The effects of amount of processing on recall and recognition

Johnson-Laird, Gibbs and de Mowbray (1978) and Ross (1981) have argued that amount of processing, as indexed by the overall number of decisions a subject makes, provides a good predictor of incidental memory performance. Conversely, McClelland, Rawles and Sinclair (1981) have provided evidence that it is normally the number of positive decisions rather than the overall number of decisions per se that determines level of recall. The present study replicated and extended the findings of McClelland and his colleagues. In free recall (Experiment 1 and 3), cued recall (Experiment 3) and recognition in the presence or absence of context cues (Experiments 2 and 3), an account based on number of positive decisions provided by far the better explanation. Experiment 3 also revealed that the experimental manipulations had a somewhat greater effect on recall than recognition. This is explained in terms of Tulving and Pearlstone's (1966) distinction between availability and accessibility. It is suggested that words associated with negative decisions are not only less accessible in memory, there are also fewer of them available for recall and recognition.     

Causal Closure,Causal Exclusion,and Supervenience Physicalism

This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism succeeds, it does so by showing that supervenience physicalism is not a unique, nonredundant way to be a physicalist.     

Typicality and face recognition: A critical re-evaluation of the two factor theory

Vokey and Read (1992) proposed that the effect of typicality on face recognition was a function of familiarity and rated memorability, reporting that typicality loaded equally on components that they identified with these variables. We offer an alternative interpretation to that of Vokey and Read in terms of the relationship between typicality and attractiveness (when the former is measured as a deviation from the typical face), the mere exposure effect, and the metamemorial beliefs of participants. In our study we identified distinctiveness , attractiveness , and residual memory components. Supporting our interpretation, three of our four measures of typicality failed to load with familiarity on the attractiveness component. Only our measure of deviation from the typical face replicated Vokey and Read's results because of its correlation with attractiveness.     

Quine against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention

Many commentators now view Quine's ‘Truth by Convention’ as a flawed criticism of Carnap. Gary Ebbs argued recently that Quine never intended Carnap as his target. Quine's criticisms were part of his attempt to work out his own scientific naturalism. I agree that Carnap was not Quine's target but object that Quine's criticisms were wholly internal to his own philosophy. Instead, I argue that C.I. Lewis held the kind of truth‐by‐convention thesis that Quine rejects. This, however, leaves Carnap out of the picture. I then show how Quine came to see the earlier criticisms as also having force against Carnap.