Which Is Better: Simultaneous or Sequential Choice?

The term "diversification bias" refers to the tendency for people to take more variety when choosing several items simultaneously than when choosing them sequentially. In this article, we investigate whether this really is a bias by measuring evaluations of sets chosen simultaneously or sequentially. In Experiment 1 participants made two choices between audio tracks for consecutive consumption. Participants liked low-variety sets most and were more likely to choose high-variety sets in simultaneous choice. In Experiment 2 participants chose between three gambles which varied in the probability of winning and their expected value. Again, simultaneous choices seemed worse than sequential ones: The simultaneous-choice groups took far more low expected value gambles than did sequential-choice subjects and rated their enjoyment as lower. We conclude that simultaneous choice often leads to outcomes that are worse than sequential choice and discuss the circumstances when this is likely to be true.     

Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous Presentation”1

Gordon Baker in his last decade published a series of papers (now collected in Baker 2004 ), which are revolutionary in their proposals for understanding of later Wittgenstein. Taking our lead from the first of those papers, on “perspicuous presentations,” we offer new criticisms of ‘elucidatory’ readers of later Wittgenstein, such as Peter Hacker: we argue that their readings fail to connect with the radically therapeutic intent of the ‘perspicuous presentation’ concept, as an achievement‐term, rather than a kind of ‘objective’ mapping of a ‘conceptual landscape.’ Baker's Wittgenstein, far from being a ‘language policeman’ of the kind that often fails to influence mainstream philosophy, offers an alternative to the latent scientism of Wittgenstein's influential ‘elucidatory’ readers.     

Beyond Just Justice – Creating Space for a Future‐Care Ethic

Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution. Modelling cross‐temporal relations on cross‐spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice metaphors rely on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and thereby on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the frame of “care”.     

Stability and change in genetic and environmental components of personality in old age

Stability and change in the mean levels and sources of variation in personality was examined. A sample of 149 monozygotic and 202 dizygotic twin pairs over 80 years were studied three times with a 2-year interval between measurement occasions. The Eysenck Personality Inventory to measure extraversion and neuroticism was used. Linear mixed models and Cholesky variance decomposition were carried out (age, gender and mortality controlled). High mean level stability was found in extraversion and neuroticism. Mortality was related to lower scores in extraversion and higher scores in neuroticism. In extraversion and neuroticism, genetic effects were moderate. Though no new genetic contributions emerged over time, significant new environmental effects were found over time. Controlling for mortality slightly increased genetic effect in extraversion.     

Why ‘Swampman’ Would Not Even Get as Far as Thinking it Was Davidson: On the Spatio‐temporal Basis of Davidson's Conjuring Trick

In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought‐experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson's Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson's Swampman as well as analysing the spatio‐temporal conditions of the thought‐experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn't take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman's creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson's. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought‐experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought‐experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self‐deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources.     

Reasons for sequence preferences

Much research shows that when it comes to preferences over sequences of money, such as a monthly paycheck, people do not always maximize present value. Rather, they often choose the lower‐valued of a pair of sequences, especially when it has attractive properties such as an increasing trend. To unearth the reasons for sequence preferences we conducted a verbal‐protocol analysis of choices between money sequences, including lifetime and one‐year earnings and one‐year lottery winnings, as well as lifetime health sequences. Participants thought aloud while choosing between visual representations of sequences. Their verbalizations contained reference to a wide range of previously hypothesized, as well as new, reasons for choice. These reasons were also correlated in sensible ways with the choices made. There was some evidence of solid economic reasoning (which we called maximization), although this was largely restricted to choices for one‐year earnings. More commonly, respondents did not distinguish between earnings and consumption, and thought about money as if they would automatically spend it at the rate it was received. This meant the most frequently given reason was what we called appropriateness—how well the money received at a given point matched the desired consumption at that point. Other common explanations include the expectedness of a sequence (we argue this is mediated by appropriateness), the way that parts of the sequence constitute reference points for other parts, and the ease with which incoming money can be managed (convenience). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Thomas Kuhn's Misunderstood Relation to Kripke-Putnam Essentialism

Kuhn's ‘taxonomic conception’ of natural kinds enables him to defend and re-specify the notion of incommensurability against the idea that it is reference, not meaning/use, that is overwhelmingly important. Kuhn's ghost still lacks any reason to believe that referentialist essentialism undercuts his central arguments in SSR – and indeed, any reason to believe that such essentialism is even coherent, considered as a doctrine about anything remotely resembling our actual science. The actual relation of Kuhn to Kripke-Putnam essentialism, is as follows: Kuhn decisively undermines it – drawing upon the inadequacies of such essentialism when faced with the failure of attempts to instantiate in history or contemporaneously its ‘thought-experiment’ – and leaves the field open instead for his own more ‘realistic’, deflationary way of thinking about the operation of ‘natural kinds’ in science. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories

Because image-enhancing technology is readily available, people are frequently exposed to doctored images. However, in prior research on how adults can be led to report false childhood memories, subjects have typically been exposed to personalized and detailed narratives describing false events. Instead, we exposed 20 subjects to a false childhood event via a fake photograph and imagery instructions. Over three interviews, subjects thought about a photograph showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guided-imagery exercises. Fifty percent of the subjects created complete or partial false memories. The results bear on ways in which false memories can be created and also have practical implications for those involved in clinical and legal settings.     

True photographs and false memories

Abstract— Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists advise clients to review old family photo albums to cue suspected "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse. Old photos might cue long-forgotten memories, but when combined with other suggestive influences they might also contribute to false memories. We asked 45 undergraduates to work at remembering three school-related childhood events (two true events provided by parents and one pseudoevent). By random assignment, 23 subjects were also given their school classes' group photos from the years of the to-be-recalled events as memory cues. As predicted, the rate of false-memory reports was dramatically higher in the photo condition than in the no-photo condition. Indeed, the rate of false-memory reports in the photo condition was substantially higher than the rate in any previously published study.