From Homeostatic to Hedonic Theories of Eating: Self-Regulatory Failure in Food-Rich Environments

Psychological theories of weight regulation are based on homeostatic feedback assumptions. They mostly attribute the cause of overweight and obesity to lowered sensitivity to internal hunger and satiety cues. Based on the assumption that human food consumption in food-rich environments is increasingly driven by pleasure rather than need for calories, a goal conflict theory of hedonic eating is presented. This theory is not only supported by the outcome of our own research programme but can also account for findings of the research conducted in the context of other psychological theories. Some implications for weight loss strategies are discussed.
Les théories psychologiques sur la régulation du poids sont basées sur des hypothèses d'une rétroaction homéostasique. Elles attribuent généralement la cause de la surcharge pondérale et de l'obésitéà une sensibilité interne amoindrie à la faim et aux indicateurs de satiété. Reposant sur l'hypothèse que la consommation alimentaire humaine dans des environnements riches en nourriture est de plus en plus guidée par le plaisir plutôt que par le besoin de calories, une théorie "goal conflict theory of hedonic eating" est présentée. Cette théorie qui ne s'appuie pas seulement sur les résultats de notre propre programme de recherches, peut aussi expliquer les résultats d'études réalisées dans le cadre d'autres théories psychologiques. Des implications concernant des stratégies de perte de poids sont discutées.     

The allure of forbidden food: On the role of attention in self-regulation

The aim of the present studies was to examine the impact of food cues on restrained eaters’ attention for food. Previous research has shown that restrained eaters spontaneously activate hedonic thoughts in response to palatable food cues, and that such food cues also lead them to inhibit their dieting goal. We argue that as a consequence, restrained eaters’ selective attention will automatically be drawn towards hedonically relevant food items. Consistent with our expectations, the results of two studies revealed that restrained eaters, but not unrestrained eaters, displayed an attentional bias for hedonically rated food items when they had been pre-exposed to food cues. However, this attentional bias did not occur when restrained eaters were primed with the concept of dieting, thereby rendering the regulation of eating behavior more successful. These findings are discussed in the context of implicit processes in self-regulation.     

Automatic goal inferences

The social psychological literature on automatic social inferences has focused on one construct that helps explaining human behavior—traits (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984). The dispositional roots of behavior, however, go beyond relatively stable constructs such as traits to include more transient causes such as one’s intentions and goals. Evidence from young infants and adult chimpanzees, knowledge acquired in the text-comprehension literature and hypotheses derived from the Automatic Causal Inferences framework (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002), seems to converge: they all suggest that perceivers may automatically infer goals from behaviors. This paper reports four studies that examine this hypothesis. The first two use surprise cued-recall, and look at goal inferences when the road to goal achievement seems straightforward and when it seems blocked. Studies 3 and 4 use on-line methodologies—probe recognition task and lexical decision—to examine whether these inferences are made at encoding.     

A functional analysis of personal autonomy: How restricting ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ affects experienced agency and goal motivation

Personal autonomy is central to people's experiences of agency and abilities to actively take part in society. To address the challenges of supporting autonomy, we propose a functional model of autonomy, according to which the experience of agency is a function of the opportunity to determine what to do, when to act and how to act in goal-pursuit. We tested the model in three experiments where the three goal-pursuit components could be constrained by another person or an artificial intelligence (AI) agent. Results showed that removing any of the three components from one's own decisions reduced experienced agency (Study 1a and 1b) and lowered motivation to pursue goals in organisational contexts (Study 2). In comparison to the strong and robust main effects, interactions between the components and the effects of the source of restriction (human vs. AI) were negligible. Implications for personal autonomy, algorithmic decision-making and behaviour change interventions are discussed.     

Evidence for the automatic evaluation of self-generated actions

The accuracy of simple actions is swiftly determined through specific monitoring brain systems. However, it remains unclear whether this evaluation is accompanied by a rapid and compatible emotional appraisal of the action that allows to mark incorrect actions as negative/bad and conversely correct actions as positive/good. In this study, we used a new method to decode the affective value of simple actions generated by participants during a standard Go/noGo task. Immediately after each Go/noGo action, participants responded to the valence of either a positive or a negative word. Results showed that False Alarms performed during the Go/noGo task led to a faster evaluative categorization of negative words relative to positive words. This action-word evaluative priming effect occurred when the interval between these two events was set to either 300 or 600ms, but not 1000ms. Finally, higher levels of trait anxiety were associated with a reduction of the evaluative priming effect. Our results suggest that simple actions are rapidly evaluated as positive or negative depending on the automatic monitoring of their perceived accuracy.     

Unconscious goal activation and the hijacking of the executive function

Building on research on unconscious human goal pursuit and the dynamic nature of our mental and physical world, this study examined the idea that an unconsciously activated goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This "hijacking" of the executive function by an unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on executive control. The results of 6 experiments show that subliminal activation of a socializing goal, or an idiosyncratic personal goal, or an academic goal, harmed participants' performance on an executive function task, such as inhibition of prepotent responses and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control, were similar when the goal was activated consciously, and were independent of task motivation and perceived inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal occupied executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. Implications for theory and research on unconscious goal pursuit and the executive function are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent.     

Anxiety not only increases,but also alters early error-monitoring functions

Anxiety has profound influences on a wide range of cognitive processes, including action monitoring. Eventrelated brain potential (ERP) studies have shown that anxiety can boost early error detection mechanisms, as reflected by an enhanced error-related negativity (ERN) following errors in high-anxious, as compared with low-anxious, participants. This observation is consistent with the assumption of a gain control mechanism exerted by anxiety onto error-related brain responses within the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). However, whether anxiety simply enhances or, rather, alters early error detection mechanisms remains unsolved. In this study, we compared the performance of low-versus high-trait-anxious participants during a go/no-go task while high-density EEG was recorded. The two groups showed comparable behavioral performance, although levels of state anxiety increased following the task for high-anxious participants only. ERP results confirmed that the ERN/Ne to errors was enhanced for high-anxious, relative to low-anxious, participants. However, complementary topographic analyses revealed that the scalp map of the ERN/Ne was not identical between the two groups, suggesting that anxiety did not merely increase early error detection mechanisms, but also led to a qualitative change in the early appraisal of errors. Inverse solution results confirmed a shift within the ACC for the localization of neural generators underlying the ERN/Ne scalp map in high-anxious participants, corroborating the assumption of an early effect of anxiety on early error-monitoring functions. These results shed new light on the dynamic interplay between anxiety and error-monitoring functions in the human brain.