Automated behavioral experiments with individually marked bees

Two automated techniques for investigating appetitive conditioning in honeybees are described. In the first method, free-flying bees conditioned to color marks are detected automatically at their approach to a color target. The second method allows the detection and separation of individually marked bees. At least 10 different bees can be processed and differentially detected at the same time. Each bee may control its own reward and test procedure. Computeraided data analysis and experimental procedures are described. Illustrative experiments on conditioning and choice behavior are reported.     

The cultural moral right to a basic minimum of accessible health care

(1) The conception of a cultural moral right is useful in capturing the social-moral realities that underlie debate about universal health care. In asserting such rights, individuals make claims above and beyond their legal rights, but those claims are based on the society's existing commitments and moral culture. In the United States such a right to accessible basic health care is generated by various empirical social facts, primarily the conjunction of the legal requirement of access to emergency care with widely held principles about unfair free riding and just sharing of costs between well and ill. The right can get expressed in social policy through either single-payer or mandated insurance. (2) The same elements that generate this right provide modest assistance in determining its content, the structure and scope of a basic minimum of care. They justify limits on patient cost sharing, require comparative effectiveness, and make cost considerations relevant. They shed light on the status of expensive, marginally life extending, last-chance therapies, as well as life support for PVS patients. They are of less assistance in settling contentious debates about screening for breast and prostate cancer and treatments for infertility and erectile dysfunction, but even there they establish a useful framework for discussion. Scarcity of resources need not be a leading conceptual consideration in discerning a basic minimum. More important are the societal elements that generate the cultural moral right to a basic minimum.     

Appearance-related teasing,body dissatisfaction,and disordered eating: A meta-analysis

A meta-analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between appearance and weight-based teasing and three outcome measures: body dissatisfaction, restrictive eating, and bulimic behaviors. Four meta-analyses were conducted. Fifty effect sizes (N = 10,618) resulted in a moderate effect size of .39 for the relationship between weight teasing and body dissatisfaction; 24 effect sizes (N = 7190) resulted in an effect size of .32 for the relationship between appearance teasing and body dissatisfaction; 20 effect sizes (N = 4792) resulted in an effect size of .35 for the relationship between weight teasing and dietary restraint; and 22 effect sizes (N = 5091) resulted in an effect size of .36 for the relationship between weight teasing and bulimic behaviors. Significant moderators that emerged were teasing measure type, publication type, study type, age group, and gender. The findings offer further support for the inclusion of strategies in body image and eating disorders’ prevention and intervention programs that focus on handling negative, appearance-related commentary.     

The basic notion of justification

Conclusion Our tasks are then complete. We offered, in J7, a defensible claim that there is a relation of necessity and sufficiency between doxastic and propositional justification. We claimed as well that propositional justification is the basic kind of justification. In order to defend this claim, several tasks were undertaken. First, a preliminary investigation showed that there are at most three irreducible kinds of justification. In order to show that there is only one kind, we first showed how personal justification is equivalent to doxastic justification. We then showed that, whereas doxastic justification can be defined in terms of propositional justification, propositional justification cannot be defined in terms of that kind of doxastic justification predicable of tokens of beliefs. We conclude that propositional justification is the basic kinds of justification.These results have implications both for the substance of epistemology and for the methodology employed in constructing an epistemological theory. First, no version of reliabilism can be defended by claiming that there are fundamentally distinct and irreducible notions of justification. Further, the procedure adopted by those versions of reliabilism which count as instances of Aristotelian epistemology cannot be correct. Such theories begin by discussing our intellectual powers, faculties, virtues, or cognitive processes and then define a primitive notion of justification in terms of the doxastic products of such powers, faculties, virtues, or processes. This approach cannot succeed, for, as we have seen, no such theory can given an adequate explanation of the connection between doxastic and propositional justification. For these theories to succeed, one of three alternatives must be available. The first is that propositional justification is explicable in terms of doxastic justification; as we have seen, that claim is false. The second and third alternatives are that Aristotelians either might claim irreducibility between propositional and doxastic justification, or the might hold that, for some reason or other, there is no such thing as propositional justification. Both of these alternatives are unattractive because of the plausibility of J7. If it is adequate, then doxastic justification is explicable in terms of propositional justification. Further, if J7 is adequate, claiming that there is no such thing as propositional justification puts the notion of doxastic justification in jeopardy as well, for doxastic justification is definable in terms of propositional justification. In sum: present reliabilist theories which hold that justification is the result of the proper employment of our cognitive equipment, and which are thereby committed to constructing a theory of justification with doxastic justification as the basic notion of justification, are incompatible with the fact that propositional justification is the basic kind of justification.     

Multiple birth and its influence on the mothering experience: A case study of parent/infant psychotherapy with quadruplets

The treatment of a mother of quadruplets during the first year of the infants' lives serves as a case example of the issues associated with a multiple birth and how these issues can be addressed via parent/infant psychotherapy. Issues concerning an individual's self-esteem, dependency, envy, and competency as a parent are exaggerated by a multiple birth. The ensuing developmental crisis provides an ideal opportunity for therapeutic work.     

Integrative Properties of the Pe1 Neuron, a Unique Mushroom Body Output Neuron

A mushroom body extrinsic neuron, the Pe1 neuron, connects the peduncle of the mushroom body (MB) with two areas of the protocerebrum in the honeybee brain, the lateral protocerebral lobe (LPL) and the ring neuropil around the α-lobe. Each side of the bee brain contains only one Pe1 neuron. Using a combination of intracellular recording and neuroanatomical techniques we analyzed its properties of integrative processing of the different sensory modalities. The Pe1 neuron responds to visual, mechanosensory, and olfactory stimuli. The responses are broadly tuned, consisting of a sustained increase of spike frequency to the onset and offset of light flashes, to horizontal and vertical movements of extended objects, to mechanical stimuli applied to the antennae or mouth parts, and to all olfactory stimuli tested (29 chemicals). These multisensory properties are reflected in its dendritic organization. Serial reconstructions of intracellularly stained Pe1 neurons using confocal microscopy reveal that the Pe1 neuron arborizes throughout all layers of MB peduncle with finger-like, vertically oriented dendrites. The peduncle of the MB is formed by the axons of Kenyon cells, whose dendritic inputs are organized in modality-specific subcompartments of the calyx region. The peduncular arborization indicates that the Pe1 neuron receives input from Kenyon cells of all calycal subcompartments. Because the Pe1 neuron changes its odor responses transiently as a consequence of olfactory learning, we hypothesize that the multimodal response properties might have a role in memory consolidation and help to establish contextual references in the long-term trace.     

Learning reward expectations in honeybees

The aim of this study was to test whether honeybees develop reward expectations. In our experiment, bees first learned to associate colors with a sugar reward in a setting closely resembling a natural foraging situation. We then evaluated whether and how the sequence of the animals’ experiences with different reward magnitudes changed their later behavior in the absence of reinforcement and within an otherwise similar context. We found that the bees that had experienced increasing reward magnitudes during training assigned more time to flower inspection 24 and 48 h after training. Our design and behavioral measurements allowed us to uncouple the signal learning and the nutritional aspects of foraging from the effects of subjective reward values. We thus found that the animals behaved differently neither because they had more strongly associated the related predicting signals nor because they were fed more or faster. Our results document for the first time that honeybees develop long-term expectations of reward; these expectations can guide their foraging behavior after a relatively long pause and in the absence of reinforcement, and further experiments will aim toward an elucidation of the neural mechanisms involved in this form of learning.