GETTING UNDER MY SKIN: WILLIAM JAMES ON THE EMOTIONS, SOCIALITY, AND TRANSCENDENCE

“You are really getting under my skin!” This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to “get under one's skin.” I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence.     

QUINTUPLE EXTENSION: MIND, BODY, HUMANISM, RELIGION, SECULARISM

Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.     

MINDS, INTRINSIC PROPERTIES, AND MADHYAMAKA BUDDHISM

Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna's argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to "The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything." Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world.     

MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.     

A HARD PROBLEM INDEED

Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem provides a rich source of reflection on the question of meaning and ethics within the context of philosophical naturalism. I affirm the title's claim that the quest to find meaning in a purely physical universe is indeed a hard problem by addressing three issues: Flanagan's claim that there can be a scientific/empirical theory of ethics (eudaimonics), that ethics requires moral glue, and whether, in the end, Flanagan solves the hard problem. I suggest that he does not, although he provides much that is of importance and useful for further reflection along the way.     

Diversion of attention in everyday concept learning: Identification in the service of use

Many people tend to believe that natural categories have perfectly predictive defining features. They do not easily accept the family resemblance view that the features characteristic of a category are not individually sufficient to predict the category. However, common category-learning tasks do not produce this simpler-than-it-is belief. If there is no simple classification principle in a task, the participants know that fact and can report it. We argue that most category-learning tasks in which family resemblance categories are used fail to produce the everyday simpler-than-it-is belief because they encourage analysis of identification criteria during training. To simulate the learning occurring in many natural circumstances, we developed a procedure in which participants' analytic activity is diverted from the way in which the stimuli are identified to the use to which the stimuli will be put. Finally, we discuss the prevalence of this diverted analysis in everyday categorization.     

Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change

The ability to entertain possibilities and draw inferences about them is essential to human intelligence. We examine the hypothesis that conditional if-then statements trigger a mental simulation process in which people suppose the antecedent (if statement) to be true and evaluate the consequent (then statement) in that context. On the assumption that supposing an event to be true increases belief that the event has occurred or will occur, this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that evaluating a conditional will heighten belief in its antecedent more than in its consequent. Two experiments, employing conditionals of the form If animal A has property X, then animal B will have property X, in which X was a property that people could not readily relate to the animals, supported this claim. The effect was stronger following the evaluation of conditionals with dissimilar animal categories.     

Cultural Mistrust,Ethnic Identity,Racial Identity,and Self‐Esteem Among Ethnically Diverse Black University Students

Cultural mistrust, ethnic identity, racial identity, and self‐esteem were examined among African (n = 26), African American (n = 110), and West Indian/Caribbean (n = 24) university students. African American students' scores were statistically different from those of African and West Indian/Caribbean students on cultural mistrust, racial identity, and ethnic identity measures. There were no statistically significant differences on self‐esteem among the 3 groups. Results did indicate that cultural mistrust, ethnic identity, and racial identity accounted for 37% of the variance in self‐esteem for African American students. Implications for practice and future research directions are discussed.     

Factor analysis of MMPI-2 basic scales among college students

The MMPI-2 was administered to 288 college students (178 women and 110 men) between the ages of 18 and 34 years. Scores on the basic 13 (three validity and ten clinical) scales were correlated and subjected to principal component analyses separately for men and women. In each case, four factors were retained and subjected to varimax rotation. Coefficients of congruence were calculated for all possible pairs of factors across two samples of college students and the normative adults, separately for men and women, and across genders within each sample. Results indicated that the factorial structure of the MMPI-2 basic scales seemed to possess considerable uniformity across samples and genders, but not without some notable exceptions.