Rethinking homosexuality: what it teaches us about psychoanalysis

This presentation, written ten years after the American Psychoanalytic Association adopted a nondiscrimination policy with regard to sexual orientation, discusses the evolving relationship between psychoanalysis and homosexuality. The paper is in three sections: (1) the process of policy change and the overturning of injustice; (2) the excursion after Freud's death into analytic bias and extreme pathologizing of homosexuality, the struggle to overcome those distortions, and the lessons to be learned from this history; and (3) the search, in the coming decade, for new understanding of homosexuality and all aspects of sexuality.     

Privacy and the encryption debate

Conclusion Robert Heinlein, author of Stranger in a Strange Land as well as countless other science fiction stories, once claimed that "The sole thing achieved by any privacy law is to make the bugs smaller." Heinlein may be correct, but that travesties will happen does not sanction them—and maybe we will invent bugs to root out and foil other bugs. I have argued for individual privacy rights or rights to control sensitive personal information. The explosion of digital technology has made possible severe violations of individual privacy by corporations, news agencies, and the government. If I am correct about all of this, one commonly used "public interest" argument given for limiting privacy rights has been undermined. It is also far from true to claim that the prevalence of strong encryption technology will lead to disaster. While I do not adhere to the view that "rights hold, though the heavens may fall," in this article I have maintained that the security arguments of law enforcement do not come close to meeting the threshold for violating privacy rights. The heavens are far from falling. He is the author of, "Employee Monitoring and Computer Technology" (forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly), "Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information Control," American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (October 1998) and is the editor of Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), in which he contributes "Introduction to Intellectual Property" and "Toward A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property."     

Predicting individual differences in attention, memory, and planning in first graders from experiences at home, child care, and school

This study adds to the growing literature linking children's experiences in the environment to individual differences in their developing skills in attention, memory, and planning. The authors asked about the extent to which stimulating and sensitive care in the family and in the child-care or school environments would predict these cognitive outcomes. The authors also questioned the primacy of experiences in the first 3 years of life. Data from a sample of 700 first graders whose experiences in the home and in child care or school were evaluated since early infancy revealed that the cumulative quality of the child-rearing environment was related to attention and memory but not to planning and that the quality of the family environment was more strongly associated with outcomes than was the quality of child care and of school. The quality of both children's early (6 through 36 months) and later (54 months and first grade) environments predicted performance on the attention and memory tasks.     

An extended comparator hypothesis account of superconditioning

Three conditioned taste aversion experiments with rats investigated superconditioning. In each experiment, alternate exposures of 2 flavor compounds with a common element (i.e., AB/AS) were administered to establish an inhibitory relationship between the 2 unique elements, B and S, and prior to testing, S was paired with lithium chloride (LiCl). In Experiment 1, pairings of a neutral cue (X) with S in compound with B after the AB/AS exposures resulted in superconditioning between X and S. Extinction of the common element (A) just before the S-LiCl pairing attenuated both the inhibitory relationship between B and S (Experiment 2) and superconditioning between X and S (Experiment 3). These observations suggest that superconditioning consists of enhanced performance rather than enhanced associative acquisition.     

Temporal coding in conditioned inhibition: analysis of associative structure of inhibition

Two experiments with rats as subjects were conducted to investigate the associative structure of temporal control of conditioned inhibition through posttraining manipulation of the training excitor-unconditioned stimulus (US) temporal relationship. Experiment 1 found that following simultaneous Pavlovian inhibition training (i.e., A --> US/XA-no US) in which a conditioned stimulus (CS A) was established as a delay excitor, maximal inhibition was observed on a summation test when CS X was compounded with a delay transfer CS. Furthermore, posttraining shifts in the A-US temporal relationship from delay to trace resulted in maximal inhibition of a trace transfer CS. Experiment 2 found complementary results to Experiment 1 with an A-US posttraining shift from serial to simultaneous. These results suggest that temporal control of inhibition is mediated by the training excitor-US temporal relationship.     

Dissociable neural systems for recognizing emotions

This study tested the hypothesis that the recognition of emotions would draw upon anatomically separable brain regions, depending on whether the stimuli were static or explicitly conveyed information regarding actions. We investigated the hypothesis in a rare subject with extensive bilateral brain lesions, patient B., by administering tasks that assessed recognition and naming of emotions from visual and verbal stimuli, some of which depicted actions and some of which did not. B. could not recognize any primary emotion other than happiness, when emotions were shown as static images or given as single verbal labels. By contrast, with the notable exception of disgust, he correctly recognized primary emotions from dynamic displays of facial expressions as well as from stories that described actions. Our findings are consistent with the idea that information about actions is processed in occipitoparietal and dorsal frontal cortices, all of which are intact in B.'s brain. Such information subsequently would be linked to knowledge about emotions that depends on structures mapping somatic states, many of which are also intact in B.'s brain. However, one of these somatosensory structures, the insula, is bilaterally damaged, perhaps accounting for B.'s uniformly impaired recognition of disgust (from both static and action stimuli). Other structures that are damaged in B.'s brain, including bilateral inferior and anterior temporal lobe and medial frontal cortices, appear to be critical for linking perception of static stimuli to recognition of emotions. Thus the retrieval of knowledge regarding emotions draws upon widely distributed and partly distinct sets of neural structures, depending on the attributes of the stimulus.     

Hindsight bias: how knowledge and heuristics affect our reconstruction of the past

Once people know the outcome of an event, they tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight. Although typically considered to be a robust phenomenon, this hindsight bias is subject to moderating circumstances. In their meta-analysis, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) observed that the more experience people have with the task under consideration, the smaller is the resulting hindsight bias. This observation is one benchmark against which the explanatory power of process models of hindsight bias can be measured. Therefore, we used it to put the recently proposed RAFT model (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) to another test. Our findings were consistent with the "expertise effect." Specifically, we observed-using computer simulations of the RAFT model-that the more comprehensive people's knowledge is in foresight, the smaller is their hindsight bias. In addition, we made two counterintuitive observations: First, the relation between foresight knowledge and hindsight bias appears to be independent of how knowledge is processed. Second, even if foresight knowledge is false, it can reduce hindsight bias. We conclude with a discussion of the functional value of hindsight bias.     

Circadian phase-shifted rats show normal acquisition but impaired long-term retention of place information in the water task

It is thought that circadian rhythms may influence learning and memory processes. However, research supporting this view does not dissociate a mnemonic impairment from other performance deficits. Furthermore, published reports do not specify the type of memory system influenced by the circadian system. The present study assessed the effects of phase shifting on acquisition and expression of place navigation in the water maze, a task sensitive to hippocampal dysfunction. The results showed that phase-shifting circadian rhythms in rats impaired the expression of place information on a retention test but not initial acquisition or encoding of place information. These results suggest that disruption of circadian rhythms may impair consolidation of previously encoded hippocampal place information.     

Is a picture worth a thousand words? Evidence from concept definitions by patients with semantic dementia

Nine patients with semantic dementia (the temporal lobe variant of frontotemporal dementia) were asked to define concrete concepts either from presentation of a picture of the object or from its spoken name. As expected, the patients with the most severe semantic impairment produced the least detailed definitions, and the quality of the definitions overall was significantly related to concept familiarity. Further analyses of the definitions were designed to assess two key theoretical aspects of semantic organization. (i) Do objects and their corresponding names activate conceptual information in two neuroanatomically separable (modality-specific) semantic systems? If so, then-apart from any expected commonality in performance attributable to factors such as concept familiarity-one would not predict striking item-specific similarities in a patient's picture- and word-elicited definitions. (ii) Do sensory/perceptual features and more associative/functional attributes of conceptual knowledge form two neuroanatomically separable subsystems? If so, then one would predict significant dissociations in the prominence of these two types of information in the patients' definitions. The results lead us to favor a model of the semantic system that is divided by attribute type but not by modality.