A generalized probabilistic theory of causal relevance

I advance a new theory of causal relevance, according to which causal claims convey information about conditional probability functions. This theory is motivated by the problem of disjunctive factors, which haunts existing probabilistic theories of causation. After some introductory remarks, I present in Section 3 a sketch of Eells's (1991) probabilistic theory of causation, which provides the framework for much of the discussion. Section 4 explains how the problem of disjunctive factors arises within this framework. After rejecting three proposed solutions, I offer in Section 6 a new approach to causation that avoids the problem. Decision-theoretic considerations also support the new approach. Section 8 develops the consequences of the new theory for causal explanation. The resulting theory of causal explanation incorporates the new insights while respecting important work on scientific explanation by Salmon (1971), Railton (1981), and Humphreys (1989). My conclusions are enumerated in Section 9.I would like to thank Nuel Belnap, John Earman, Richard Gale, Paul Humphreys, Satish Iyengar, Wes Salmon, and two anonymous referees for comments and discussion. I am also indebted to the members of an audience at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, where some of the ideas contained in this paper were presented.     

Solving deductive-reasoning problems after unilateral temporal lobectomy

The possible functional role of mental imagery in solving deductive-reasoning problems was investigated. Patients with left or right temporal lobectomies and normal control subjects had 32 different solvable three-term series problems read to them. Almost all subjects in the control and in the right-temporal-lobe groups reported consistent use of imagery in solving these problems, whereas less than half the left-temporal-lobe group reported using such a strategy. Overall, the left-temporal-lobe group was impaired relative to both the right-temporal and control groups. The right-temporal-lobe group was impaired only when the form of the question asked was not congruent with the form of the information in the premises. It was concluded that either (a) the left-temporal-lobe group had an unexpectedly large verbal comprehension deficit, or (b) the form of imagery utilized in solving deductive-reasoning problems is based upon verbal symbolic information, and as such is mediated by the left hemisphere.     

The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims

Following Dretske (1977), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in causal claims. Following van Fraassen (1980), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in explanations and explanation-requesting why-questions. Amazingly, the two bodies of literature have remained almost entirely disjoint. With an understanding of the contrastive nature of ordinary causal claims, and of the linguistic roles of contrastive stress, it is possible to provide a unified account of both phenomena. I provide such an account from within the framework of a probabilistic theory of causation. Relations of screening-off, long familiar to researchers in probabilistic causality, play a central role in this account.I would like to thank the following people for comments upon earlier drafts of this paper: Frank Arntzenius, Eric Barnes, Nuel Belnap, Alex Byrne, John Carroll, Fiona Cowie, Alan Hájek, David Hilbert, Carl Hoefer, Marc Lange, Wes Salmon, Cindy Stern, Nigel Thomas, and Jim Woodward.     

Emotional arousal and memory: a test of the poststimulus processing hypothesis

Emotional arousal is believed to enhance memory for details central to an episode but impair memory for peripheral details. However, new research suggests that arousal induced thematically (i.e., through involvement with an unfolding event) produces only memory enhancements. This article examines whether consciously controlled elaborative processing in the aftermath of an arousing experience is responsible. A dual task manipulation was used to prevent participants from ruminating over a video that depicted an abduction and attack. Several indices of recall showed greater memory for emotional event details than for details from a neutral control video, which remained the case when the opportunity for post-stimulus elaboration was prevented. Thus, superior retention of the content of emotional experiences may arise from the way in which arousal is induced rather than through immediate postevent cognitions.     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.