Incremental Validity of Teacher and Parent Symptom and Impairment Ratings when Screening for Mental Health Difficulties

Although universal screening for mental health difficulties is increasingly recognized as a way to identify children who are at risk and provide early intervention, little research exists to inform decisions about screening, such as the choice of informants and the type of information collected. The present study examined the incremental validity of teacher- and parent-rated (primarily mothers) symptoms and impairment in a non-referred sample of early elementary school children (n = 320, 49 % boys, ages 6 to 9) in terms of predicting impairment as rated by a different teacher 1 year later. Teacher-rated symptoms and impairment and parent-rated impairment were each unique predictors of later impairment; however, parent-rated symptoms did not contribute to the prediction of later impairment above and beyond these other indicators. The results indicate that, when screening for mental health difficulties in the school system, impairment ratings collected across settings add useful information, but it may not be necessary to use parent symptom ratings when teacher symptom ratings are available.     

Elementary school students with AD/HD: predictors of academic achievement

Academic underachievement frequently is associated with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AD/HD); however, the role of variables beyond AD/HD symptoms and cognitive mediators is unknown. Further, whether prediction models vary (a) relative to non-AD/HD students, (b) between math and reading, and (c) based on how achievement is defined has not been examined. Multiple measures (e.g., teacher ratings and behavior observations) were examined as predictors for concurrent achievement outcomes (standardized achievement test scores and report card grades) in math and reading in two samples of 1st through 4th grade children (136 with AD/HD, 53 without AD/HD). Teacher perceptions of academic skills were the strongest predictors of achievement test scores for both groups, while academic skills and enablers accounted for reading report card grades in children with AD/HD but not their normal counterparts. Implications of these findings for school-based assessment and intervention for students with AD/HD are discussed.     

Genetic architecture of context processing in late middle age: more than one underlying mechanism

Studies comparing young and older adults suggest a deficit in processing context information as a key mechanism underlying cognitive aging. However, the genetic architecture of context processing has not been examined. Consistent with previous results, we found evidence of functionally dissociable components of context processing accuracy in 1127 late middle-aged twins ages 51-60. One component emphasizes use of context cues to prepare responses (proactive cognitive control), and the other emphasizes adjustment of responses after probes are presented (reactive control). Approximately one-quarter of the variance in each component was accounted for by genes. Multivariate twin analysis indicated that genetic factors underlying two important components of context processing were independent of one another, thus implicating more than one underlying mechanism. Slower reaction time (RT) on noncontext processing trials was positively correlated with errors on the strongly proactive control component on which young adults outperform older adults, but RT was negatively correlated with errors on the strongly reactive control component on which older adults perform better. Although this RT measure was uncorrelated with chronological age in our age-homogeneous sample, slower RT was associated with performance patterns that were more like older adults. However, this did not generalize to other processing speed measures. Genetic correlations, which reflect shared genetic variance, paralleled the phenotypic correlations. There was also a positive genetic correlation between general cognitive ability and accuracy on the proactive control component, but there were still mostly distinct genetic influences underlying these measures. In contrast, the reactive control component was unrelated to general cognitive ability.     

FIRST-PERSON BELIEF AND EMPIRICAL CERTAINTY

This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first-person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object (1976) and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person (1981). I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according to which first-person belief essentially involves the believer's introspective acquaintance with herself.     

TEMPORARY INTRINSICS AND RELATIVIZATION

Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based on a strategy called tensing the copula , and present a general argument to demonstrate why this strategy – and any strategy based on relativization – fails. I then show how the considerations raised in this general argument undermine other attempts to resolve the problem while denying perdurance. All these attempts are undermined by an assumption essential to the problem of temporary intrinsics, to wit, that there are many moments of time and all have the same ontological status. As long as this assumption is maintained, the only solution to the problem is that familiar, concrete objects perdure. Thus, in order to defend the view that objects persist through time by enduring, one must adopt a different metaphysics of time (viz., presentism). I conclude that it is neither unreasonable nor impracticable to do so.     

"THEISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY": A THEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE

I take the APA publication A Spiritual Strategy for Counseling and Psychotherapy (Richards and Bergin 2005), along with a devoted issue of Journal of Psychology and Theology (Nelson and Slife 2006), as a paradigmatic example of a trend. Other instances include the uncritical use of "Eastern" philosophy in Humanistic and Transpersonal Psychology, almost normative appeal to the "Sacred" within the psychology of spirituality, talk of "God in the brain" within neurological research, the neologism entheogen referring to psychedelic drugs, and calls for new specializations such as neurotheology and theobiology. In response to the legitimate ethical requirements of respect and openness regarding clients' religious worldviews, the trend is to make God an essential component in psychological theory. The argument is that God is active in the universe and especially in human affairs to such an extent that any accurate account of strictly psychological matters, not just a comprehensive, interdisciplinary purview that could include a distinct theological dimension, must include God as an explanatory factor. Less nuanced than standard theological thought about divine intervention—including a range of opinions from supernaturalism, to occasionalism, to providential and deistic naturalism—this trend would blur the epistemological differences between religion and science by appeal to claimed knowledge sources such as inspiration and revelation and thus undermine the achievements of evidence-based science and establish particularistic religious beliefs as standard explanatory accounts. The concern to include a spiritual, in contrast to a religious or theist, dimension in psychological theory is welcome; but elaborated approaches, such as my own and those of Roberto Assagioli, Viktor Frankl, and Ken Wilber, open to varied theological applications, already exist.