Primary Process Content in Paranoid Schizophrenic Speech

Free speech samples given by paranoid schizophrenics, nonschizophrenic paranoids, and nonpsychotic psychiatric patients were submitted to computerized content analysis. Speech samples were searched for words belonging to the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Martindale, 1975), which yields a well-validated measure of primary process content. Three word-concreteness dictionaries were also employed. Compared to the other groups, paranoid schizophrenics produced speech higher in primary process content as well as in transitive verb concreteness. Results are consistent with psychoanalytic theory.     

Children,words and symptomatic acts

Referring to communicative material from an autistic and a psychotic child, the author argues for the primary importance of understanding children's words and actions in terms of their conscious or intended meaning before seeking a latent, symbolic meaning for them and attempting to convey this to the child in therapy. In furtherance of the argument the author introduces and develops a distinction between the signification and the significance of expressive utterances, and explains its relevance to the development of children's concepts by means of clinical material.     

The development and analysis of tutorial dialogues in AutoTutor Lite

The goal of intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) that interact in natural language is to emulate the benefits that a well-trained human tutor provides to students, by interpreting student answers and appropriately responding in order to encourage elaboration. BRCA Gist is an ITS developed using AutoTutor Lite, a Web-based version of AutoTutor. Fuzzy-trace theory theoretically motivated the development of BRCA Gist, which engages people in tutorial dialogues to teach them about genetic breast cancer risk. We describe an empirical method to create tutorial dialogues and fine-tune the calibration of BRCA Gist’s semantic processing engine without a team of computer scientists. We created five interactive dialogues centered on pedagogic questions such as “What should someone do if she receives a positive result for genetic risk of breast cancer?” This method involved an iterative refinement process of repeated testing with different texts and successively making adjustments to the tutor’s expectations and settings in order to improve performance. The goal of this method was to enable BRCA Gist to interpret and respond to answers in a manner that best facilitated learning. We developed a method to analyze the efficacy of the tutor’s dialogues. We found that BRCA Gist’s assessment of participants’ answers was highly correlated with the quality of the answers found by trained human judges using a reliable rubric. The dialogue quality between users and BRCA Gist predicted performance on a breast cancer risk knowledge test completed after exposure to the tutor. The appropriateness of BRCA Gist’s feedback also predicted the quality of answers and breast cancer risk knowledge test scores.     

Responsibility Allocation and Human Rights

How does morality allocate responsibility for what it requires? I am concerned here with one fundamental part of this question, namely, how morality determines responsibility when multiple agents are capable of contributing to or completing a moral task, and special relationships capable of generating duties with respect to the task are non-existent, insufficient as a moral response, or partly indeterminate. On one view, responsibility falls to the agents who can bear it with the least burden. I show why this is initially attractive and mistaken. Instead, I defend an equity-based approach that accommodates the intuitions that both support and trouble the least-cost principle. One upshot is that sometimes we ought prefer a distribution of responsibility that is more expensive and less local than needed to complete the task. I illustrate the practical significance of the argument in terms of the human rights of refugees.     

Object-location binding across a saccade: A retinotopic spatial congruency bias

Despite frequent eye movements that rapidly shift the locations of objects on our retinas, our visual system creates a stable perception of the world. To do this, it must convert eye-centered (retinotopic) input to world-centered (spatiotopic) percepts. Moreover, for successful behavior we must also incorporate information about object features/identities during this updating – a fundamental challenge that remains to be understood. Here we adapted a recent behavioral paradigm, the “spatial congruency bias,” to investigate object-location binding across an eye movement. In two initial baseline experiments, we showed that the spatial congruency bias was present for both gabor and face stimuli in addition to the object stimuli used in the original paradigm. Then, across three main experiments, we found the bias was preserved across an eye movement, but only in retinotopic coordinates: Subjects were more likely to perceive two stimuli as having the same features/identity when they were presented in the same retinotopic location. Strikingly, there was no evidence of location binding in the more ecologically relevant spatiotopic (world-centered) coordinates; the reference frame did not update to spatiotopic even at longer post-saccade delays, nor did it transition to spatiotopic with more complex stimuli (gabors, shapes, and faces all showed a retinotopic congruency bias). Our results suggest that object-location binding may be tied to retinotopic coordinates, and that it may need to be re-established following each eye movement rather than being automatically updated to spatiotopic coordinates.     

Personality and Neural Correlates of Mentalizing Ability

Theory of mind, or mentalizing, defined as the ability to reason about another's mental states, is a crucial psychological function that is disrupted in some forms of psychopathology, but little is known about how individual differences in this ability relate to personality or brain function. One previous study linked mentalizing ability to individual differences in the personality trait Agreeableness. Agreeableness encompasses two major subdimensions: Compassion reflects tendencies toward empathy, prosocial behaviour, and interpersonal concern, whereas Politeness captures tendencies to suppress aggressive and exploitative impulses. We hypothesized that Compassion but not Politeness would be associated with better mentalizing ability. This hypothesis was confirmed in Study 1 (N = 329) using a theory of mind task that required reasoning about the beliefs of fictional characters. Post hoc analyses indicated that the honesty facet of Agreeableness was negatively associated with mentalizing. In Study 2 (N = 217), we examined whether individual differences in mentalizing and related traits were associated with patterns of resting‐state functional connectivity in the brain. Performance on the theory of mind task was significantly associated with patterns of connectivity between the dorsal medial and core subsystems of the default network, consistent with evidence implicating these regions in mentalization. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Joint Influence of Visual and Auditory Words in the Stroop Task

We conducted four Stroop color–word experiments to examine how multiple stimuli influence interference. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that interference was strong when the word and color were integrated, and that visual and auditory words made independent contributions to interference when these words had different meanings. Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed this pattern when the word information and color information were not integrated, and hence when overall interference was substantially less. Auditory and visual interference effects are comparable except when the visual distracter is integrated with the color, in which case interference is substantially enhanced. Overall, these results are interpreted as being most consistent with a joint influence account of interference as opposed to a capture account.     

Detecting and identifying offset gaze

A number of experiments have demonstrated that observers can accurately identify stimuli that they fail to detect (Rollman and Nachmias, 1972; Harris and Fahle, 1995; Allik et al. 1982, 2014). Using a 2x2AFC double judgements procedure, we demonstrated an analogous pattern of performance in making judgements about the direction of eye gaze. Participants were shown two faces in succession: one with direct gaze and one with gaze offset to the left or right. We found that they could identify the direction of gaze offset (left/right) better than they could detect which face contained the offset gaze. A simple Thurstonian model, under which the detection judgement is shown to be more computationally complex, was found to explain the empirical data. A further experiment incorporated metacognitive ratings into the double judgements procedure to measure observers’ metacognitive awareness (Meta-d’) across the two judgements and to assess whether observers were aware of the evidence for offset gaze when detection performance was at and below threshold. Results suggest that metacognitive awareness is tied to performance, with approximately equal Meta-d’ across the two judgements, when sensitivity is taken into account. These results show that both performance and metacognitive awareness rely not only on the strength of sensory evidence but also on the computational complexity of the decision, which determines the relative distance of that evidence from the decision axes.