Psychological empowerment, job satisfaction and performance among Filipino service workers

The present study surveyed 954 employees and their supervisors to determine the relationship of empowerment with job satisfaction and performance in five different service sectors: hotels, food service, banking, call centers, and airlines. Psychological empowerment was positively correlated with both job satisfaction and performance. Although intrinsic motivation was associated with higher levels of empowerment and job satisfaction, contrary to hypothesis, intrinsic motivation did not moderate the relationship between empowerment and job satisfaction and performance. Men reported greater empowerment than women even when job level and performance were controlled for. Cross-industry analyses indicated differences in empowerment across different types of service sectors with employees in call centers reporting less empowerment compared to employees in hotel, airlines, food establishments, and banks.     

Bilateral opercular syndrome and crossed aphemia due to a right insular lesion: A clinicopathological study

A right-handed male patient suddenly noted lower bilateral facial and lingual palsy, and inability to masticate and swallow, but with preserved automatic functions. He was mute, communicating only through writing, but verbal comprehension was normal (aphemia). On anatomopathological examination, an ischemic infarction of the entire right insula, with mild extension to the fronto-temporoparietal operculum was observed. The left hemisphere was normal. The clinical findings suggest a bilateral opercular syndrome due to a right hemisphere lesion and a crossed aphemia.     

Signal detection and localization by real observers

A model for detection and localization (DAL) was applied to the processing of a noise-masked tonal signal by human Ss. The model was supported in that consistent values of d’ were obtained from rating. forced-choice (FC). and DAL procedures. Also. the rating d’ accurately predicted per cent correct on the FC and DAL trials. A shortcoming of the theory was its failure to account satisfactorily for the details of FC and DAL stimulus-response matrices.     

Religiosity and Cancer Screening

Churches have been suggested as avenues to reach African-American populations with messages about health because of their strong participation in church activities. Membership in several religious denominations has been associated with healthy lifestyle practices that are associated with lower cancer-incidence rates and better coping strategies among cancer patients. Among African-American women, however, belief in God as their doctor might preempt seeking treatment for cancer. The goal of the present study was to examine the influence of church participation and religious beliefs on the utilization of breast and cervical cancer screening among low-income, predominantly African-American women. A cohort consisting of 290 women was surveyed at baseline and one year later to determine the association between screening rates in the past year and measures of religiosity. The majority of women were members of a church (88%), with fairly regular church attendance (51% reported weekly attendance), and strong beliefs regarding God's influence on their health (e.g. 88% agreed that God was their doctor). Church attendance was the only religious variable related to screening frequency in univariate analyses, with those reporting attending church 1–3 times per month more likely to receive mammography screening (p = .013). Churches can provide avenues to reach African-American women about cancer screening; strong religious beliefs do not, however, appear to keep women from receiving regular screening exams.     

Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups

According to the psychological essentialism perspective, people tend to explain differences between groups by attributing them different essences. Given a pervasive ethnocentrism, this tendency implies that the human essence will be restricted to the ingroup whereas outgroups will receive a lesser degree of humanity. Therefore, it is argued that people attribute more uniquely human characteristics to the ingroup than to the outgroup. The present article focuses on secondary emotions that constitute such characteristics. Study 1 showed that members of high‐ and low‐status groups attribute more positive secondary emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Study 2 verified that the differential attribution extended also to negative secondary emotions. No exemplars of emotions were provided in Study 3. Instead, participants had to estimate the means of two distributions of numbers that supposedly represented characteristics of the ingroup and of the outgroup. The results of this third experiment illustrated the reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. The findings are discussed from the perspective of psychological essentialism. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reduced fixation on the upper area of personally familiar faces following acquired prosopagnosia

Selective impairment of face recognition following brain damage, as in acquired prosopagnosia, may cause a dramatic loss of diagnosticity of the eye area of the face and an increased reliance on the mouth for identification ( Caldara et al., 2005 ). To clarify the nature of this phenomenon, we measured eye fixation patterns in a case of pure prosopagnosia (PS, Rossion et al., 2003 ) during her identification of photographs of personally familiar faces (27 children of her kindergarten). Her age‐matched colleague served as a control. Consistent with previous evidence, the normal control identified the faces within two fixations located just below the eyes (central upper nose). This pattern (location and duration) of fixations remained unchanged even by increasing difficulty by presenting anti‐caricatures of the faces. In contrast, the great majority of the patient's fixations, irrespective of her accuracy, were located on the mouth. Overall, these observations confirm the abnormally reduced processing of the upper area of the face in acquired prosopagnosia. Most importantly, the prosopagnosic patient also fixated the area of the eyes spontaneously in between the first and last fixation, ruling out alternative accounts of her behaviour such as, for example, avoidance or failure to orient attention to the eyes, as observed in autistic or bilateral amygdala patients. Rather, they reinforce our proposal of a high‐level perceptual account ( Caldara et al., 2005 ), according to which acquired prosopagnosic patients have lost the ability to represent multiple elements of an individual face as a perceptual unit (holistic face perception). To identify a given face, they focus very precisely on local features rather than seeing the whole of a face from its diagnostic centre (i.e. just below the eyes). The upper area of the face is particularly less attended to and less relevant for the prosopagnosic patient because it contains multiple features that require normal holistic perception in order to be the most diagnostic region. Consequently, prosopagnosic patients develop a more robust representation of the mouth, a relatively isolated feature in the face that may contain more information than any single element of the upper face area, and is thus sampled repeatedly for resolving ambiguity in the process of identification.     

Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

A ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist (in some form or other). I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical (hence, according to the moral error theorist, ontologically problematic) if and only if epistemic reasons are.     

On the Deductive System of the Order of an Equationally Orderable Quasivariety

We consider the equationally orderable quasivarieties and associate with them deductive systems defined using the order. The method of definition of these deductive systems encompasses the definition of logics preserving degrees of truth we find in the research areas of substructural logics and mathematical fuzzy logic. We prove several general results, for example that the deductive systems so defined are finitary and that the ones associated with equationally orderable varieties are congruential.