A simple and effective decision rule for choosing a significance test to protect against non-normality

There is no formal and generally accepted procedure for choosing an appropriate significance test for sample data when the assumption of normality is doubtful. Various tests of normality that have been proposed over the years have been found to have limited usefulness, and sometimes a preliminary test makes the situation worse. The present paper investigates a specific and easily applied rule for choosing between a parametric and non-parametric test, the Student t test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, that does not require a preliminary significance test of normality. Simulations reveal that the rule, which can be applied to sample data automatically by computer software, protects the Type I error rate and increases power for various sample sizes, significance levels, and non-normal distribution shapes. Limitations of the procedure in the case of heterogeneity of variance are discussed.     

Listeners invest in an assumed other's perspective despite cognitive cost

We explored perspective-taking behavior in a visuospatial mental rotation task that requires listeners to adopt an egocentric or “other-centric” frame of reference. In the current task, objects could be interpreted relative to the point-of-view of the listener (egocentric) or of a simulated partner (other-centric). Across three studies, we evaluated participants’ willingness to consider and act on partner-specific information, showing that a partner’s perceived ability to contribute to collaborative mutual understanding modulated participants’ perspective-taking behavior, either by increasing other-centric (Study 2) or egocentric (Study 3) responding. Moreover, we show that a large proportion of participants resolved referential ambiguity in terms of their partner’s perspective, even when it was more cognitively difficult to do so (as tracked by online movement measures), and when the presence of a social partner had to be assumed (Studies 1 and 2). In addition, participants continued to consider their partner’s perspective during trials where visual perspectives were shared. Our results show that participants will thoroughly invest in either an other-centric or egocentric mode of responding, and that perspective-taking strategies are not always dictated by minimizing processing demands, but by more potent (albeit subtle) factors in the social context.     

A Typology of Youth Participation and Empowerment for Child and Adolescent Health Promotion

Research suggests that increasing egalitarian relations between young people and adults is optimal for healthy development; however, the empirical assessment of shared control in youth–adult partnerships is emerging, and the field still requires careful observation, identification, categorization and labeling. Thus, our objective is to offer a conceptual typology that identifies degrees of youth–adult participation while considering the development potential within each type. We use an empowerment framework, rooted in evidence-based findings, to identify five types of youth participation: (1) Vessel, (2) Symbolic, (3) Pluralistic, (4) Independent and (5) Autonomous. The typology is constructed as a heuristic device to provide researchers, practitioners and policy-makers with a common language for articulating degrees of youth participation for optimal child and adolescent health promotion.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Pointing with the eyes: the role of gaze in communicating danger

Facial expression and direction of gaze are two important sources of social information, and what message each conveys may ultimately depend on how the respective information interacts in the eye of the perceiver. Direct gaze signals an interaction with the observer but averted gaze amounts to "pointing with the eyes", and in combination with a fearful facial expression may signal the presence of environmental danger. We used fMRI to examine how gaze direction influences brain processing of facial expression of fear. The combination of fearful faces and averted gazes activated areas related to gaze shifting (STS, IPS) and fear-processing (amygdala, hypothalamus, pallidum). Additional modulation of activation was observed in motion detection areas, in premotor areas and in the somatosensory cortex, bilaterally. Our results indicate that the direction of gaze prompts a process whereby the brain combines the meaning of the facial expression with the information provided by gaze direction, and in the process computes the behavioral implications for the observer.     

Multisource Feedback and Leaders' Goal Performance: Moderating effects of rating purpose,rater perspective,and performance dimension

The main purposes of this study are to examine whether multisource feedback ratings predict leaders' organizational goal performance, and whether the relationships are consistent across the two rating purposes (developmental, administrative), two leadership dimensions behaviors (Consideration, Initiating Structure), and three rating perspectives (supervisor, self, and ‘other’ raters, i.e., peers and subordinates). Leaders (n=396) in a large organization in the transportation industry participated in two multisource feedback programs, the first for developmental purposes and the second 8 months later for administrative purposes. Approximately 1 month later, they were rated by their supervisor on their effectiveness in attaining five organizational performance goals (financial, safety, customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, diversity). Results revealed that both developmental ratings and administrative ratings uniquely predicted leaders' goal performance. However, both leadership dimension and rater perspective moderated these relationships. Leadership behaviors associated with Consideration were stronger predictors of goal performance for supervisor ratings, whereas behaviors associated with Initiating Structure were stronger predictors of goal performance for self and other ratings.     

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.     

Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism

Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist can avoid reliabilism. I then argue that the resulting view is preferable to Peacocke’s own account of self-knowledge.     

Continuous Dynamics in Real-Time Cognition

ABSTRACT— Real-time cognition is best described not as a sequence of logical operations performed on discrete symbols but as a continuously changing pattern of neuronal activity. The continuity in these dynamics indicates that, in between describable states of mind, mental activity does not lend itself to the linguistic labels relied on by much of psychology. We discuss eye-tracking and mouse-tracking evidence for this temporal continuity and provide geometric visualizations of mental activity, depicting it as a continuous trajectory through a state space (a multidimensional space in which locations correspond to mental states). When the state of the system travels toward a frequently visited region of that space, the destination may constitute recognition of a particular word or a particular object; but on the way there, the majority of the mental trajectory is in intermediate regions of that space, revealing graded mixtures of mental states.     

On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation

This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the First Answer to the question. In Foundations of Ethics Ross repudiated the Objective View in favor of the Subjective View, from which he inferred a Second Answer. In this paper each of the Objective and Subjective Views and the First and Second Answers are rejected in favor of the Prospective View and a Third Answer. The implications of the Prospective View for another question closely related to the original question are then investigated: what precisely is your right regarding my returning the book and what constitutes its satisfaction?