Processing the intensity of dichotic syllables

Subjects were required to match the intensity levels of the left- and right-ear members of dichotically presented nonsense syllables. When subjects matched the overall average intensities of a sequence of differing dichotic pairs no ear differences were observed. When repetitions of single dichotic pairs were matched right-ear syllables were judged louder than left-ear syllables. The results support a model predicting left-hemisphere superiority in a task permitting higher-level encoding of speech input.     

Identity matching and oddity learning in patients with moderate to severe Alzheimer-type dementia

Discrimination learning was investigated in patients with moderate to severe Alzheimer-type dementia (AD), comparing their performance with age-matched controls. Four AD patients were trained to criterion on identity matching and then shifted to the same task with novel stimuli. The AD patients showed no savings in learning to match novel stimuli, whereas a comparative group of four control subjects rapidly learned the novel matching discrimination, maintaining criterion performance on the transfer test. A second group of four patients was initially trained on oddity, taking a similar number of trials to reach criterion as the matching group. When these patients were subsequently shifted to the matching task with novel stimuli, they performed substantially worse than the first group of patients who had learned the matching task in the first stage. The lack of positive transfer in the shift between matching to matching suggests that the AD patients solved the identity-matching task on the basis of stimulus-response associations rather than a rule. The presence of negative transfer after shifting from oddity to matching may be explained by a pre-disposition to respond to a novel stimulus that is carried over into the matching task, but this warrants further investigation, as indicated in the discussion.     

Empathy on trial: A response to its critics

Despite being held in something approaching universal esteem for its capacity to promote prosocial behavior and inhibit antisocial behavior, empathy has recently become the recipient of strong criticism from some of today’s leading academics. Two of the more high-profile criticisms of empathy have come from philosopher Jesse Prinz and psychologist Paul Bloom, each of whom challenges the view that empathy has an overall beneficial influence on human behavior. In this essay, I discuss the basis of their criticisms as well as why I am not compelled by their arguments to believe that empathy does more harm than good. In the process of responding to empathy’s critics, I discuss the important role that empathy plays in our moral lives. I argue that, rather than employing rational considerations to minimize the role that empathy plays in our moral and political judgments, such considerations are put to better use by expanding empathy when conducive to the common good and suppressing it when it opposes the common good.