Children's difficulties handling dual identity

Thirty-nine 6-year-old children participated in a longitudinal study using tasks that required handling of dual identity. Pre- and posttest sessions employed tasks involving a protagonist who was partially informed about an object or person; for example, he knew an item as a ball but not as a present. Children who judged correctly that the protagonist did not know the ball was a present (thereby demonstrating some understanding of the consequences of limited information access), often judged incorrectly (1) that he knew that there was a present in the box, and (2) that he would search as if fully informed. Intervening sessions added contextual support and tried to clarify the experimenter's communicative intentions in a range of ways. Despite signs of general improvement, the distinctive pattern of errors persisted in every case. These findings go beyond previous studies of children's handling of limited information access, and are hard to accommodate within existing accounts of developing understanding of the mind.     

Children's understanding that utterances emanate from minds: using speaker belief to aid interpretation.

Children interpreted an utterance made by a protagonist with a false belief, such as, 'I would like the car in the garage.' Calculating the speaker's belief in conjunction with the literal meaning of the utterance would lead to the correct interpretation that the intended referent is the car on the track, given that the car in the garage swapped places with the one on the track. In Experiments 1 and 2, many children aged around 4 and 5 years wrongly indicated the car in the garage. In contrast, many correctly indicated the car on the track when it was unnecessary to consider the speaker's belief because the utterance was, 'the car I put in the garage'. Six-year-olds found both kinds of utterance equally easy in Experiment 1, while 3-year-olds had equal difficulty with both. In Experiments 2 and 3, the speaker gave an ambiguous utterance and many children aged between 3 and 6 years successfully used information about the speaker's belief to identify which of several candidate referents was intended. We discuss the results in relation to characteristics of utterance comprehension and consider implications for developments in understanding the mind by children beyond 4 years.     

Emotion Display as a Strategy for Identity Negotiation

Affect control theory provides a formal model of emotions, behavior, and identity shifts during social interaction. According to the theory, emotions provide information about both the identity of an emoting actor and how well current social events are confirming that identity. Actors can avoid or mitigate identity damage resulting from inappropriate behaviors by displaying certain emotions (e.g. remorse). Alternately, actors can expose their identities to social damage by displaying inappropriate affect while behaving otherwise normatively. Here we present experimental tests of eight hypotheses based on affect control-based simulations. We find that (1) display of emotions that are affectively congruent with behaviors can reduce damage to identity from harmful behaviors; (2) display of evaluatively incongruent emotions can actually contribute to a spoiled identity, even in the context of socially positive behaviors; and (3) emotions that are evaluatively congruent with behaviors make actors seem more powerful. Respondents feel that they understand and like actors more when they display normative, affectively congruent emotions. These results are complicated somewhat by responses to the emotion of anger. One hypothesis—that low potency emotions will make actors seem more powerful—is not confirmed. We interpret these results and suggest avenues for future research.     

Pathways to Risk Among Inner-City African-American Adolescent Females: The Influence of Gang Membership

Differential rates of participation in three categories of risk behaviors (i.e., sexual activity, substance use, violence) were explored, comparing gang members to nonmembers, within a sample of 1,143 inner-city African American adolescent females. The relationship between gang membership and risk behavior also was examined, by exploring the association between a variety of microsystemic influences (e.g., gang, family, school) and participation in risk behaviors. MANOVA analyses indicated that gang members, relative to nonmembers, reported higher rates of participation in each of the three categories of risk behaviors. Stepwise linear regression analyses indicated that gang membership was the variable with the most consistent predictive ability, across all categories of risk, as it entered early in all equations and remained in all three final models after controlling for other statistically significant contextual variables. Findings suggest that intervention efforts aimed at reducing adolescent females' participation in sexual activity, substance use, and violence should consider the influence of gang membership on the participation in these behaviors.     

Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection

It is observed that in ordinary everyday causal explanations often just one causal factor is mentioned. One causal factor carries the explanatory burden, even if there are several causal factors that are responsible for the event to be explained. This paper deals with the question of how to account for this explanatory selection. I argue for a pragmatic stance towards explanation, that we must attend to the question–answer situation as a whole and the context of the explanation. The context of an explanation includes the inquirer's and the explainer's beliefs and presuppositions relevant for the explanation-seeking question, and these are encoded in a reference class. Furthermore I argue that the explanation-giving answer contains an implicit counterfactual claim, the explanation-giving counterfactual. The solution to the problem of explanatory selection is to be found in the presuppositions encoded by the reference class and the eg-counterfactual. In short we select as explanatory that factor which, together with the presupposition encoded in the reference class we believe will make the eg-counterfactual true. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Infants’ responses to objects representing levels of word knowledge and categorical information

The effects of differing levels of word knowledge on infants’ sequential touching behaviors were investigated in two studies. In both, parent report was used to assess three levels of word knowledge: known, frontier, and unknown. In the first study, 14-month-old infants sequentially touched objects consistent with parents’ reports of their word knowledge. In the second study, 20-month-old infants sequentially touched objects by both conceptual category and reported level of word knowledge. It appears that even infants, like adults, can make distinctions among objects on the basis of their knowledge about the objects’ labels.