Poison-drinking in obedience to the faith: a phenomenological study of the experience

In Appalachia, there are certain Christian sects who handle venomous serpents in their church services. Although their serpent handling has received some attention, another of their practices, poison-drinking, has all but escaped the concern of investigators. Addressing this issue, this study included phenomenological interviews with seven believers who ingested strychnine at church. A hermeneutic analysis of their transcribed interviews discovered four major themes that emerged across all protocols to describe the structure of meaning in the experience of poison-drinking: (1) Desire to Drink; (2) “God Moving on Me” (in terms of Anointing and “Insurance” against Harm); (3) Already “Snake Bit”; and (4) “Victory”/“Devil Troubling My Mind”. These interdependent themes are discussed in relation to the existential grounds of body, others, time, and world.     

Retrieval failure versus memory loss in experimental amnesia: definitions and processes

For at least 40 years, there has been a recurring argument concerning the nature of experimental amnesia, with one side arguing that amnesic treatments interfere with the formation of enduring memories and the other side arguing that these treatments interfere with the expression of memories that were effectively encoded. The argument appears to stem from a combination of (1) unclear definitions and (2) real differences in the theoretical vantages that underlie the interpretation of relevant data. Here we speak to how the field might avoid arguments that are definitional in nature and how various hypotheses fare in light of published data. Existing but often overlooked data favor very rapid (milliseconds) synaptic consolidation, with experimental amnesia reflecting, at least in part, deficits in retrieval rather than in the initial storage of information.     

An experimental study on fear of public speaking using a virtual environment.

This paper examines a necessary condition for successful exploitation of a virtual environment (VE) in therapeutic intervention for fear of public speaking. The condition is that clients experience a degree of anxiety in the VE that is similar to what they would have been expected to experience in a similar real world setting. We refer to this as a "presence" response. The experimental study involved 20 people who were confident public speakers and 16 who were phobic, assessed on a standard psychological scale. Half of each group spoke within a VE depicting an empty seminar room, and the other half within the same room but populated by a neutrally behaving virtual audience of five people. Three responses were measured--a questionnaire-based measure of anxiety, a measure of self-focused attention on somatic responses, and actual heart rate. On all responses, the people with phobia showed a significant increase in signs of anxiety when speaking to the virtual audience compared to the empty room, whereas the confident people did not. The result was strong in spite of the relatively low representational and behavioral fidelity of the virtual characters.     

The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs

Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.     

Stability in cognition across early childhood. A developmental cascade

Children confront the formidable task of assimilating information in the environment and accommodating their cognitive structures to that information. Developmental science is concerned equally with two distinctive features of these processes: children's group mean level of performance through time and the standing of individual children through time. Prevailing opinion since the inception of the mental-measurement movement has been that individual development is unstable-that individual children change unpredictably in their abilities. We report results of a large-scale controlled, multivariate, prospective, microgenetic, 4-year longitudinal study that reveals a statistically significant cascade of species-typical cognitive abilities from infancy to childhood. Infancy is a recognizable starting point of life; we find that to a small but significant degree, infancy also represents a setting point in the life of the individual.     

Decisions from experience: Why small samples?

In many decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the risks involved in our actions. In lieu of such data, we can arrive at an understanding of our dicey options by sampling from them. The size of the samples that we take determines, ceteris paribus, how good our choices will be. Studies of decisions from experience have observed that people tend to rely on relatively small samples from payoff distributions, and small samples are at times rendered even smaller because of recency. We suggest one contributing and previously unnoticed reason for reliance on frugal search: Small samples amplify the difference between the expected earnings associated with the payoff distributions, thus making the options more distinct and choice easier. We describe the magnitude of this amplification effect, and the potential costs that it exacts, and we empirically test four of its implications.     

A review of the profile of mood states (POMS) in the prediction of athletic success

Abstract

The Profile of Mood States (POMS) is a self-report inventory that has been used by numerous researchers attempting to identify the personality states that reliably differentiate athletes of differing levels of ability. The paper began by reviewing the studies by Nagle, Morgan, Hellichn, serfass, and Alexander (1975). Morgan and Pollock (1977), and Morgan and Johnson (1978). These studies popularized the use of the POMS in the sport setting The review highlighted the fact that the POMS was orighally employed as one of several psychological inventories desighed to assess an athlete's state of mental health. Specifically, these studies hypothesized that successfid athletes would possess more positive emotional and mental health than unsuccessfid athletes. With respect to the POMS this would be reflected by successful athletes scoring lower than unsuccessfid athletes on the scales of depression, tension, anger, fatigue, and confusion and higher than unsuccessful athletes on the scale of vigor. The POMS was found to be of limited value in diffkreutiating the successll from unsuccessful athlete. Despite this fact, studies Continued to be published that examined the POMS' ability to diffrrentiate athletes of diffenhg levels of ability. This misunderstanding is attributed to researchers' Mure to distinguish between two common approaches to the study of entiate a) the athlete from the nonathlete and, b) athletes of differing levels of ability. The Profile of Mood States (POMS) is a self-report inventory that has been used by numerous researchers attempting to identify the personality states that reliably differentiate athletes of differing levels of ability.