The role of the agranular insular cortex in anticipation of reward contrast

Sixteen male Long-Evans rats were tested on a modified version of Flaherty et al.'s [Flaherty, C. F., Turovsky, J., & Krauss, K. L. (1994). Relative hedonic value modulates anticipatory contrast. Physiology and Behavior, 55, 1047-1054.] anticipatory contrast paradigm to assess memory for the anticipation of reward. Prior to testing each rat received either a control or quinolinic acid induced lesion of the agranular insular cortex. In the home cage, each rat was allowed to drink a water solution containing 2% sucrose for 3 min followed by a water solution containing 32% sucrose for 3 min. Across 10 days of testing, the control rats showed significantly increased anticipatory discriminability as a function of days. In contrast, rats with agranular insular cortex lesions failed to show anticipatory discriminability. The results of a preference task revealed that both groups could perceptually discriminate between a 2% and a 32% sucrose solution. The data suggest that the agranular insular cortex may be involved in the anticipation of reward.     

Cholinergic modulation of Pavlovian fear conditioning in rats: differential effects of intrahippocampal infusion of mecamylamine and methyllycaconitine

The cholinergic system has consistently been implicated in Pavlovian fear conditioning. Considerable work has been done to localize specific nicotinic receptor subtypes in the hippocampus and determine their functional importance; however, the specific function of many of these subtypes has yet to be determined. An alpha7 nicotinic antagonist methyllycaconitine (MLA) (35 microg), and a broad spectrum non-alpha7 nicotinic antagonist mecamylamine (35 microg) was injected directly into the dorsal hippocampus or overlying cortex either 15 min pre-, 1 min post-, or 6h post-fear conditioning. One week after conditioning, retention of contextual and cue (tone) conditioning were assessed. A significant impairment in retention of contextual fear was observed when mecamylamine was injected 15 min pre- and 1 min post-conditioning. No significant impairment was observed when mecamylamine was injected 6h post-conditioning. Likewise, a significant impairment in retention of contextual fear was observed when MLA was injected 1 min post-conditioning; however, in contrast, MLA did not show any significant impairments when injected 15 min pre-conditioning, but did show a significant impairment when injected 6h post-conditioning. There were no significant impairments observed when either drug was injected into overlying cortex. No significant impairments were observed in cue conditioning for either drug. In general, specific temporal dynamics involved in nicotinic receptor function were found relative to time of receptor dysfunction. The results indicate that the greatest deficits in long-term retention (1 week) of contextual fear are produced by central infusion of MLA minutes to hours post-conditioning or mecamylamine within minutes of conditioning.     

Brain, emotion and decision making: the paradigmatic example of regret

Human decisions cannot be explained solely by rational imperatives but are strongly influenced by emotion. Theoretical and behavioral studies provide a sound empirical basis to the impact of the emotion of regret in guiding choice behavior. Recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging data have stressed the fundamental role of the orbitofrontal cortex in mediating the experience of regret. Functional magnetic resonance imaging data indicate that reactivation of activity within the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala occurring during the phase of choice, when the brain is anticipating possible future consequences of decisions, characterizes the anticipation of regret. In turn, these patterns reflect learning based on cumulative emotional experience. Moreover, affective consequences can induce specific mechanisms of cognitive control of the choice processes, involving reinforcement or avoidance of the experienced behavior.     

The Perverse Effects of Competition on Scientists’ Work and Relationships

Competition among scientists for funding, positions and prestige, among other things, is often seen as a salutary driving force in U.S. science. Its effects on scientists, their work and their relationships are seldom considered. Focus-group discussions with 51 mid- and early-career scientists, on which this study is based, reveal a dark side of competition in science. According to these scientists, competition contributes to strategic game-playing in science, a decline in free and open sharing of information and methods, sabotage of others’ ability to use one’s work, interference with peer-review processes, deformation of relationships, and careless or questionable research conduct. When competition is pervasive, such effects may jeopardize the progress, efficiency and integrity of science.     

Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

Revisiting the predictive validity of emotional intelligence: self-report versus ability-based measures

In response to general press assertions that training emotionally intelligent children will lead to great rewards, this study examined the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI) and academic achievement in college students, using both self-report and ability-based measures of EI. Specifically, the Mayer, Salovey, Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, an ability-based measure) and the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i, a self-report measure) were used to predict academic achievement. Achievement was operationalized as the respondents’ cumulative GPA. Results indicated that EI is not a strong predictor of academic achievement regardless of the type of instrument used to measure it. However, a construct validity examination revealed that the MSCEIT correlated highly with indices of cognitive ability but minimally with personality dimensions. In contrast, the EQ-i failed to correlate with indices of cognitive ability but correlated substantially with numerous personality dimensions.     

Optimism and Attributional Retraining: Longitudinal Effects on Academic Achievement,Test Anxiety,and Voluntary Course Withdrawal in College Students1

A longitudinal study examined how optimism and attributional retraining (AR) influenced 256 first‐year college students' test anxiety, cumulative academic achievement, and course persistence in college over an academic year. Students' optimism was assessed at the start of the academic year and they were assigned to either an AR or no‐AR (control) condition. Measures of students' test anxiety, cumulative grade point average, and voluntary course withdrawal were obtained at the end of the academic year. Results suggest that although high optimism was an academic risk factor among students who did not receive AR, high‐optimism students who did receive the AR cognitive intervention benefited from its effects to a greater extent than did low‐optimism students.     

One missing-letter effect: two methods of assessment.

When participants search for a target letter while reading, they make more omissions if the target letter is embedded in frequent function words than in less frequent content words. This effect is usually observed with a paper and pencil procedure. It has been shown that a similar pattern is observed using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure in which words appear one at a time on a computer screen. It has been questioned, however, whether the two methods tap the same cognitive processes. Item-based correlations between the paper and pencil and the rapid serial visual presentation procedure were high and not significantly different from reliability estimates of either procedure. It is concluded that both procedures highlight the same cognitive processes that are responsible for the missing-letter effect.