A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.     

历史能是真实的吗？叙述主义、实证主义与“隐喻的转向”

20世纪历史哲学在上半叶由黑格尔式的思辨历史哲学转向历史认识论研究。之后 ,自 1 970年开始 ,它又经历了语言学转折。后者的表现便是叙述主义历史哲学的兴起。它注重分析历史文本的语言风格这类形式要素中表现的本质内涵 ,也在认识论的层面彻底消解了传统实在论意义上的历史客观性。人们对历史叙述过程诸要素有了越来越多的了解之后 ,对某一历史主题确立的目的和效果也就有了更有效的解析方法 ,进而为当代历史哲学重新深入历史本体 ,探讨宏大历史叙事与叙述权力创造了条件。当代历史哲学正以 2 0世纪历史认识论的成就为依据 ,在推进历史 /史学观念分析之时 ,也表现出一种重新步入思辨历史哲学领地的倾向。此时 ,具有前瞻性的世界史家也像当代历史哲学家那样 ,注意到了世界历史观念的现实意义。本栏选取的 4篇文章 (另外两篇将以后刊出 )便分别涉及到构成上述倾向的某些特定层面。     

Bare Quantifiers?

In a series of publications I have claimed that by contrast to standard formal languages, quantifiers in natural language combine with a general term to form a quantified argument, in which the general term's role is to determine the domain or plurality over which the quantifier ranges. In a recent paper Zoltán Gendler Szabó tried to provide a counterexample to this analysis and derived from it various conclusions concerning quantification in natural language, claiming it is often ‘bare’. I show that Szabó's example fails, and that even if it were successful his conclusions would not be supported by it.