The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Against 'Time–Slices'

The concept of 'time–slice' turns out to be at best philosophically inconsequential, I argue. Influential philosophies of time as apparently diverse as those of Dummett, Lewis and Bergson, thus must come to grief. The very idea of 'time–slice' upon which they rest – the very idea of spatialising time, and of rendering the resulting 'slices' of potentially infinitely small measure – turns out on closer acquaintance not to amount to anything consequential that has yet been made sense of. Time is, rather, a ubiquitous lived 'tool' for the organisation and co–ordination of human activities, a tool so completely involved in those activities that Anti–Realism about it is as unstateable as Realism about it is unnecessary.     

Stop Thinking and Start Doing: Switching From Cognitive Therapy to Behavioral Activation in a Case of Chronic Treatment-Resistant Depression

Several recent investigations have demonstrated that Cognitive Therapy (CT) and Behavioral Activation (BA) are both efficacious treatments for depression (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Dimidjian et al., 2006; Dobson, 1989; Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & Blackburn, 1998; Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002; Jacobson et al., 1996). This investigation focuses on the treatment of Mr. X, a 62-year-old man with chronic treatment-resistant depression and comorbid personality pathology. After a course of 21 sessions of CT, treatment was switched to BA. We present daily mood data from 147 days of each treatment. Generalized least squares analyses of these time series data demonstrated that BA was associated with improved mood and these results were supported by clinical observation of improved functioning during the course of BA. We hypothesize that efforts at cognitive restructuring had an iatrogenic effect on this client and paradoxically triggered depressive rumination; these failed efforts provided further evidence in support of his underlying defectiveness schema. We also speculate that this client's dependent personality ran counter to CT's emphasis on autonomous homework assignments. Future randomized clinical trials are needed to investigate if nonresponders to CT benefit by switching to BA.     

The Dynamics of Personality Approach (DPA): 20 Tenets for Uncovering the Causal Mechanisms of Personality

Over the last few decades, most personality psychology research has been focused on assessing personality via scores on a few broad traits and investigating how these scores predict various behaviours and outcomes. This approach does not seek to explain the causal mechanisms underlying human personality and thus falls short of explaining the proximal sources of traits as well as the variation of individuals' behaviour over time and across situations. On the basis of the commonalities shared by influential process-oriented personality theories and models, we describe a general dynamics of personality approach (DPA). The DPA relies heavily on theoretical principles applicable to complex adaptive systems that self-regulate via feedback mechanisms, and it parses the sources of personality in terms of various psychological functions relevant in different phases of self-regulation. Thus, we consider personality to be rooted in individual differences in various cognitive, emotional–motivational, and volitional functions, as well as their causal interactions. In this article, we lay out 20 tenets for the DPA that may serve as a guideline for integrative research in personality science. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

The similarity heuristic

Decision makers often make snap judgments using fast‐and‐frugal decision rules called cognitive heuristics. Research into cognitive heuristics has been divided into two camps. One camp has emphasized the limitations and biases produced by the heuristics; another has focused on the accuracy of heuristics and their ecological validity. In this paper we investigate a heuristic proposed by the first camp, using the methods of the second. We investigate a subset of the representativeness heuristic we call the “similarity” heuristic, whereby decision makers who use it judge the likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to which it is similar to others in that category. We provide a mathematical model of the heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment. In this environment, the similarity heuristic turns out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it is also how choices are made. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of how our work fits in the broader “fast‐and‐frugal” heuristics program, and of the boundary conditions for the similarity heuristic. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Documents

The Great Revival: the Russian Church under German Occupation by W. Alexeev and T. G. Stavrou, Minneapolis, 1976, xvi+229 pp. No price.

The Religious World ol Russian Culture. Essays in Honour of Georges Florovsky, Vol. 11 Russia and Orthodoxy edited by Andrew Blane, Mouton, The Hague and Paris, 1975, 359 pp. No price.

The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets by Salo W. Baron, Macmillan, New York, 1976, $14.96.

The Jews in Russia ‐ their History in Maps and Thotographs by Martin Gilbert, National Council of Soviet Jewry, 78 pp., 8op.

The Baptist Church: Illusions and Reality (Baptizm: illyuzii i realnost) by G. S. Lyalina, “Politizdat”, Moscow, 1977, 175 pp., 37 kopecks.

Questions of Scientific Atheism (Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma) No. 17, “Mysl”, Moscow, 1975, 399 pp.     

Situation models and memory: The effects of temporal and causal information on recall sequence

Participants watched an episode of the television show Cheers on video and then reported free recall. Recall sequence followed the sequence of events in the story; if one concept was observed immediately after another, it was recalled immediately after it. We also made a causal network of the show's story and found that recall sequence followed causal links; effects were recalled immediately after their causes. Recall sequence was more likely to follow causal links than temporal sequence, and most likely to follow causal links that were temporally sequential. Results were similar at 10-minute and 1-week delayed recall. This is the most direct and detailed evidence reported on sequential effects in recall. The causal network also predicted probability of recall; concepts with more links and concepts on the main causal chain were most likely to be recalled. This extends the causal network model to more complex materials than previous research.