different paradigms: The Implicit Association Test, the Name Letter Preference Task, and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. The results of the three experiments are unequivocally indicative of positive implicit self-esteem in currently depressed patients. However, it remains an intriguing question what exactly these indirect measures assess.     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

Intention-behaviour consistency: Effects of consideration set size,involvement and need for cognition

This study focuses on the strength of the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in a multi-alternative choice context. Two separate moderating processes of intention-behaviour consistency were hypothesized, i.e. the amount of reasoning during intention formation, and the degree of confidence in the intention. Involvement (as an issue-specific factor), and need for cognition (as an individual difference factor) were investigated as antecedents of amount of reasoning. confidence in the intention was predicted from the size of the consideration set (i.e. the number of alternatives that one considers for choice), and involvement. The study comprised a longitudinal two-wave survey conducted before and after national elections in The Netherlands, in which pre-election voting intentions were compared with actual voting behaviour. A high degree of intention-behaviour consistency was found, which was significantly related to both amount of reasoning and confidence. The expected relations were found. The results extend current process models of attitude–behaviour relations. Furthermore, the results indicate that processes related to the consideration set size and content account for variance in intention-behaviour consistency in choice contexts that cannot be accounted for by traditional attitude-behaviour perspectives.     

A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0

We propose a theory of regret regulation that distinguishes regret from related emotions, specifies the conditions under which regret is felt, the aspects of the decision that are regretted, and the behavioral implications. The theory incorporates hitherto scattered findings and ideas from psychology, economics, marketing, and related disciplines. By identifying strategies that consumers may employ to regulate anticipated and experienced regret, the theory identifies gaps in our current knowledge and thereby outlines opportunities for future research.     

The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

When demand accelerates demand: Trailing the bandwagon

Consumers generally prefer scarce products, which has been related to their exclusiveness. Currently scarce products, however, are not necessarily exclusive, but could be scarce because many other consumers previously bought them. We propose that consumers also prefer scarce products in this situation, which an appeal to uniqueness cannot explain. Three experiments support our predictions and reveal that scarcity effects even occur when consumers only see traces of others' behavior through emptied shelf space. Furthermore, this bandwagon effect disappears when uniqueness is threatened due to others in close spatial distance.