A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization

This article presents a theory of categorization that accounts for the effects of causal knowledge that relates the features of categories. According to causal-model theory, people explicitly represent the probabilistic causal mechanisms that link category features and classify objects by evaluating whether they were likely to have been generated by those mechanisms. In 3 experiments, participants were taught causal knowledge that related the features of a novel category. Causal-model theory provided a good quantitative account of the effect of this knowledge on the importance of both individual features and interfeature correlations to classification. By enabling precise model fits and interpretable parameter estimates, causal-model theory helps place the theory-based approach to conceptual representation on equal footing with the well-known similarity-based approaches.     

Life,Chaos, and Transdisciplinarity: A Personal Journey

This article uses an autobiography as an object of research, to both illustrate some principles of chaos theory in analytic practice, and give those ideas a personal and social context, thereby producing a unique but explanation-rich history of chaos theory and recent intellectual history of transdisciplinarity and social research in the West. The ideas from Chaos Theory it uses and illustrates include: three-body analysis (Poincaré); fractals (Mandelbrot); fuzzy logic (Zadeh); and the butterfly effect (Lorenz).     

What determines saccade timing in sequences of coordinated eye and hand movements?

In action sequences, the eyes are generally fixated ahead of the stimulus being responded to, overlapping the processing of adjacent stimuli. What determines when the saccade to the next item is initiated and what processing is overlapped remain controversial. Saccade initiation has been linked directly to the difficulty of the underlying processing on the fixated item or to a rhythmic timer whose period is adjusted to the difficulty of the context. We compared the effects of item and context difficulty when subjects made speeded choice responses to five visual stimuli arrayed linearly. Item difficulty was manipulated by varying stimulus-response compatibility, creating contexts (sequences) whose average item difficulty differed. Results showed that saccade initiation time reflected item difficulty, not context difficulty, with evidence that saccade initiation was delayed until central processing was completed. We discuss the implications of these results for the control of saccades and processing in action sequences.     

Using variability to guide dimensional weighting: associative mechanisms in early word learning

At 14 months, children appear to struggle to apply their fairly well-developed speech perception abilities to learning similar sounding words (e.g., bih/dih; Stager & Werker, 1997). However, variability in nonphonetic aspects of the training stimuli seems to aid word learning at this age. Extant theories of early word learning cannot account for this benefit of variability. We offer a simple explanation for this range of effects based on associative learning. Simulations suggest that if infants encode both noncontrastive information (e.g., cues to speaker voice) and meaningful linguistic cues (e.g., place of articulation or voicing), then associative learning mechanisms predict these variability effects in early word learning. Crucially, this means that despite the importance of task variables in predicting performance, this body of work shows that phonological categories are still developing at this age, and that the structure of noninformative cues has critical influences on word learning abilities.     

Vanishing dual-task interference after practice: has the bottleneck been eliminated or is it merely latent?

Practice can, in some cases, largely eliminate measured dual-task interference. Does this absence of interference indicate the absence of a processing bottleneck (defined as an inability to carry out certain stages in parallel)? The authors show that a bottleneck need not produce any observable interference, provided that there is no temporal overlap in the demand for bottleneck stages on the 2 tasks. Such a "latent" bottleneck is especially likely after practice, when central stages are short. The authors provide new evidence that a latent bottleneck occurred for a participant who produced no interference in M. Van Selst, E. Ruthruff, and J. C. Johnston (1999). These findings demonstrate that the absence of dual-task interference does not necessarily indicate the absence of a processing bottleneck.     

Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects

In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; indeed, we argue that anyone who accepts TOPO should reject endurantism.     

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors