Quine on Hume and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.     

Listening, not watching: situational familiarity and the ability to detect deception

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the influence of situational familiarity with the judgmental context on the process of lie detection. They predicted that high familiarity with a situation leads to a more pronounced use of content cues when making judgments of veracity. Therefore, they expected higher classification accuracy of truths and lies under high familiarity. Under low situational familiarity, they expected that people achieve lower accuracy rates because they use more nonverbal cues for their veracity judgments. In all 4 experiments, participants with high situational familiarity achieved higher accuracy rates in classifying both truthful and deceptive messages than participants with low situational familiarity. Moreover, mediational analyses demonstrated that higher classification accuracy in the high-familiarity condition was associated with more use of verbal content cues and less use of nonverbal cues.     

Reinforcing saccadic amplitude variability

Saccadic endpoint variability is often viewed as the outcome of neural noise occurring during sensorimotor processing. However, part of this variability might result from operant learning. We tested this hypothesis by reinforcing dispersions of saccadic amplitude distributions, while maintaining constant their medians. In a first experiment we reinforced the least frequent saccadic amplitudes to increase variability, and then reinforced the central part of the amplitude distributions to reduce variability. The target was placed at a constant distance from the fovea after the saccade to maintain the postsaccadic visual signal constant and an auditory reinforcement was delivered depending on saccadic amplitude. The second experiment tested the effects of the contingency. We reinforced high levels of variability in 4 participants, whereas 4 other participants were assigned to a yoked control group. On average, saccadic amplitude standard deviations were doubled while the medians remained mostly unchanged in the experimental participants in both experiments, and variability returned to baseline level when low variability was reinforced. In the control group no consistent changes in amplitude distributions were observed. These results, showing that variability can be reinforced, challenge the idea of a stochastic neural noise. We instead propose that selection processes constrain saccadic amplitude distributions.     

Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism

In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology.