The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs

Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.     

Decisions from experience: Why small samples?

In many decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the risks involved in our actions. In lieu of such data, we can arrive at an understanding of our dicey options by sampling from them. The size of the samples that we take determines, ceteris paribus, how good our choices will be. Studies of decisions from experience have observed that people tend to rely on relatively small samples from payoff distributions, and small samples are at times rendered even smaller because of recency. We suggest one contributing and previously unnoticed reason for reliance on frugal search: Small samples amplify the difference between the expected earnings associated with the payoff distributions, thus making the options more distinct and choice easier. We describe the magnitude of this amplification effect, and the potential costs that it exacts, and we empirically test four of its implications.     

A review of the profile of mood states (POMS) in the prediction of athletic success

Abstract

The Profile of Mood States (POMS) is a self-report inventory that has been used by numerous researchers attempting to identify the personality states that reliably differentiate athletes of differing levels of ability. The paper began by reviewing the studies by Nagle, Morgan, Hellichn, serfass, and Alexander (1975). Morgan and Pollock (1977), and Morgan and Johnson (1978). These studies popularized the use of the POMS in the sport setting The review highlighted the fact that the POMS was orighally employed as one of several psychological inventories desighed to assess an athlete's state of mental health. Specifically, these studies hypothesized that successfid athletes would possess more positive emotional and mental health than unsuccessfid athletes. With respect to the POMS this would be reflected by successful athletes scoring lower than unsuccessfid athletes on the scales of depression, tension, anger, fatigue, and confusion and higher than unsuccessful athletes on the scale of vigor. The POMS was found to be of limited value in diffkreutiating the successll from unsuccessful athlete. Despite this fact, studies Continued to be published that examined the POMS' ability to diffrrentiate athletes of diffenhg levels of ability. This misunderstanding is attributed to researchers' Mure to distinguish between two common approaches to the study of entiate a) the athlete from the nonathlete and, b) athletes of differing levels of ability. The Profile of Mood States (POMS) is a self-report inventory that has been used by numerous researchers attempting to identify the personality states that reliably differentiate athletes of differing levels of ability.     

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.     

The Religious Schema Scale: Construction and Initial Validation of a Quantitative Measure for Religious Styles

This article presents the Religious Schema Scale (RSS). Its conceptual background is the model of religious styles. After a conceptual discussion of the relation between religious styles and religious schemata, the steps of scale construction are reported. Based on 822 responses from research participants in the United States and Germany to a preliminary 78-item version, we used construct-oriented iterative and factor-analytic procedures for reducing the RSS to a 15-item version that consists of three 5-item subscales with acceptable reliabilities. Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the RSS has a robust 3-factor structure, which is cross-culturally valid in both the United States and Germany. We report correlations of the RSS with the Big Five, Psychological Well-Being, Religious Fundamentalism, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. We also present predictive characteristics of the RSS in regard to Fowler's stages of faith. Finally, we report results on the incremental validity of the RSS.