A knowledge-resonance (KRES) model of category learning

This article introduces a connectionist model of category learning that takes into account the prior knowledge that people bring to new learning situations. In contrast to connectionist learning models that assume a feedforward network and learn by the delta rule or backpropagation, this model, the knowledge-resonance model, or KRES, employs a recurrent network with bidirectional symmetric connection whose weights are updated according to a contrastive Hebbian learning rule. We demonstrate that when prior knowledge is represented in the network, KRES accounts for a considerable range of empirical results regarding the effects of prior knowledge on category learning, including (1) the accelerated learning that occurs in the presence of knowledge, (2) the better learning in the presence of knowledge of category features that are not related to prior knowledge, (3) the reinterpretation of features with ambiguous interpretations in light of error-corrective feedback, and (4) the unlearning of prior knowledge when that knowledge is inappropriate in the context of a particular category.     

AN EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECEPTIVE SPEECH SKILLS AND EXPRESSIVE SIGNING

We examined the effects of receptive speech on the acquisition of manual signing among three mentally retarded children. In an alternating treatments design, we compared the acquisition of expressive signs that were, versus were not, in a child's receptive vocabulary. The children were trained via total communication in which pictorial referents were named during sign training. Signs corresponding to known words were generally acquired faster and retained better than signs corresponding to unknown words. We conducted posttests to assess the stimulus control of signing and any changes in expressive and receptive signing and speech. Observed changes in performance could be accounted for by attention to aspects of the stimulus complex during training and functional equivalence of stimuli established by training.     

ACQUISITION OF EXPRESSIVE SIGNING BY AUTISTIC CHILDREN: AN EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF SIMULTANEOUS COMMUNICATION AND SIGN-ALONE TRAINING

Two methods of training autistic children to use manual signs were compared. Two children, one mute and one capable of some verbal imitation, were taught to use signs as expressive labels for pictures of objects. Using an alternating treatments design, speed of sign acquisition was compared across two training conditions in which signs were presented either accompanied by, or without, the corresponding verbal label. In both conditions, the training procedure incorporated reinforcement, modeling, prompting, fading, and stimulus rotation. The efficacy of training in both treatment conditions was demonstrated by the use of a multiple baseline control across signs, but no clear differences in acquisition speed across conditions were apparent. Posttests conducted to assess stimulus control of signing, and learning of verbal labels when these were present in training, showed that the behavior of the imitative, but not the mute, child was controlled by the verbal stimuli. The implications of the results both for understanding deficits characteristic of autistic children and for developing appropriate language training procedures are discussed.     

HENRY THOREAU, NATURE, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

In a famous passage from "Slavery In Massachusetts," Thoreau writes, "The remembrance of my country spoils my walk. My thoughts are murder to the State, and involuntarily go plotting against her."¹ Here is Thoreau the anarchist, the misanthrope, the self-righteous angry young man, as he is so often portrayed in the secondary literature. It would be easy to consider the issue resolved: the conventional wisdom about Thoreau's misanthropy and anarchism are demonstrated, and there is little more to say. It would also be a significant mistake—one that has been made over and over again by commentators on both his political views and his nature writings. Thoreau's comment is not the climax of "Slavery in Massachusetts," but rather is the prelude to the climax. Consider the passage that follows and leads to the conclusion of the essay:     

CHRONOMETRIC EVIDENCE FOR TWO TYPES OF ATTENTION

Abstract— Parallel processing in the human brain is subject to severe attention limits, but it is unclear whether such limits arise from a single intentional process or multiple distinct attention processes. We provide new evidence that two candidates, input attention and central attention, operate at different temporal stages of processing. This conclusion is supported by chronometric analyses showing that the same reference stage (letter identification) operates after the stage at which input attention operates, but prior to the stage at which central attention operates. The finding that attention operates at different temporal loci provides new support for the existence of distinct attentional processes.     

Involuntary attentional capture by abrupt onsets

The extent to which brief abrupt-onset visual stimuli involuntarily capture spatial attention was examined in five experiments. The paradigm used was intended to maximize the opportunity and incentive for subjects to ignore abrupt-onset distractor stimuli in nontarget locations. Subjects made a speeded two-choice response to a target letter appearing in one of four boxes. An abrupt-onset visual stimulus, easily discriminable from the target, was flashed briefly prior to the presentation of a target. In separate blocks, the flash stimulus marked the box in which the target would subsequently appear (SAME), a different box (DIFF), fixation (CENTER), or all four boxes (ALL). Prior to each block, subjects were informed of the flash-target relationship. In all five experiments, response time was elevated in the DIFF, CENTER, and ALL conditions. The interference effect was larger for the DIFF condition and persisted for longer flash-target SOAs. These results suggest that, under appropriate conditions, spatial attention can be involuntarily drawn to abrupt-onset events despite the intention of subjects’ to ignore them.     

Can new objects override attentional control settings?

Previous research suggests that attentional capture by abrupt onsets is contingent on top-down attentional control settings. Four experiments addressed whether similar contingencies hold for capture elicited by the appearance of new perceptual objects. In a modified spatial cuing task, targets defined by abrupt onset or color were paired with distractors consisting of an abrupt brightening of an existing object or the abrupt appearance of a new object. In Experiments 1 and 2, when subjects searched for an onset target, both distractor types produced evidence of capture. When subjects searched for a color target, however, distractors produced no evidence of attentional capture, regardless of whether they consisted of a new perceptual object or not. Experiments 3-5 showed that the lack of distractor effects in the color-target condition cannot be accounted for by rapid recovery from capture. It was concluded that attentional capture by new objects is subject to top-down modulation by attentional control settings.     

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors

Instructions for Authors